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Abstract   
The considerable growth in world population represents a constantly increasing 
demand for electronic services.  The fast development of internet services and 
communication methods provide a promising communication environment to be 
used for human interaction. However, data transmitted through this extensive 
communication environment are often exposed to the threat of attackers, and 
therefore, they should be well protected against unauthorized access of intruders by 
utilizing reliable, firmly established security systems. Over many years 
cryptography was being used to ensure the security and authentication of data being 
exchanged among clients in different communication networks. The two major 
public key cryptosystems commonly considered as reliable and trustworthy for 
security and authentication purposes are RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems 
ECC. RSA and ECC algorithms are currently used to secure and authenticate 
information stored in hardware devices or transferred throughout networks.  
In future years, IoT hardware devices are expected to play a vital role in any 
communication environment. These hardware devices can be locally used to 
organise a specific location like smart home. They can also provide communication 
through a wide area network with data servers by using internet technique. In both 
ways IoT devices use and transfer information that may be confidential and 
personal like medical records and bank accounts details.  The small size and limited 
resources of these IoT devices will restrict the choices of designers who try to work 
out efficient mechanisms to secure and authenticate information stored or 
transferred through these devices. One of the solutions suggested by experts is the 
use of RSA and ECC as protective techniques. 
 In this thesis, I focus on examining the suitability and reliability of the current RSA 
and elliptic curve authentication techniques implemented on small devices with 
limited power. One of the security risks RSA and ECC may encounter are fault 
attacks. The aim of fault attacks is to inject faults inside hardware devices like IoT 
in order to retrieve the secret information stored inside these devices through the 
faults generated in their computations. I consider an IoT device as an example of a 
hardware device of small size and limited power. Developers of IoT hardware 
devices usually try to protect their devices from all risks which threaten the 




to program and update their devices. In this thesis, I will concentrate on the security 
risks against hardware devices which threaten the software used to program these 
devices by proposing various forms of fault attacks against them.  I propose a 
factoring attack and a retrieve secret key attack against RSA cryptosystems, and a 
fault point attack against elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC), which are used to 
secure hardware devices. The attacks proposed in this research work are based on 
the concept of safe error attack. The three fault attacks proposed here target the 
software used to program and update EEPROM devices inside the hardware devices 
through injecting faults in the hardware devices by modifying cryptography 
algorithms.   
I demonstrate the security risks against IoT hardware devices through a number of 
steps. Firstly, I carry out a full investigation of previous research projects that 
focused on fault attacks against hardware devices that use RSA and ECC to secure 
them. Secondly, I build an implementation platform by using Intel (R) Core (TM) 
i7-4500 CPU 2.4 GHZ with 8 GB RAM as a hardware platform and Windows 7 as 
the operating system and Maple software to implement the proposed attacks. 
Thirdly, the full review I have made of EEPROM devices support the concept I 
have suggested in this thesis, namely that the hardware device may be attacked by 
means of targeting the software used to program EEPROM inside the hardware 
device. I utilize this basic concept to get control over EEPROM inside the hardware 
device, and then modify the original cryptography algorithm stored in EEPROM 
after it is loaded in the RAM of the same device by injecting a fault value and using 
it instead of the correct value in the computation in order to deduce the secret 
information in view of the fault result. Furthermore, I eliminate the generated fault 
result in order to render any countermeasures, used to check free-error procedures, 
quite useless. Finally, I verify that my proposed attacks can be applied on hardware 
devices with limited resources by implementing all the attacks suggested in this 
research work on Arduino Mega2560 with Microcontroller ATmega2560, Flash 
Memory 256 KB of which 8 KB are used by the bootloader (firmware), 
SRAM 8KB and EEPROM 4KB as a hardware platform and MATLAB 2017b 
as a software platform. 
 In addition, I provide a short comparison between Maple and MATLAB 




this comparison, I recommend Maple to be used in this operation as it is more 
powerful than MATLAB when implementing RSA algorithms with high numbers 
3072 bits long digits or implementing ECC algorithms with high numbers 384 bits 
long digits.   
The main contribution of this research work is that it offers, for the first time, a fault 
attack which targets the software used to program an EEPROM by injecting an error 
inside the hardware device through modifying the cryptography algorithm stored in 
EEPROM inside the hardware device. Furthermore, the concept of safe error is 
improved as I eliminate the fault result, I generated so that the attacks proposed here 
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Public key cryptography systems especially RSA and ECC were being used for the 
protection of the data stored in hardware devices for many years and they are still 
being used until now. In this thesis, IoT devices have been taken as an example of 
hardware devices with small size and limited resources.  
IoT represents a future worldwide information network system that will be used to 
promote advanced technological activities and services. This information network 
will make use of numerous instruments such as sensors, actuators, RFID tags or 
mobile devices for the purpose of sensing, tracing, detecting and gathering data 
about the user’s environment [YZV 2014]. 
The widespread deployment of IoT has a positive impact on everyday human life. 
It enhances human interaction with the natural and social environment. It increases 
our interest in other people and objects.  Developing efficient applications for the 
IoT is generally considered a difficult and complicated task for several reasons: 
 (i) The complex nature of distributed computing. 
 (ii) The absence of any basic principles or commonly acceptable guidelines that 
control the process of low-level communication or facilitate high level 
implementation. 
(iii) The lack of a unified programming language and diversity in communication 
protocols.  
These complications have led IoT experts to consider developing new techniques 
that can provide proper solutions to the above-mentioned difficulties [ARC 2018, 
p. 8]. Cisco considers that IoT will grow to nearly 50 billion installed units by 2020 
[Eva 2011].  
Bashir in [BM 2018] considers that IoT architecture consists of three layers [MJ 
2015], namely physical/perception layer, network layer and application layer. The 
physical or perception layer has sensors for collecting data from the environment. 
It senses physical parameters and transmits this accumulated data to other smart 
objects. Low energy communication protocols and technologies such as IEEE 
802.15.4 [IEEE 802 2011], ZigBee [ZigBee 2006], ISA 100.1a [ISA 2009] and 




objects. The network layer consists of low-power protocols such as RPL (Routing 
Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks) [Win 2012] for interchange of data 
with other IoT nodes.  
The application layer consists of IoT middleware and includes various applications 
like (smart cities, industries, transportation, etc) in which IoT information network 
can be employed. Some protocols used at the application layer include CoAP 
(Constrained Application Protocol) [BCS 2012], MQTT (Message Queue 
Telemetry Transport) [Loc 2010] and AMQP (Advanced Message Queuing 
Protocol) [AMQP 2012]. These protocols are specially designed for resource 
constrained networks like IoT. 
1.2 Example Application 
The Internet of Things (IoT) plays a vital role in modern societies. It covers many 
areas of human daily life and activities such as medical services, transportation, 
household appliances, entertainments, sports, etc. Figure 1.1 demonstrates scenario 
1 of fault injection attack proposed in this thesis.           
 
                                                                                    
 
 





                                         
 
Figure 1.1 Scenario 1 of fault injection attack 
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In scenario 1 a sender sends a message to the receiver but for authentication purpose 
he will sign it. Therefore, he will send his message to the signature device so a 
signature will be added to the message. The attacker who has an access to the 
signature device will try to retrieve the secret components of this device. To achieve 
his goal, the attacker will inject a fault in the computations of the signature 
algorithm, and by using this fault result he will factorize modulus n of RSA 
cryptography systems. Then he will use the secret components p and q to sign a 
new message and send it instead of the sender’s message. The verification device 
will verify the message as the attacker will use the same secret components of the 
sender. Finally, the receiver will receive a verified message from the attacker 
instead of the sender.  
 
                                                                   
 
 




                                                    
 
Figure 1.2 Scenario 2 of Fault Injection Attack 
Figure 1.2 demonstrates scenario 2 of the fault injection attack proposed in this 
thesis.  In scenario 2 a sender wants to send an encrypted message to the receiver. 
Therefore, he will send the message to the encryption device. The message will be 
encrypted by using the public key components of the receiver. Then the message 
will be sent to the decryption device on the other side. The attacker who has an 
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access to the decryption device will try to retrieve the secret components of this 
device. The attacker will inject a fault in the computation of decryption algorithm 
and by using this fault result he will retrieve the components of the secret key of 
cryptography systems. Then he will use the secret key components to decrypt the 
message he gets and any other message he gets in the future. Finally, the decryption 
device will decrypt the message and send it to the receiver. 
I have used Internet of Things (IoT) devices to implement my proposed attacks on 
them. Internet of Things (IoT) includes a big number of smart devices that can swap 
sensed data by using online services. Smart devices can collect healthcare 
information about human beings and send them to a health center. Since such 
healthcare information may be very confidential or crucial, the process of 
transferring data must be secured. Signature-based schemes are one of the 
techniques which can be used to secure this communication process. Smart devices 
need a special type of signature-based schemes with lightweight calculations 
because these devices have restricted resources. 
Mughal et.al in [MLUUM 2018] demonstrate a light-weight reduced complicated 
digital signature algorithm for transferring secure data between smart devices in 
human centred IoT. Mughal and his fellow researchers have utilized less wide 
operations to accomplish signature and verification processes. They have also 
presented multiple options in the choice of the parameter to utilize a signature 
verification pair of expressions at specific index to ensure the security of critical 
documents. They claim that their approach improves the security level against 
traffic analysis attacks. To test the efficiency of their technique, they have subjected 
their scheme and a number of existing digital signature schemes to an experimental 
operation. The results show the superiority of their scheme to other existing 
schemes. 
1.3 Problem Overview 
The main objective of this research work is to examine the suitability of current 
RSA and elliptic curve security techniques implemented on small devices with 
limited resources by highlighting the security risks that threaten these hardware 
devices through the software used to program and control them rather than their 
hardware components. Most designers of hardware devices concentrate on 




against fault and side-channel attacks, yet they do not pay due attention to software 
attacks against their devices. This issue is gaining more attention in consequence of 
the fast development of IoT devices and the highly important and confidential 
information that is stored in them or interchanged between them. Most IoT devices 
such as mobile phones, WSN nodes etc. can be reprogrammed and updated through 
wired or wireless connections. If an intruder has the opportunity to get control over 
the software that is used to program or update these devices, then that may threaten 
all the information inside them. Therefore, the research question will be  
Research Question: How can a fault attack utilizing software used to program 
EEPROM threaten hardware devices like IoT devices? 
Answer: To answer this question I propose new fault attacks against two 
cryptosystems RSA and ECC by using the technique of safe error fault attack and 
the software used to program EEPROM where algorithms of these cryptosystems 
are stored. The new proposed fault attacks will warn designers of hardware devices 
of the security risks their devices may face on the programming level.   
1.4 Thesis Aims and Significance 
The aims of this thesis can be summarized into the following: 
• Investigating the security of hardware devices as far as the software used 
to program them is concerned. 
According to chapter 2 (sections 2.5.2 and 2.7.1.1) and chapter 3 (sections 
3.4.1, 3.4.4 and 3.4.5) of this thesis there were attempts to apply fault attacks 
against hardware devices by targeting the software used to program them. 
However, such attacks were very limited and constrained as attackers 
focused more on the hardware level than the software level. 
• Exploring any attempts to inject faults in cryptography algorithms stored 
in EEPROM by utilizing the software used to program the EEPROM 
No one has tried this approach yet. The researchers tried to introduce a 
hardware fault by changing register values or memory locations. However, 
some researchers try to utilize the software level when attacking hardware 
devices but they usually target the processing stage of a program by making 




• Examining the possibility of the process of injecting a fault in 
cryptography algorithm stored in EEPROM by utilizing the software used 
to program the EEPROM. 
According to the analyses on EEPROM explicated in chapter 3 of this 
research work, this process is possible. This conclusion is based on the first 
concept in section 3.5 which states that “a specific portion of EEPROM 
memory devices can be reprogrammed without any need to remove the 
EEPROM from its original position. The reprogamming process can be 
achieved without resort to erasing all memory cells [Lan 2015, chap. 6]. 
The significance of this research lies in the fact that it proposes, for the first time, a 
fault attack against two public key cryptosystems RSA and Elliptic Curve through 
attacking the software used to program EEPROM. The proposed fault attacks reveal 
the security risks that could threaten hardware devices through the software used to 
program and update them. The attacker may try a connection with a victim hardware 
device through wired or wireless connection depending on the physical 
environment.   In either case he can use a suitable software to deal with hardware 
devices to get the information he wants. The victim hardware devices may be an 
IoT device which has critical information like bank accounts or any kind of 
important personal or confidential information. 
1.5 Thesis Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis may be summarized as follows: 
1. I built a programming platform to implement two public key systems (RSA and 
Elliptic Curve) by using Maple 2017. I used this software platform to analyse the 
procedures of these cryptographic systems. 
2. I studied and analysed attacks against RSA and Elliptic Curve by reviewing 
previous related work. 
3. I reviewed existing literature on EEPROM hardware devices to achieve the 
second and third aims of this thesis.  
4. I proposed two new fault attacks against RSA cryptosystems to highlight security 
issues against hardware devices through the software used to program them. The 
first one was the fault factorizing attack (FF) which factorized the RSA modulus by 




proposed a retrieve secret key (RSK) attack which was able to retrieve the secret 
key d by applying a fault attack on both versions of Protected Montgomery Ladder 
RSA: “Left-to-Right” and “Right-to-Left” algorithms. 
5.  I implemented the two attacks FF and RSK by using Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-
4500 CPU 2.4 GHZ with 8 GB RAM as a hardware platform and Windows 7 as the 
operating system. Maple 2017 was chosen as the software platform as it contains a 
cryptography package designed for cryptographic arithmetic operations. 
6. I proposed a fault point attack on six scalar multiplications algorithms of ECC 
which include both versions “Left-to-Right” and “Right-to-Left” of Montgomery, 
Coron and Joye algorithms. The fault attack proposed is used to demonstrate 
security issues against hardware devices through software used to program them. 
7. I also made a comparison between General Weierstrass and Montgomery Elliptic 
Curves equations. I used the General Weierstrass Elliptic Curves equations because 
they compute the two coordinates x and y of the point in the same step.  
8. I implemented a fault point attack on six ECC algorithms by using Intel (R) Core 
(TM) i7-4500 CPU 2.4 GHZ with 8 GB RAM as a hardware platform and Windows 
7 as the operating system. I selected Maple 2017 as a software platform because it 
contains a cryptography package designed for cryptographic computation 
operations. 
9. I complemented the implementation of all attack algorithms against RSA and 
ECC by using Arduino Mega2560 hardware. The total number of attack algorithms 
which had been implemented were ten: four against RSA algorithms and six against 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) algorithms.  
10. All the fault attacks I proposed inject a fault in the computations of a 
cryptography algorithm stored in EEPROM after it is loaded in the RAM of the 
same hardware device by modifying the original algorithm through utilizing the 
software used to program EEPROM. I used the fault result generated to retrieve the 
secret key. 
11. I improved the efficacy of safe error attack by eliminating the fault result I have 
generated. Therefore, any test-free procedures cannot detect my proposed fault 




1.6 Chapter Summary 
The thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
 Chapter 1 provides a background of IoT devices by highlighting the impact of their 
low resources features and EEPROM circuits used inside them on their information 
security. It also presents an IoT application example, followed by a thorough 
discussion of the thesis problem. Then, the thesis aims and significance are 
discussed. Next, the thesis contributions are clarified. Finally, the chapter summary 
of the thesis is presented in section 1.6. 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the RSA and ECC public key 
cryptosystems. It also refers to the related research works that deal with fault attacks 
against these public key cryptosystems including physical types of fault attacks and 
fault attack goals. This chapter also offers a review of fault attacks against RSA, 
ECC and their countermeasures. 
Chapter 3 provides a review of EEPROM including EEPROM architecture, 
EEPROM programming and attacks on EEPROM memory devices.  
Chapter 4 presents two fault attacks proposed against RSA cryptosystems. I propose 
the fault factoring attack (FF) which factorizes the RSA modulus by applying a fault 
attack on two RSA-CRT Signature Garner’s algorithms. The first one is protected 
by Modified Shamir’s Countermeasure and the second one is protected by 
Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure. I also propose a retrieve secret key (RSK) 
attack which can retrieve the secret key d by applying a fault attack on both 
Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA versions “Left-to-Right” and “Right-to-Left” 
algorithms. All attack algorithms proposed in this chapter are implemented using 
Maple software. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates the proposed fault point attacks on both versions “Left-to-
Right” and “Right-to-Left” of Montgomery, Coron and Joye algorithms. It also 
includes a comparison between General Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and 
Montgomery Elliptic Curves equations. All attack algorithms proposed in this 




Chapter 6 describes the implementation examples of ten attack algorithms proposed 
in chapters four and five against RSA and ECC cryptosystems by using Arduino 
Mega2560 hardware and MATLAB 2017b as a software platform. 

























Chapter Two Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter includes numerous references to related literature for the sake of 
comparison and contrast, and in order to enrich this thesis with expert ideas, 
techniques and approaches used in previous research projects.   
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Triangular Fuzzy Number TFN 
A triangular fuzzy number [ABKA 2017] denoted by M=<m, α, β> has the 
membership function 










           𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚−∝< 𝑥 < 𝑚




          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 < 𝑥 < 𝑚 + 𝛽
0                 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 𝑚 + 𝛽
 
The point m, with membership function grade of 1 is called the mean value while 
α and β are the left-hand and the right-hand spreads of M respectively. 
2.2.2 Residue Number System (RNS) 
An RNS [SS 2017] base B defines a set of L relatively prime base components m1, 
m2, …, mL called “moduli.”. Each base is linked with a corresponding range M, 





Any integer X ϵ [0,M-1] has a unique RNS representation ?⃗? = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝐿} =
 {〈𝑋〉𝑚1 , 〈𝑋〉𝑚2 , … , 〈𝑋〉𝑚𝐿  }, where 〈𝑋〉𝑚𝑖 denotes the operation X mod mi. 
2.2.3 Side-Channel attacks 
This kind of attacks use monitoring of changes which happen to the physical 
parameters, such as calculation of timings or power utilisation, which are analysed 
utilizing statistical tools to infer links between physical measurements and internal 





2.2.4 Differential Fault Analysis DFA 
DFA is a specific physical attack that compares the outcomes of a correct 
calculation to one faulty outcome which has been made by an attacker at a particular 
time, in order to deduce information about the secret key bits. [LCFS 2017]. 
2.2.5 Differential power analysis DPA 
DPA which is proposed by Kocher et al. [KJJ 1999] is a kind of extensively used 
side-channel attack that effectively recovers the secret key from several (normally 
noisy) power utilisation measurements. [WYSLGG 2018]. 
2.2.6 Simple power analysis SPA 
SPA provides information about a cryptography system by inspecting a single 
power trace. SPA can retrieve two types of information. SPA high level can 
recognize various instructions or block of instructions that are executed on the 
device. On the other hand, the lower level of SPA can retrieve the values of the 
operands included in each elementary instruction specifically for load and store 
operations, when this data is read from or written to the bus. [CMW 2014]. 
2.3 Public key Cryptosystems 
2.3.1 RSA Cryptosystems 
I present in this section some research papers which deal with the latest 
developments that have been made on RSA algorithms to make them more resistant 
to side-channel and fault attacks. These recent papers confirm that RSA algorithms 
are still considered as important techniques that can be effectively used to secure 
multiple applications like IoT devices. These papers can be summarized as follows: 
Abdullah et al. in [ABKA 2017] propose RSA algorithm that depends on fuzzy set 
theory and uses Triangular Fuzzy Number TFN to represent encryption and 
decryption texts. The benefit of using TFN mathematical functions in encrypting 
plaintext and decrypting cipher text is to create difficulty to the attacker when 
dealing with these cryptosystems. The authors claim in their paper that the same 
concept can be applied on other cryptosystems. 
Schinianakis and Stouraitis in [SS 2017, chap. 12], demonstrate how Residue 
Number System (RNS) can be used to enhance the security of public-key 




Residue Number System RNS which is used in RSA and ECC cryptography 
systems are based on the research efforts of Bigou and Tisserand [BT 2015]. 
 The First, they explain the meaning of RNS and provide all mathematical 
background required to deal with this number system. Then they illustrate a 
complete RNS Montgomery modular multiplication RNSMMM algorithm which is 
based on utilizing RNS in his mathematical computations. Finally, they implement 
the RNSMMM in both RSA and ECC cryptography schemas and show how they 
will enhance their resistance against fault attacks as the modulus set is changed.  
2.3.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC)   
I present in this section some research papers which deal with the latest 
improvements that have been made on ECC algorithms to make them more resistant 
to side- channel and fault attacks. These recent papers state that ECC cryptosystems 
can still be used to secure multiple applications like IoT devices. These papers can 
be summarized as follows: 
Chen in [Che 2017] proposes an effective hardware architecture for Montgomery 
powering ladder (MPL) protected by a countermeasure that utilizes a mix of 
sequence masking (SM), exponent splitting (ES) and point randomization (PR) [He 
2013]. He also implements his proposed hardware architecture on FPGA. The SM 
technique [FV 2006] appends a mask to the base point P to create a masked MPL. 
The ES technique [CJ 2001] splits the scalar d into two parts by using a random 
number, so that dP will be the result of (rP + (d-r)P). The PR is the first 
countermeasure proposed by Coron [Cor 1999]. In this technique, the 
representation of the secret exponent d is changed to 𝑑′ = 𝑑 + 𝑘#𝜀, where k is a 
random number and #𝜀 is number of all points on the curve E. The author shows 
that simple power, computation safe-error and doubling attacks have no effect on 
MPL. However, relative doubling, memory safe-error and comparative power 
analysis attacks are effective on MPL. Nevertheless, the author states that MPL, 
when protected by SM, ES and PR, can resist SCAs, relative doubling, comparative 
power analysis, and high-order attacks. 
Huang in [Hua 2017] develops some scalar multiplication algorithms based on an 
elevated binary number system (EBNS) proposed by him to enhance their resistance 
against side-channel attacks. The EBNS is a number system similar to the binary 




system. The author studies two scalar multiplication algorithms which are doubling-
and-add always and Montgomery powering ladder (MPL) algorithms. He shows 
that doubling-and-add always algorithm is vulnerable to doubling [FV 2003] and 
computation safe-error [SKLM 2001] attacks. He also demonstrates that MPL 
algorithm is vulnerable to relative doubling [YKMH 2006] and memory safe-error 
[YJ 2000] attacks. The author also investigates some countermeasures like 
exponent splitting [CJRR 1999] and [FV 2006], masked MPL [FV 2006] and 
sequence masking [Cor 1999]. He discusses the level of protection that each 
countermeasure can provide and the kinds of attacks that can affect them. Then, he 
proposes one left-to-right and five right-to-left algorithms. Their mathematical 
computations depend on EBNS. The proposed algorithms have the same level of 
security compared with other existing algorithms and a higher calculation 
efficiency. He claims that one of his proposed right-to-left algorithms is not affected 
by Park’s fault attack [PBMCKH 2009]. He also extended all above algorithms to 
deal with elevated high radix number system. The elevated high radix number 
system is an extension of ENBS as its base is integer m and its set is {1,2,…,m}. 
He presents a detailed discussion about the security and efficiency of his proposed 
algorithms confirming that they provide a significant improvement in security and 
performance levels compared with other existing algorithms.   
Lalonde in [Lal 2017] builds a platform to analyse and test side-channel attacks 
against an extensive range of cryptosystems to highlight vulnerabilities of 
cryptographic hardware on various levels. The author implements a successful 
differential power analysis against AES-128. He also examines a range of scalar 
multiplication algorithms in terms of security and efficiency.  He states that m-ary 
Joye [Joy 2009a] algorithm is more powerful than Montgomery’s Ladder [JY 2002] 
as it is regular and can resist timing, computation and memory safe-error attacks. 
Furthermore, m-ary Joe algorithm resists power analysis.  
2.4 Fault Attacks on Public Key Cryptosystem 
Fault attacks are a kind of attacks that try to inject a fault into the computation of a 
cryptographic device to get fault result which may help an attacker to retrieve 
private information. A physical type of fault injection, elementary fault properties, 




2.4.1 Physical Types of Fault Attacks 
A fault attack is classified as an active attack. In this kind of attacks two categories 
of fault injection techniques can be identified. The first one is the global fault 
injection techniques which use low cost equipment and create troubles on global 
parameters like power supply, voltage, etc. The attacker who uses the global 
techniques needs to perform several injections to get the required fault. However, 
the second one is the local fault injection techniques which are more expensive as 
they use high cost equipment but they are more precise in identifying fault location 
[PBR 2017].           
Various techniques are used to inject a fault into cryptographic devices. Some of 
them are described below. 
2.4.1.1 Below-Powering 
One of the low-cost fault injection methods is the underpowering of a device power 
[KSV 2013, p. 2296]. The fault obtained in such kind of fault injection has no 
precise time. Therefore, faults occur uniformly throughout the calculations, and the 
attacker must have the ability to eliminate any unwanted result that does not support 
his goal. 
Power spikes [KK 1999], [BGV 2011] and [ABFHS 2002] is another method of 
inducing a fault in the computation by changing power of a device. This kind of 
fault, which tampers with the power supply of the device, is more precise. Power 
spikes may cause a memory fault or a skip of an instruction when a processor 
executes a program. However, it is essential for the attacker who tries this kind of 
fault injection to have access to the power supply of a device.    
2.4.1.2 Clock Faults 
A fault can be generated by supplying the devices with clock signals that contain 
one or several pulses that are much shorter than the standard clock signal [KSV 
2013, p. 2296]. This kind of fault may cause a processor to overlap by executing 
two instructions or storing a wrong data in a memory location or register [KK 1999]. 
This kind of fault cannot be introduced in a device that uses an internal clock.  
2.4.1.3 Temperature Variation 
Increasing or reducing temperature out of a specific range of temperatures may 




fault results [Pet 1997] and [Sko 2002]. This kind of fault is used to alter data stored 
in a memory location but cannot attack a specific portion of stored data [KSV 2013, 
p. 2296].  
2.4.1.4 Optical Fault 
A hardware chip exposure to an intense light source can cause optical faults [KSV 
2013, p. 2296]. The intense light source may be a photo flash or a laser beam [SA 
2002]. A focused laser beam can cause a change in transistors state which means a 
single bit in memory location can set or reset. The attacker can target the chip on 
either the front side or back side. The location of the transistors is on the front side, 
but since they are protected by metal layers, it is better to attack the back side of the 
device. However, the attack on the backside needs a proper wavelength of the laser 
beam that confirms sufficient breakthrough depth to be used. Another optical attack 
is introduced by Skorobogatov in [Sko 2009]. His optical attack is based on the use 
of a laser beam for the purpose of changing an EEPROM cell value. 
2.4.1.5 Electromagnetic Fault 
A fault can appear in function of a hardware chip or a change in memory content in 
case of the hardware chip exposure to external electromagnetic (EM) field [KSV 
2013, p. 2296]. This fault can cause a single bit fault [QS 2002]. The cheap way to 
induce this kind of fault is by using a gas lighter [SH 2007]. 
2.4.2 Fault Attacks Goals 
The main component which is targeted by fault attacks in a hardware configuration 
is the generic processor. According to the literature [KSV 2013, p. 2297], the four 
main parts of the generic processor targeted by fault attacks are inputs, data, storage 
and control parts. 
2.4.2.1 Fault Attacks on Input Parameters 
A fault result can be obtained if a fault input is supplied to computation in a device 
[Sei 2005], [BCCC 2006], [KIK 2008], [KBPQ 2008] and [BCG 2010]. This kind 
of fault is very precise, but it depends on the device and its uses. One has to consider 
that this kind of fault will fail in case the device is programmed to test and discover 





2.4.2.2 Fault Attacks on Data Processing Section 
A fault can be introduced during computations performed by the device [BDL 
1997], [BMM 2000], [BOS 2006], [FLRV 2008], [JY 2002], [JQBD 1997], [KSQL 
2007], [PV 2006], [PBA 2010], [SM 2009], [SH 2008], [SM 2010] and [Wan 2004]. 
This kind of fault depends on the mathematical process performed by a device and 
the kind of cryptosystem implemented. The same effect can be obtained if the fault 
is introduced during the transfer operation of data, or stored in register or memory.  
2.4.2.3 Fault Attacks on Storage Section 
The storage part is more distinguishable than other parts of a hardware chip. 
Therefore, it is easier for an attacker to target this part. The fault in a volatile storage 
can change the intermediate results of calculations. A fault in a nonvolatile storage 
can alter system parameter [KSV 2013, p. 2297].   
2.4.2.4 Fault Attacks on Instruction Processing Section 
A fault attack can target the flow of program execution instead of the calculations 
performed by the device. In this kind of attack, the attacker targets the control part 
of the process [YJ 2000], [YMH 2002] and [WW 2005]. The attack will try to 
change the execution sequence of instructions or faults causing misconstruction of 
specific instructions. 
2.4.3 Summary 
In this section, I presented some of the physical techniques used to inject a fault in 
a hardware device such as below-powering, clock faults, temperature variation, 
optical fault and electromagnetic fault. These techniques were used to change the 
status of one or more of storage locations in memory or processor, and consequently 
causing an error in the computation’s operations performed by the hardware device. 
I also pointed out four main parts of generic processor which were mostly targeted 
by fault attacks, i.e. inputs, data, storage and control parts. 
2.5 Fault Attacks on RSA Cryptosystems 
RSA is one of the widely used public-key cryptosystems in securing systems as it 
can be used in both encryption and signature processes. A fault attack is one of the 
methods used to extract secret information of RSA cryptosystem. According to the 




attacks, tampering with the program flow fault attacks and safe-error fault attacks 
[KSV 2013, p. 2298]. 
2.5.1 Specific Algorithm Fault Attacks 
The fault attacks in this category are directed against a specific algorithm. RSA 
algorithm represents the most common target of fault attacks.  
2.5.1.1 RSA - CRT Algorithm 
Algorithm 2.1 represents the RSA-CRT signature using Garner’s algorithm 
protected by modified Shamir’s countermeasure [RG 2014, Alg. 10] of which the 
outline is presented in section 4.2.9. This algorithm has been targeted by fault 
attacks proposed in this thesis. All details concerning this algorithm and the fault 
attack proposed against it are given in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
 
Algorithm 2.1 RSA-CRT Signature Using Garner’s Algorithm Protected 
by Modified Shamir’s Countermeasure 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  p, q, d, 𝑖𝑞 ≡q
-1 mod p. 
INPUT by user:  message M.    
OUTPUT: The CRT signature scrt of message m or error. 
1. Choose a small random integer r. 
2. pr           p*r. 
3. qr           q*r. 
4. If pr ≢ 0 mod p or qr ≢ 0 (mod q) then return error. 
5. 𝑆𝑝𝑟            𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟). 
6. 𝑆𝑞𝑟            𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑟). 
7. if  𝑆𝑝𝑟 ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟) then return error. 
8. 𝑆𝑝            𝑆𝑝𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).         
9. 𝑆𝑞            𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞). 
10. 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡          𝑆𝑞 + 𝑞 ∗ [(i𝑞 ∗  (𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆𝑞) )(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)]. 
11. if 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡  ≢ 𝑆𝑝𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡  ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞) then return error. 
12. return S. 
  
Algorithm 2.2 represents the RSA-CRT signature with Garner’s algorithm 




in section 4.2.10. This algorithm which is proposed by Rauzy and Guilley [RG 
2014] represents a modification of the countermeasure suggested by Vigilant [Vig 
2008]. This algorithm has been targeted by fault attacks proposed in this thesis. All 
details concerning this algorithm and the fault attack proposed against it are given 
in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. 
 
Algorithm 2.2 RSA-CRT Signature with Garner’s Algorithm Protected by 
Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  p, q, dp, dq, 𝑖𝑞 ≡q
-1 mod p. 
INPUT by user:  message M.    
OUTPUT: Message M Singing result S ≡𝑀𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛, or a random value. 
1. Choose a small random integer r. 
2.   n                  p*q. 
3. 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ               𝑝 ∙  𝑟
2.   
4. 𝑖𝑝𝑟                       𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2). 
5. 𝑀𝑝                  𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
6. 𝐵𝑝                    𝑝 ∙  𝑖𝑝𝑟. 
7. 𝐴𝑝                   1 − 𝐵𝑝 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
8. 𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ             𝐴𝑝  ∙   𝑀𝑝 + 𝐵𝑝  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
9. 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ               𝑞 ∙  𝑟
2.   
10. 𝑖𝑞𝑟                 𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2). 
11. 𝑀𝑞                 𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
12. 𝐵𝑞                  𝑞 ∙  𝑖𝑞𝑟. 
13. 𝐴𝑞                    1 − 𝐵𝑞 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
14. 𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ               𝐴𝑞  ∙   𝑀𝑞 + 𝐵𝑞  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
15. 𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ                  𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
 𝑑𝑝 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ).    
16. 𝑆𝑝𝑟                      1 + 𝑑𝑝  ∙ 𝑟. 
17. 𝑐𝑝                     𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
18. 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ                  𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
 𝑑𝑝 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ).    
19. 𝑆𝑞𝑟                   1 + 𝑑𝑞  ∙ 𝑟. 




21. 𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ               𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ) ). 
22. 𝑆𝑟                     𝑆𝑞𝑟 + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑞𝑟)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ) ). 
23. 𝑐𝑠                     𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑟 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟
2). 
24. Return 𝑆 ≡   𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑞𝑐𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛). 
 
Other related research works are summarized below. 
Boneh et al. in [BDL 1997] present a fault attack which is implemented on several 
cryptosystems and makes use of hardware faults. They show that their attack can 
be implemented on cryptosystems use Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) like RSA 
and Rabin signature and can be extended to other systems with more faults. They 
state that the same idea can be applied on authentication schemas like Fiat Shamir 
and Schnorr identification protocols. They suggest error detection bits as a 
countermeasure to prevent their attack and verify computation and protect internal 
storage.   
Joye et al. in [JLQ 1999] present some remarks on the security of cryptosystems 
which use CRT. Their results show that careless implementation of such 
cryptosystems could make them vulnerable. Their method improves Bellcore’s 
result published in [BDL 1997] as Bellcore’s method requires two signatures, one 
correct and one faulty, to retrieve the secret information. However, their method 
needs a one fault signature and known message which means their method is more 
efficient.  
The presence of faults in cryptosystems could be the result of applying active 
attacks on these systems by inducing errors in the behaviour of their computational 
hardware devices, for example, changing ROM content, EEPROM content 
updating [AK 1996], [AK 1997], [Gut 1996], [Koc 1996], [Pet 1997] and [Qui 
1997]. The main goal of Joye and his team is to show the importance of the cautious 
implementation of cryptosystems.  
Yen et al. in [YKM 2006] try a fault attack with only one fault induced in the 
computation phase to make RSA cryptosystem susceptible to factorising RSA 
modulus. They show that the two protocols suggested by [YKLM 2003] to protect 




Schmidt and Hutter in [SH 2007] present an optical and electromagnetic fault attack 
on the implementation of RSA with CRT. They inject a fault by using light beams 
which switch values in SRAM of a microcontroller and that leads to fault results in 
the calculation of RSA signature. The other scenario is to use spark gaps which 
induce high-voltage pulses that will generate a high electromagnetic field. This 
electromagnetic field will lead microcontroller to give fault results of RSA 
signature computation phase. They also apply their attack to three different 
decapsulation techniques. They mention that all attacks are implemented at low 
cost.   
Berzati et al. in [BCG 2008] present a fault injection attack which can defeat the 
secure implementation of RSA-CRT proposed by Ciet and Joye [CJ 2005a]. Their 
attack principle is injecting an error in one of the bytes that represent the sub 
signature value Sp related to prime p which is one of the factors of modulus n of 
RSA cryptosystems. They can retrieve secret exponent of 1024-bit modulus by 
using 13 fault signatures and with a probability of success of 50%. They can also 
improve the probability of success of their attack to 99% if they use 83 faulty 
signatures instead of 13.  They finally concluded that the countermeasure proposed 
to secure RSA-CRT signature is not secure.       
Trichina and Korkikyan in [TK 2010] describe two fault laser attacks on 32 bit 
ARM Cortex M3 uses RSA-CRT as a cryptosystem to protect its information. The 
laser attack is more accurate to targeting a specific area on a hardware device and 
changes a specific variable.  
Two conclusions can be drawn from the author’s experimental work. Firstly, their 
laser attack can be applied on a chip even if a complex system on chip (SOCs) is 
used and the kind of laser is a multi-layer metal technology front side laser.  
Secondly, the main effect of their laser attack is to change the flow of program 
execution by skipping instructions instead of changing values in hardware registers. 
A fault induced in the flow of the program can attack cryptosystems protected by a 
countermeasure depending on conditional instructions like modified Ciet-Joye 
scheme and modified Giraud scheme which are presented in [KQ 2007a] and 
improved in [KQ 2007b]. In view of these experiments, one can conculde that the  




The authors indicate that the attack equipment may have some limitations that must 
be taken into consideration when they design countermeasures to prevent this 
attack. The first limitation is the fact that the laser beam can only shoot twice on the 
same spot during the program execution. The second limitation is that the attacker 
cannot specify the time of attack according for two reasons: the recharge time of 
laser beam and the delay time between the trigger signal and the shot is the same 
for one run. Their experiment shows that their attack is feasible on undefended 32-
bit ARM Cortex M3. They also believe in protecting cryptosystems from laser 
attacks through applying countermeasures that include a combination of 
algorithmic-level software with hardware (shields, sensors, alternative logic styles). 
Brier et al. in [BNNT 2011] present a key-recovery fault attack against RSA-CRT 
signatures by injecting error on the value of RSA modulus n before implementing 
CRT instead of targeting one of the subdivisions of RSA-CRT Sp or Sq. This attack 
depends on orthogonal lattice techniques proposed by Nguyen and Stern [NS 1997] 
which is used to factorize RSA-CRT modulus n. The authors claim that they need 
five faulty signatures to make their attack succeed if they know the values of 
incorrect moduli for five different messages. However, they will need 45 faulty 
signatures to factorize RSA-CRT modulus n when they do not know the faulty 
moduli, and the faulty moduli differ from the correct one by only one byte or 
multiple bytes restricted to the least bytes only.  
Fouque et. al in [FGLTZ 2013] proposed a number of effective fault attacks against 
implementations of RSA-CRT signatures that utilize modular exponentiation 
depending on Montgomery scalar multiplication. These attacks can be operated on 
any padding function like randomized paddings and they were the first efficient 
fault attacks against RSA-PSS. The new proposed attacks depend on the 
supposition that a value of a small register can be forced to either zero, constant or 
with zero high order bits. Fouque and his team consider that these prototypes are 
quite naturalistic as these faults can be accomplished against many suggested 
hardware designs for RSA signatures. 
Kong et al. in [KZJSY 2017] proposed an attack against Lee’s improved RSA-CRT 
algorithm [LCC 2014]. Lee et al. in [LCC 2014] used modulus chaining method to 
protect RSA-CRT algorithm by ensuring that the three primes p, q and r are not 




Lee’s improved RSA-CRT algorithm. The first one injects a permanent fault in Spr, 
and as a result of this fault, they can factorize modulus n of RSA-CRT algorithm. 
The second attack injects a transient error in prime p, and by using the fault result 
generated by this error they can get the same result as in the first attack. However, 
the modulus chaining method used by Lee cannot prevent the two attacks 
mentioned above. 
All the fault attacks proposed in the research works discussed above depended on 
generating an error on the hardware level while the fault attacks proposed by this 
thesis target the software level. 
2.5.1.2 Modular Exponentiation Algorithms  
Algorithm 2.3 is the algorithm I have chosen to attack (which is known as Protected 
Montgomery Ladder RSA algorithm Left-to-Right [JY 2002, Fig. 9]). All details 
concerning this algorithm and the fault attack proposed against it are given in 
sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. 
Algorithm 2.3 Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA Left-to-Right Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  d = (dt, dt-1,… , d1)2, size of secret key 
t. 
INPUT by user:  message g, modulus n. 
OUTPUT: gd (mod n).   
1. R(0)         1, R(1)           g. 
2. For i from t to 1 do 
        2.1 b           ¬ di.            
        2.2 R(b)           (R(b) * R(di)) (mod n). 
        2.3 R(di)               R(di)
2(mod n) .     
 End for. 
3. Return R(0). 
 
Algorithm 2.4 represents Right-to-Left version of algorithm 2.3 which I have 
constructed by myself. All details concerning this algorithm and the fault attack 






Algorithm 2.4 Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA Right-to-Left Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  d = (dt, dt-1,… , d1)2, key size t. 
INPUT by user:  message g, modulus n. 
OUTPUT: gd (mod n). 
1. R(0)         1, R(1)          g. 
2. For i from 1 to t do 
        2.1 b           ¬ di .           
        2.2 R(b)               R(b)
2(mod n). 
        2.3 R(b)          R(b) * R(di) (mod n). 
 End for. 
3. Return R(0). 
 
Other related research works are summarized below. 
Berzati et al. in [BCG 2008] introduce a fault attack against modular 
exponentiation: "Right-To-Left" algorithm. The target of this attack is to recover 
the secret key d by using Differential Fault Analysis and injecting error in RSA 
modulus n. The authors present a theoretical analysis that shows their attack is 
efficient compared to the attacks published by [Sei 2005], [Mui 2006] and [BCCC 
2006]. They also use Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) implementation to 
demonstrate that their attack represents a real threat to RSA cryptosystem. 
Berzati et al. in [BCDG 2009] provide an improvement of previous attacking 
techniques published by [BCG 2008]. These techniques are based on modular 
attack exponentiation “Right-To-Left” algorithm. The authors in their modified 
attack overcome the problem of complexity of decomposing modular 
exponentiation “Left-To-Right” into fractional multiplications by adjusting the 
RSA modulus to a number with recognised factorisation. A full study of faulty 
prime numbers with a fixed size vindicated the fault model in this article. 
The fault attacks proposed in related research works outlined above depended on 
analysing processes (such as DFA), while the fault attacks proposed by this thesis 
depend on improving safe error attacks. The fault attacks proposed in the thesis 
generate an error in the computations of algorithms by using the software used to 




2.5.2 Tampering with the Program Flow of Fault Attacks 
Amiel et al. in [AVFM 2007] describe a new general attack which is a combination 
of side channel attack and fault attack. This new class of attacks allow an attacker 
to retrieve the secret key with a single power consumption curve. The attacker will 
inject a fault in the flow of program execution which makes the processor skip an 
instruction which assigns a value to one of the registers used in the program. 
Therefore, this register will set with zero value and the result which is calculated 
according to that value can easily be distinguished in power consumption curve. As 
a result, the secret key can be recover. The authors show practical results which 
prove that this attack is not only a theoretical threat. They state that the classical 
countermeasures cannot prevent their attack. Finally, they suggest possible ways to 
prevent their attack which are simple to apply and have no significant impact on the 
complexity of the original cryptosystem.  
Schmidt and Herbst in [SH 2008] present a fault attack on the square and multiply 
algorithm based on inducing a fault in the control flow. The attacker tries in this 
attack to change program flow computation by skipping a square operation. The 
faulty result obtained can indicate the value of an equivalent bit of exponent. The 
authors implemented their attack by using non-invasive spike attack and they 
showed the effects of different side channel analysis countermeasures on their 
attack. They used a low-cost equipment in their attack. 
Barenghi et al. in [BBPP 2009] describe a fault attack based on the effects of under 
power supplied to ARM general purpose CPU. The fault model is implemented on 
an ARM9 microprocessor with RSA cryptosystems. The authors show that 
decreasing the power of the ARM 9 CPU power supply will induce double faults. 
The first one will be a fault data since it appears with data load instruction from 
memory. The second fault will be swap instructions which differ with a single bit 
in their opcode in the flow of the program. The main advantages of this attack are 
its low cost and easy implementation. To prove the efficiency of the fault model, 
the authors suggest two attacks methods, Bellcore [BDL 1997] and the earth root 
extraction attacks [Sho 2001], to demonstrate practical implementation of the attack 





Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhyay in [BM 2017] improve the official differential 
fault analysis on the 2-bit branch predictor performance under the influence of 
faults. Their fault model is based on the ability of the attacker to introduce a bit-flip 
error into the private keystream. The result of their analysis demonstrates that 
differences of branch misses under the impact of fault can leak information about 
private key bits. The authors claim that this kind of attack can threaten RSA 
modular exponentiation and RSA-CRT algorithms. It can also threaten algorithms 
protected by a countermeasure which halts or randomizes the final result if a fault 
has been detected. This attack can be adjusted to attack processers with embedded 
soft-core by introducing practical errors through a skip instruction technique.   
2.5.3 Safe-Error Fault Attacks 
Yen and Joye in [YJ 2000] describe a fault attack based on the concept of safe error 
attack. In this kind of attack, the secret key bits leak depends on the information 
whether the device had a fault result or correct one after the fault is injected. This 
kind of attack cannot event prevent a check made before the output is delivered to 
another stage. The authors state that their proposed attack is more powerful as it has 
small computational complexity than other existing attacks. The primary target of 
this article is to show that a hardware error-based cryptanalysis cannot be prevented 
even if a check is made on the correctness of the outcomes. The authors advise the 
cryptosystems hardware designers to deal cautiously with each detail when 
improving the secure system.  
2.5.4 Summary 
In this section, I presented some fault attacks which targeted RSA cryptosystems. 
The fault attacks could be classified into three major types: a specific algorithm, 
tampering with the program flow and safe error. The aim of these attacks was to 
inject an error into the computation process and use the fault result to deduce the 
secret key which might be a key used in information encryption or signing a 
message. The two kinds of fault attacks which were related to the proposed fault in 
my thesis were fault attacks against specific algorithms and safe error fault attacks. 
I discussed some articles that presented fault attacks against specific algorithms like 
RSA-CRT and modular exponentiation. These articles suggested multiple ways to 
inject faults such as laser, light beams, spark gaps and other methods which differed 




EEPROM and changing the cryptography algorithm stored in it.  On the other hand, 
I discussed the safe error concept which was suggested by Yen and Joye [YJ 2000] 
as they tried to guess the secret key by checking the fault result of an injected error. 
I modified their concept in my research work and made an additional operation 
which eliminated the fault result after I deduced the secret key. This modification 
makes any countermeasure, using verification process to search for fault values in 
the computation process, quite useless.  
2.6 RSA Countermeasures against Fault Attack  
2.6.1 RSA Countermeasures against Fault Attack      
Aumüller et al. in [ABFHS 2002] show that the standard Bellcore fault attack is in 
principle feasible when using completely unprotected microcontrollers. Moreover, 
they also indicate that unskilled implementations of countermeasures are not always 
reliable. They again answer the question of Kaliski and Robshaw [KR 1997] and 
show that these attacks are indeed practical. Their investigation also reveals that 
one should test any conceivable countermeasures in reality against all possible 
attack scenarios before trusting them. This approach was specially made with their 
newly developed software countermeasures. 
Although their software countermeasure seems to be very promising, they are 
firmly convinced that cryptographic hardware should never be used without 
appropriate hardware countermeasures in combination with software 
countermeasures. As a result, they finish with the advice given by Kaliski and 
Robshaw [KR 1997] from the RSA Laboratories stating that good engineering 
practices in the design of secure hardware are essential.  
Kim and Quisquater in [KQ 2007a] claim that exponentiation algorithm suggesed 
by Fumaroli and Vigilant [FV 2006] is defeated by fault attack (FA), simple power 
analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). They also claim that the fault 
attack against the exponentiation algorithm injects a fault during the calculation of 
exponentiation and uses the fault result to deduce the secret key. Then, they propose 
a powerful countermeasure that can resist SPA, DPA and FA based on the concept 
of randomising all intermediate variables. 
Boscher et al. in [BNP 2007] suggest a modular exponentiation algorithm which 




Their algorithm is verified by a practical fault model. The authors’ algorithm differs 
from the classical modular exponentiation only by two additional modular 
multiplications. The main idea of their proposed algorithm is inserting some 
coherence test at the end of an algorithm to make it resistant to FA and SPA. 
Vigilant in [Vig 2008] presents a countermeasure against Bellcore attack. His 
proposed countermeasure is suitable to be implemented on devices with restricted 
resources which include: execution time, memory utilisation, personalisation 
management and code size. The countermeasure depends on the concept of 
inserting a random integer in the computation of intermediate variables used in 
modular exponentiation algorithm. 
Joye in [Joy 2009b] proposes a countermeasure which embeds the public key e in 
the verification of final signature result and the representation of the key object of 
RSA. In RSA-CRT mode, the key object can be obtained from the {p, q, 𝑑𝑝 ≡
𝑑(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 − 1), 𝑑𝑞 ≡ 𝑑(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 − 1), iq}. However, in the RSA-standard mode, 
the key object can be obtained from {N, d}. His countermeasure returns the final 
signature S if a verification process which depends on public key e is successful. 
The author claims that his proposed countermeasure is suitable for RSA 
cryptosystem applied in Java Cards. 
Coron et al. in [CGMPV 2010] investigate the fault resistance of Vigilant's 
proposed efficient way of implementing an RSA-CRT resistance against fault 
analysis [Vig 2008], and they show that it is not immune to fault injection. Indeed, 
they highlight two weaknesses which can help an attacker to recover the whole 
private key by using only one faulty signature. They also suggest some 
modifications with a negligible cost to improve the fault resistance of Vigilant’s 
scheme. Therefore the scheme, including modifications, remains suitable for 
embedded device constraints. 
Kim et al. in [KKHH 2011] made an investigation on countermeasures against 
simple power and fault attacks concerning security and efficiency. They found that 
the countermeasures they analysed are vulnerable to improved power and fault 
attacks. They claim that utilising checksums operations decreases the security of 




which is resistant to the power and fault attacks as it uses logical operations instead 
of arithmetic ones to check fault values in the RSA-CRT combination.  
Fournaris and Koufopavlou in [FK 2012] proposed a hardware architecture which 
is based on Montgomery modular exponentiation and multiplications which utilizes 
the basics of parallelism to provide a high level of efficiency in space and time 
complexity. They claim that their suggested hardware design is resistant to simple 
power and fault attack. They built a testing platform to test their hardware design. 
They also implemented their proposed hardware in FPGA technology.   
Rauzy and Guilley in [RG 2014] carried out an analytical study on existing 
countermeasures against fault injection attacks to understand how they work. The 
intermediate results they got can be summarized as follows. Firstly, all 
countermeasures they have studied had common features, but they optimize in 
different ways. Secondly, there is no conceptual distinction between experiment-
based and infected countermeasures and how either one can be converted to the 
other one. Thirdly, faults on data can represent a fault on the code (skipping 
instruction error). After considering the above intermediate results, they managed 
to improve the countermeasures they have studied through fixing Shamir's 
countermeasure (which is known to be insecure), enhancing Vigilant's 
countermeasure by reducing its nine tests into three, and thus achieving a higher 
security level, and they were able to produce an updated countermeasure which is 
resistant to an unspecified number of faults.   
Kim in [Kim 2017] proposes a countermeasure to protect RSA algorithms based on 
utilizing additive blinding technique. Additive blinding technique uses exponent or 
modulus blinding approaches. The blinding approach is based on using random 
variables to prevent an attacker from getting information about the parameters 
through using exponent or modulus blinding approaches. The author proves the 
efficiency of his proposed countermeasure by making security and performance 
analyses. He claims that his countermeasure is low cost and faster than other 
countermeasures that use multiplicative blinding. He also shows that his 
countermeasure is resistant to various power attacks and it can be used to improve 





According to the above literature, various forms of countermeasures were 
introduced by experts to protect RSA cryptosystems against fault attacks. The 
techniques used in these countermeasures could be summarized as follows: 
randomization of the initial values or intermediate variables used in the computation 
process, modification of modular exponentiation algorithm by inserting coherence 
tests, verification of final results by using public key e, and using logical checksums 
instead of numeric ones. All these techniques cannot prevent attacks proposed in 
this thesis. I started by injecting a fault into the computation algorithm used to 
encrypt or sign information which was stored in EEPROM and then I checked the 
value of the key used in the algorithm according to the injected fault. Finally, I 
eliminated the fault result I had generated, and therefore, any free error test 
procedures could not detect any error in the calculations. Furthermore, even 
randomizing variables could not undermine the proposed attacks in this thesis as 
the attacker would generate an intermediate fault result by replacing one of the 
components of the adding process by the fault value he injected. He would be able 
to deduce the secret value according to this fault result.  
2.7 Fault Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) 
The main attack against elliptic curve cryptosystems aims to recover the secret 
integer k given points P and Q such that Q = kP is computed on a known curve E 
over a known field GF(q). The mathematical recovery of k is believed to be an NP-
complete problem [GG 2016]). However, many so-called ‘fault attacks’ have been 
produced, taking various forms and serving different purposes, but I am only 
concerned with fault attacks on the ECDH, and in this section, I review the current 
state of such attacks. 
According to the literature, most fault attacks can be classified into safe error, weak 
curve-based and sign change attacks. In all cases, there is an assumption that the 
attacker has sufficient access to the device to be able to perform the attack. 
2.7.1 Safe-Error Fault Attacks 
Safe error attacks induce temporary faults in cryptographic computations with the 
aim of leaking key bits. Yen and Joye in [YJ 2000] presented such an attack based 




multiplication algorithm by changing the value of one of the registers which take 
part in the calculation. The authors assume that the attacker should at least have a 
minimum degree of the required controllability of hardware fault position in order 
to be able to inject a fault in an exact register. 
   Timing and power attacks are likely to distinguish between point doubling and 
point addition formulas and thus reveal bits of the secret key. However, if these are 
adjusted by the use of ‘dummy operations’ this may lead to safe error attacks 
[GJMRV 2011] and [FV 2012].  
2.7.1.1 Computation Safe-Error 
Algorithm 2.5 (taken from [FV 2012, alg. 1] where it is presented in additive form) 
represents the Montgomery powering ladder with Left-to-Right scalar 
multiplication beginning the point additions from the second bit from the left. All 
details concerning this algorithm and the fault attack proposed against it are given 
in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
Algorithm 2.5 The Left-to-Right Montgomery Ladder Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size, where 
kt = 1. 
INPUT by user: P ϵ E(Fq). 
OUTPUT: k*P. 
1. R(0)            P, R(1)           2P. 
2. For i from t-1 down to 1 do 
        2.1 R(¬ ki)           R(0)+R(1). 
        2.2 R(ki)           2R(ki). 
End for. 
3. Return R(0).                
 
While there appears to be no algorithm in the literature cited as being the Right-to-
Left equivalent of algorithm 2.5, I have used the Right-to-Left version of the EC 
(protected) equivalent [JY 2002, Fig 6(b)] which I have modified to make it suitable 
to be implemented for elliptic curves. Algorithm 2.6 represents the Right-to-Left 
Montgomery Ladder algorithm. All details concerning this algorithm and the fault 





Algorithm 2.6 The Right-to-Left Montgomery Ladder Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size. 
INPUT by user: P ϵ E(Fq). 
OUTPUT: Q= k*P. 
1. R(0)            O. 
2. R(1)          P. 
3. For i from 1 up to t do 
        3.1 G          R(1). 
        3.2 b           1– ki. 
        3.3 R(b)                R(0) + R(1). 
        3.4 R(1)           G. 
        3.5 R(1)           2R(1). 
 End for. 
4. Return R(0). 
 
Algorithm 2.7 represents Coron Left-to-Right [DHB 2016, Alg 5]. All details 
concerning this algorithm and the fault attack proposed against it are presented in 
sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. 
Algorithm 2.7 The Left-to-Right Coron Algorithm. 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size, where 
kt = 1. 
INPUT by user: P ϵ E(Fq). 
OUTPUT: kP. 
1. W(0)            P. 
2. For i from t-1 down to 1 do 
        2.1 W(0)           2W(0). 
        2.2 W(1)           W(0)+P. 
        2.3 W(0)           W(ki). 
3. Return W(0)                
 
Algorithm 2.8 represents a corresponding Right-to-Left version of algorithm 2.7, 
which I have personally developed and introduced in this thesis. All details 
concerning this algorithm and the fault attack proposed against it are given in 





Algorithm 2.8 The Right-to-Left Coron Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: P ϵ E(Fq). 
OUTPUT: kP. 
1. W(0)            O, R           P 
2. For i from 1 down to t do 
        2.1 W(1)           R. 
        2.2 W(1)           W(0)+ W(1). 
        2.3 W(0)           W(ki). 
        2.4 R               2R. 
End For. 
3. Return W(0).                
 
Algorithm 2.9 is in fact the Joye-Yen ‘Left-to-Right’ version [JY 2002, Fig. 7], 
working from the most to the least significant bits (I have modified this algorithm 
to get the output Q=kP instead of gk). All details concerning this algorithm and the 
fault attack proposed against it are given in sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2. 
Algorithm 2.9 The Left-to-Right Joye-Yen Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size, where 
kt = 1. 
INPUT by user: P ϵ E(Fq). 
OUTPUT: Q= kP. 
1. R(0)          O. 
2. R(1)          P. 
3. For i from t to 1 do 
        3.1 R(¬ ki)           R(0) +R(1).  
        3.2 R(ki)               2R(ki). 
 End for. 





Algorithm 2.10 represents the ‘Right-to-Left’ version [Joy 2007, Alg. 3] working 
in the opposite direction. All details concerning this algorithm and the fault attack 
proposed against it are given in sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4. 
Algorithm 2.10 The Right-to-Left Joye Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: P ϵ E(Fq). 
OUTPUT: kP. 
1. R(0)         O. 
2. R(1)         P. 
3. For i from 1 to t do 
        3.1 b           1- ki. 
        3.2 R(b)                2R(b). 
        3.3 R(b)           R(b) + R(ki). 
 End for. 
4. Return R(0). 
 
A comparison of the six algorithms, which are targeted by the fault point attack 
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3 R(0) = O and R(1) = P. 
 
                       Table 2.1 Comparison of Six Original ECC Algorithms 
Where: 
O= identity point =[ infinity, infinity] 
P=Base point 
2P= Double of base point=P+P 
Other related research works are summarized below. 
Schmidt and Medwed in [SM 2009] present a fault attack on elliptic curve digital 
signature algorithm (ECDSA). Their attack depends on the concept of computation 
safe error.Their attack is achieved by inducing a fault relying on the possibility of 
skipping instructions in the execution of double and add or Montgomery ladder 
algorithms. The attacker repeats his attack number of times and uses the faulty result 
he gets to obtain a sufficient number of bits of the secret key which enable him to 
use lattice attacks [HS 2001], [NS 2003] to find the rest of the secret key. 
The authors also propose a countermeasure which uses check value and redundancy 
to modify the system, based on ECC, to be resistant to their attack. 
Poddebniak e,t al in [PSSLR 2018] investigate the security of deterministic ECDSA 
and EdDSA signature schemes and show that removing of random number 
generators in these schemes make them vulnerable to new types of fault attacks. 
They present a practical attack against EdDSA utilizing the Rowhammer fault 
attack. They claim that there are a number of protocols, (such as TLS, SSH, and 
IPSec) which utilize EdDSA, that cannot be victimized by their practical attack. 
They also specify the features of protocols utilizing these deterministic signature 
schemes which make them vulnerable to their attack. Finally, they discuss 





2.7.1.2 Memory Safe-Error 
Yen and Joye in [YJ 2000] proposed a memory safe error attack for the first time. 
Their attack is based on the assumption that if a fault in register or memory location 
can be cleared depending on specific binary value component of the secret key, then 
the attacker can deduce the value of this secret key by considering the result of the 
above process. The attack is repeated number of times depending on some binary 
bits of the secret key value. The authors show how their attack can be implemented 
on RSA cryptosystems. They also claim that this attack can be implemented on 
Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication (ECSM).   
2.7.2 Weak Curve Based Attacks 
In such attacks, the assumption is that a strong elliptic curve is chosen for the 
cryptosystem but that the attack moves the computations onto a weak elliptic curve, 
where it is hoped that it will be easier for the attacker to retrieve the secret key 
values by solving the ECDLP. In this type of attack, fault injection can make use of 
invalid points, invalid curves, and twisted curves. 
2.7.2.1 Invalid Point Attacks 
Biehl et al. in [BMM 2000] demonstrated such an attack by showing how an invalid 
point which does not belong to the original elliptic curve can be used in the scalar 
multiplication algorithm to solve the ECDLP on a weaker curve, and this process 
will help the attacker to find the key. As a countermeasure, they suggest that the 
processor should check the validity of each point produced during the execution of 
the algorithm. However, their countermeasure can be circumvented by the attacker 
if the invalid point is introduced precisely after the checkpoint. 
Jager et al. in [JSS 2015] claim that some popular cryptographic libraries they have 
investigated did not check whether the points used in their calculation belong to the 
curves or not. ECC implementations of Oracle and Bouncy Castle miss the check 
above. The authors investigate the impact of missing the checking process on 
Oracle’s default Java TLS execution (JSSE with a SunEC provider) and TLS 
servers using the Bouncy Castle library.  They define an attack which retrieves the 
long-term secret key from a TLS server which uses vulnerable Bouncy Castle 




2.7.2.2 Invalid Curve Attacks 
Ciet and Joye in [CJ 2005b] identify two models of fault attacks: permanent and 
transient. The permanent model assumes that there is a fault in the system 
parameters which is stored in non-volatile memory (EPROM) before its transfer to 
the working memory, RAM, to be used in the computations. On the other hand, the 
transient model assumes that a fault in the system parameters is induced during the 
transfer from EPROM to RAM. The authors show that both fault models can be 
used to retrieve information about the secret key k.   
Barenghi et al. in [BBPS 2011] demonstrate a fault attack against elliptic curve 
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). The target of this attack is the signature 
recombination part of the algorithm, which is not analysed yet by any known fault 
attack on ECDSA at that time. The attack utilises a low-cost device to inject the 
fault and does not cause any damage to the device under attack [NS 2003], [SH 
2007]. The attack succeeds to retrieve the secret key as it reduces the size of ECDLP 
version, and consequently transfer the process to a weaker curve configuration, and 
thus the problem is solved in shorter time. 
Belgarric et.al in [BFMMT 2016] analyse the side-channel resistance of the 
execution of the ECDSA signature system in Android’s typical cryptographic 
library. They show that the secret key of elliptic curves over prime fields can be 
recovered very effectively on smartphones utilizing electromagnetic side channel 
and famous lattice reduction techniques. They practically demonstrate that elliptic 
curve operations (doublings and additions) can be differentiated in multiple cores 
CPU clocking over the Giga-hertz. They then expand the typical lattice attack on 
ECDSA over prime fields to binary Koblitz curves. They claim that they were the 
first experts who tried to implement an attack against Koblitz curves. These curves, 
which can be found in Bouncy Castle that uses a sliding windows algorithm, allow 
very effective execution utilizing the Frobenius operation. This leads to signal 
processing challenges since the number of obtainable points are decreased. These 
experts also examine practical side channel, clarifying the concrete risk of such 
implementations. The attacks proposed in their research benefit from visible 
architectural characteristics, like specific instructions calculations or memory 
accesses of previous works targeting smartphones. 
Serraj et al. in [SIA 2017] demonstrate that elliptic curve criterions suggested by 




Technology (NIST) [NIST 2013], the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) [ANSI 2010] and the Chinese Commercial Cryptography Administration 
Office (OSCCA) [OSCCA 2010] cannot resist random fault attacks. The main aim 
of random fault attack is to transfer the calculations of ECDLP problem from a 
strong curve to a weaker curve with less points by inducing faults [BMM 2000] & 
[FLRV 2008]. The fault model of this attack is based on its effects, position and the 
number of faults needed to make the attack succeed. The attacker in such kind of 
attack faces great difficulty if he tries to induce a fault in a specific bit or when 
choosing a proper faulty value. The authors offer a full mathematical description of 
random fault attack against ECDLP implemented on PARI/GP system. 
Samwel and Batina in [SB 2018] enhance and generalize preceding attacks against 
Ed25519 by utlizing realstic targert platform. They state that their attack is 
achievable with a high degree of success by utilizing voltage Fault Injection (FI) 
and Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EMFI). They claim that an attacker can 
recover the key by using their proposed attack with only one successful fault. They 
affirm that their attack can achieve a high degree of success (close to 100%). The 
attack remains effective even with adding redundancy to the implemenation. 
Adding some randomness in the creation of the ephemeral scalar can be considered 
a countermeasure against this attack. They also proposed an attack against the 
implementation of WolfSSL and extended their attack to other implementations of 
Ed25519.2.7.2.3 Twist Curve Based Fault Attack. 
   Fouque et al. in [FLRV 2008] present a fault attack targeting Montgomery-like 
methods when the y-coordinate is not used. Using the twist of the given curve, 
which is often weaker than the initial one, they can recover the secret key. The fault 
model used in this attack is typical and reasonable, and by injecting a few faults, 
the attacker can retrieve the secret key. The authors claim that to develop a 
countermeasure to this attack, the designer needs to repeat the verifications enough 
number of times to reduce the possibility of the attack success, since the probability 
to find a random point on the curve is very high.   
Romailler and Pelissier in [RP 2017] present a fault attack against Edwards-curve 
digital signature algorithm (EdDSA). EdDSA is based on edwards25519 (the 




instead of elliptic curve digital signature (ECDSA) to sign messages in embedded 
devices as it provides better performance and security. EdDSA branch and lookup 
operations are not based on private key values during the signature process. 
Therefore, EdDSA is considered resistant to various side-channel attacks. The 
authors propose a fault attack against EdDSA by inducing a fault on hash function 
involved in its signature algorithm. This fault will generate a fault signature that 
can be used by the attacker to retrieve sufficient information about the secret key. 
This will enable the attacker to form useful signatures for any message. They also 
offer a practical execution of their attack against an implementation on Arduino 
Nano. Samwel et al. in [SBBDS 2018] claim that EdDSA is not resistant to side-
channel attacks. 
2.7.3 Sign Change Fault Attacks 
Sign change attacks work directly on the original curve and introduce sign changes 
to points used in the computation. Blömer et al. in [BOS 2006] demonstrate how 
sign changes of intermediate points can be used to recover the unknown scalar 
factor. Their attack leads to a faulty output that is a valid point on the original 
elliptic curve. They base their approach on what is known as the ‘left to right 
repeated doubling’ method of computing point multiples where the scalar target 
multiple is represented in non-adjacent form. The authors state that they believe this 
approach can also be employed against other scalar multiplication algorithms, 
including the right to left version, binary expansion based repeated doubling, and 
the Montgomery ladder [Mont 1987].  
2.7.4 Summary 
In consequence of investigating related literature, I enumerated and briefly 
discussed, in this section, various forms of fault attacks against ECC, such as safe 
error, weak curve based and sign change fault attacks. The attacker, in most of the 
attacks reviewed, tried to make a hardware fault by changing register value and 
memory location through using special equipment like a laser beam. Changing 
values, which aim at producing faulty results, could be done by means of converting 
positive base point into a negative one, or changing a single bit or multiple bits of 
the register value which takes part in the calculation. The attacker analysed the fault 
results he got to guess the secret key value. Other approaches were based on using 




curve. Such approaches enabled an attacker to solve ECDLP in an easier 
environment. The attacker might also try to make a fault software attack by skipping 
single or multiple instructions which led to a fault in the algorithm being executed 
and thus produced fault results. All the attacks against ECC, referred to in my 
summarized review of related literature, differ from the attacks proposed in the 
thesis as I targeted the software used to program the EEPROM. The attacker would 
change the algorithm stored in the EEPROM by injecting a fault value and using it 
instead of the correct value, and thus produced a fault value. Then the attacker 
would use the fault result to retrieve the secret value.  
2.8 Fault Attack on ECC Countermeasures 
2.8.1 Fault Attack on ECC Countermeasures     
In the previous section, I have presented fault-based attacks against ECC. In this 
section, I will discuss relevant countermeasures.  
   Algorithms in which the computations made take the same amount of time, 
without the use of dummy operations, are referred to as ‘regular’. Such algorithms 
are resistant to power, timing, and safe error attacks, and therefore, all algorithms 
should be designed to be regular. 
   Biehl et al. in [BMM 2000] and Ciet and Joye [CJ 2005b] suggest verifying that 
points produced during an elliptic curve computation are the same points on the 
curve. Ciet and Joye [CJ 2005b] suggest the use of cyclic redundancy checks to 
look for faults in curve parameters. Giraud [Gir 2006] suggests a coherence 
verification which compares the intermediate or final result with some acceptable 
pattern.  
Blömer et al. in [BOS 2006] propose the use of an elliptic curve over a ring 
constructed by ‘combining’ two elliptic curves, one the ‘target’ curve and the other 
a ‘dummy’ curve, over different fields; if the point to be signed has sufficient order 
on both curves, then an algorithm computing elliptic curve additions on both the 
combined curve and the dummy curve will produce the required result for the target 
curve. This method is used as a countermeasure against sign change attacks. 
Fournaris and Sklavos [FS 2015] explore effective algorithmic methods that can 




offs between hardware efficiency concerning (space and calculation speed) and 
level of resistance against FA and PA. They suggest a countermeasure combining 
countermeasures against power attacks group and fault attacks group. Their 
proposed countermeasure protects cryptography system (RSA/ECC) from (simple 
power attack, comparative simple power attack, refined power attack and 
differential power attack) by using Montgomery power ladder base point blinding 
and randomization extension (which means using of two random variables B and 
B-1 to mask the message). The proposed countermeasure also protects RSA and 
ECC from FA and differential fault attack by using infective calculation and error 
detection. 
Rauzy et al. in [RMGN 2015] have studied the modular extension protection 
technique, and they found that this technique is wrong, and therefore, they propose 
another version of the same technique after they fix it. They prove the efficiency of 
their improved technique especially the inverse relation between security 
parameters and fault non-detection parameters. They implemented their techniques 
on scalar multiplication of ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.  
Fournaris et al. in [FPBS 2016] investigate Residue Number system RNS capability 
to design a countermeasure against fault attacks and power attacks. They also 
propose a scalar multiplication algorithm that resists fault attacks and power attacks 
by using RNS. According to their analyses, they are able to verify their 
countermeasure. They claim that the merging of classical PA and FA 
countermeasures with lightweight RNS countermeasure can produce a powerful 
cryptography system which resists FA and PA. 
Seysen in [Sey 2017] presents a modification on modular extension of a curve 
countermeasure which is used to protect point multiplication in elliptic curve. 
Seysen claims that this modification will make the countermeasure more secure 
against faults attacks. This modified countermeasure operates by utilizing a small 
curve to make the point multiplication on modular extension of the main curve. 
After that, the result is compared to the same point multiplication recomputed on 
the small curve. If they are equal, then the system is secure. The above comparison 
can be defective or worthless if a point in the infinity on the small curve can be 
accessed with acceptable probability. The author suggests an alternative modular 




Dugardin et al. in [DGMNR 2017] study the modular extension technique used to 
protect elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) algorithms. They discover that 
the existing countermeasure based on modular extension is faulty. Therefore, they 
develop a test-free countermeasure to replace the previous one. Their 
countermeasure makes use of Edwards’s curves and twisted Edwards’s curves in 
its computation as the addition law of these curves is complete. The addition of a 
curve is said to be complete when it deals with all pairs of input points but it does 
not deal with any point at infinity. A point at infinity can be accessed as intermediate 
point and therefore it may leak information about the secret key. Edwards’s curves 
share with Weierstrass curve the advantage that the addition law for these curves is 
unified and the same formula can be used for adding and doubling. This ensures 
that their countermeasures will be more resistant to side-channel attacks.  
Ambrose et.al in [ABFJLM 2018] demonstrate a number of differential fault attacks 
and one differential power analysis attack against deterministic signature schemes. 
These attacks show that eliminating randomness from the equation does 
unavoidably remove all attacks vectors. The researches examine varied 
countermeasures and propose a new one which involve entropy for low-cost 
defence against these attacks. Their proposed countermeasure does not require 
altering the key generation or the verification procedures and consequences in a 
signature scheme. This countermeasure provides high performance and security for 
an extensive range of use-cases. 
Audrey and Tisserand in [AT 2018] study the protections of scalar multiplication 
against both observation and perturbation attacks. The observation attack (side 
channel attack) is the attack that targets scalar multiplication through observing 
changes in physical parameters.  The perturbation attack (fault attack) is the attack 
that generates a fault by using perturbations of the system such as variation of power 
supply. They propose two countermeasures to protect scalar multiplication against 
these two attacks and they implemented them on a Cortex-M0 microcontroller. The 
finite field operation over point coordinates is protected by the first proposed 
countermeasure. The second countermeasure protects key bits. 
2.8.2 Summary 
Investigation of literature related to the countermeasure techniques, which were 




concepts. One important concept confirmed by many experts was that all algorithms 
must be regular and do not use dummy operations in their computations.  Another 
important concept was checking and ensuring that all the points used in the 
computation should belong to the original curves before beginning with the 
computations process. The countermeasures suggested by many experts were cyclic 
redundancy checks, comparing the intermediate or final results with some 
acceptable patterns, using two curves instead of one and comparing the final results 
between them, using RNS, and using randomization techniques. However, after 
considering all the above countermeasures techniques, I came to the conclusion that 




















Chapter Three EEPROM Environment  
3.1 Introduction 
EEPROM hardware devices store what is essentially 'metadata' needed to run, 
change or secure another hardware device. Such metadata may include secret key 
and algorithms used to encrypt and decrypt information or add a signature to this 
information. Many research projects deal with different aspects of EEPROM.  This 
chapter is a review of EEPROM in three directions: EEPROM Architecture, 
EEPROM Programming and Attacks on EEPROM Memory Devices.  The thesis 
work deals with attacks against algorithms stored in EEPROM and used to secure 
information. The proposed attacks on EEPROM in this research work target the 
software used to program EEPROM instead of attacking its physical layer. 
Therefore, the importance of this chapter is to show how EEPROM is constructed 
and programmed from the view related to the thesis work. Furthermore, I present 
some attacks on EEPROM proposed in related research projects and compare them 
to attacks proposed in this thesis.  
  The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 shows the EEPROM 
architecture. Section 3.3 presents EEPROM programming. Section 3.4 shows 
attacks on EEPROM memory devices. Section 3.5 gives the implications of 
proposed attacks in the thesis. Finally, a summary is given in section 3.6.  
3.2 EEPROM Architecture 
EEPROM architecture has a general configuration consisting of EEPROM array 
with its periphery devices which connect EEPROM with the outer world and 
control its operations. In this section, I present the general configuration of 
EEPROM. Furthermore, I present main components of EEPROM cell.   
3.2.1 General Configuration 
The EEPROM can be organised as an array of cells with m rows, n columns and z 
bits (cells) in each column. The size of EEPROM can be measured by bits or bytes. 
As an example, 16 rows by 16 columns with 8 bits in each column construct an 
EEPROM with size 2Kb where K represents 1024 bits. Periphery circuits connect 
the EEPROM with its environment. These periphery circuits are: X decoder is used 
for selecting the effective row. Y decoder is used for selecting the effective column. 




capability to switch between them) are used as data and address bit storage units. A 
high voltage power supplies Vcc and Vss. Sense amplifier is used for reading  and 
writing control operation [DXFM 2006]. The location of cryptography algorithms 
which I implement my propose attack against them is stored on EEPROM array.   
The general EEPROM architecture is shown in Figure 3.1 [Ros 1998]. 
 
Figure 3.1 General Architecture of EEPROM 
3.2.2 EEPROM Memory Cell Design 
Each memory cell consists of two transistors: the first one is a memory transistor 
which is MOS transistor with an extra floating gate called floating gate transistor 
(FGT). The floating gate acts as the main component of the erasing and 
programming section of EEPROM cell. When the floating gate is charged with a 
negative charge, it is said to be erased. While, when the floating gate is charged 
with a positive charge then the EEPROM cell is programmed [AD 2008]. The 
second transistor is the select transistor (ST) which is connected with the first 
transistor serially and also connected with periphery circuits in order to control the 
operations (Read, Erase and Write) of EEPROM cell and ensure that no mistakes 
will happen during the writing operations [DXFM 2006] and [YYK 1971]. The 
MOS and ST transistor can be shown in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 shows the EEPROM cell configuration derived from [Was 2012]. Figure 




















Figure 3.3 Floating Gate Operation. 
According to the literature, many articles show different models for EEPROM cell 
design which differ in the material size used and values of capacitance connected 
to FGT and ST transistors. This difference affects the time of programming and life 
of EEPROM cell. As I will consider the programming level of EEPROM in thesis 
work, then I will not go deeper on this subject. For more information the reader can 
refer to these articles [DXFM 2006], [LS 2007], [AD 2008], [RLBBRM 2008], 
[WSCH 2008], [DRSFLN 2009], [LCK 2010], [DLDJLTZ 2012], [TMRCPK 
2013], [SASOMKOKN 2014], [BKS 2015], [CC 2015], [MJ 2015], 
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3.3 EEPROM Programming  
The EEPROM is a modified generation of EPROM devices. EPROM devices must 
be removed from their hardware circuit and connected to a special device, so that 
they can be erased or reprogrammed. On the other hand, the EEPROM, or even a 
particular part of it, can be erased and reprogrammed without any need to remove 
it from its original circuit [Lan 2015, chap. 6]. 
Programming an EEPROM cell is a process of charging the floating gate of FGT in 
EEPROM cell by threshold voltage VT, and this can be done analogously or 
digitally.  
3.3.1 Analogous Programming of EEPROM Cell 
According to the literature, EEPROM cell can be analogously programmed by 
connecting it to a controller which can provide a stable threshold voltage 14 
volts.This method is presented by Barnett and Liu in [BL 2008] as they propose a 
controller with a gated clock which generates a constant programming voltage 
during a wide range of received RF input power, whereas Compagnoni et al. in 
[CMAMS 2009] present a model that can explain how TaN/Al2O3/Si3N4/SiO2/Si 
(TANOS) memory cell can be programmed and this physical model can reproduce 
a threshold voltage VT that remains constant over a wide range of programming 
prejudices and times. 
3.3.2 Digital Programming of EEPROM Cell  
Langbridge in [Lan 2015, Chap. 6] presents a programming system that enables one 
to access EEPROM memory and digitally read, i.e. get data, and also write, i.e. 
change data in the memory, by using a special EEPROM library included in 
Arduino Uno hardware device. EEPROM library is a group of routines that can 
access EEPROM memory. These routines can read and write bytes, bits, strings and 
other values. For more information, the reader can refer to Wiley eBook [Lan 2015, 
Chap. 6].  
Beningo in [Ben 2017, chap. 9] presents a hardware abstraction layer (HAL) that 
manages internal and external EEPROM devices. HAL is an interface that gives the 
applications designers a set of functions that can be used to deal with hardware 
functions. The author uses five different brands and sizes of EEPROMs to develop 




The author generates a basic spreadsheet to list all the functions he needs to deal 
with all kinds of EEPROMs he chooses for his work. The author suggests four main 
categories of functions of HAL for EEPROM which initialization are, writing data, 
reading data and writing and reading the status registers. Then, he provides codes 
which show how the above four categories can be represented as functions that can 
deal with EEPROM. He also presents the codes of implementation of his HAL 
design on an external EEPROM. 
Microchip Company provides a manual for programming EEPROM devices. 
Section 5.5 in this manual explains how one can erase and program EEPROM 
blocks. According to the manual EEPROM can be accessed by utilizing table read 
and write. The manual lists some operations that can be applied on the data 
EEPROM, for instance, erase one word, erase one row (16 words), erase entire data 
EEPROM, program one word and program one row (16 words). During data 
EEPROM normal operation any read and write operations can be performed on it. 
NVMCON and NVMKEY registers are being utilized during erase and program 
operations on data EEPROM. The programming software waits for each operation, 
erase or program, to be complete, and then begins another one. The three 
approaches are: used to inform the software that the pervious operation is complete 
when WR bit in NVMCOM register is cleared, NVMIF bit is set or enable NVM 
interrupts. The screen shots of all five operations will be shown in Appendix A. For 
further information you can check a pdf in [Mic 2005].  
3.4 Attacks on EEPROM Memory Devices 
3.4.1 Software Attack 
Hogenboom and Mostowski in [HM 2009] present a software attack on open Java 
Card smart card which aims to give the attacker a random access to the whole 
memory locations of the cards. An open Java Card means the card can install new 
applets. Their attack depends on the use of exploitable bug in the limited Java 
Virtual Machine running on the card to give the attacker the possibility of reading 
or modifying other applet’s data and code on the card. They cannot confirm that the 
card used in their work is exactly the card still utilised in the market. The attack 
proposed by this article is similar to the attack proposed by the thesis in the point 




level. However, the proposed attack in the thesis differs from their own, since our 
proposed attack is more directed to get specific data. It is also more universal as it 
can work with any device and has no restriction on the kind of software, whereas 
the attack proposed by Hogenboom and Mostowski works only with a smart card 
with specific software type (Java Card) and it works only with the open card and 
gets all the information stored in EEPROM without a classification of data types 
which they extract from EEPROM.  
3.4.2 Laser Attack  
Skorobogatov in [Sko 2009] shows how a laser beam can be used to change an 
EEPROM cell value. In his attack, he used low-cost laser-diode module mounted 
by a microscope. He claims that if a memory cell is being heated by using a laser 
beam that will change its value, even if this operation cannot change all memory 
cells because of their small size. However, he claims that cryptographic key can be 
recovered by using a brute force attack. The attack proposed by Skorobogatov is a 
permanent fault injection, and even this process may damage the device because of 
the heating. The proposed attack by the thesis deals with software level of 
EEPROM instead of physical layer. Furthermore, the injection fault result is 
eliminated and causes no damage to the device. 
Sakamoto et al. in [SFM 2016] introduce an attack technique which combines the 
laser irradiation and power analysis techniques. This attack aims to extract data 
while reading data from the EEPROM. The proposed attack method uses the laser 
irradiation to extract multiple bits from sense amplifier when it is operating in real 
time. The power analysis techniques are used to specify the time of executing the 
decryption operation. The secret key must be read at the beginning of decryption 
operation so the attacker can know the time of extracting critical information 
according to the information provided by power attack. The attack proposed by the 
article is working on hardware level, and needs to combine two types of hardware 
attacks for extracting secret data. Furthermore, this attack requires special hardware 
devices to be implemented. The proposed attack by the thesis  deals with 





3.4.3 Optical Fault Masking Attacks 
Skorobogatov in [Sko 2010] introduces an optical attack against EEPROM memory 
called fault masking attacks. The aim of these attacks is to cripple regular memory 
process through stopping changes of the memory contents. The objective of this 
attack is to write-protect specific memory areas when required. The attack is applied 
on two kinds of PIC microcontrollers: old (larger size like PIC16F84 which is 
constructed with 1.2 µm technology), and new (smaller size like PIC16F628A built 
with 0.5 μm technology with two metal layers). The attack has been improved by 
attacking the backside and applied on PIC and MSP430 microcontrollers. The 
benefit of this attack is to help data analysis and other types of fault injection attack.  
However, the author does not give a clear view of how this attack assists in 
retrieving secret information stored in EEPROM.  
 The attack proposed in this article is working on the hardware level, whereas the 
attack proposed in the thesis is working on the software level. Also, it gives a clear 
and accurate method to retrieve the secret key in cryptography systems.   
3.4.4 Extraction and Analysis of Non-Volatile Memory of the ZW0301 
Module IoT Device  
Badenhop et al. in [BRMM 2016] analysed EEPROM and flash memory of Z-wave 
devices which are used as IoT devices. In their work, they identified the hardware 
and software of Z-wave devices. Furthermore, they proposed methods for 
extracting information from memory. They also examined this information to find 
the source code and compiler. Also, they discovered information related to the data 
structure of EEPROM memory used in the Z-wave devices. Finally, they made their 
tools (which they updated during their research) available under Github 
AFITWiSec group. The attack proposed by Badenhop et al. is similar to thesis 
attack as both of them are working with software level but they differ as article 
attack works against EEPROM found on specific IoT devices while thesis attack is 
a universal attack which works against EEPROM on any device.  
3.4.5 Microprobing Attacks 
Skorobogatov in [Sko 2017] indicates that encryption of embedded memory 
devices inside secure microcontrollers is not enough to protect information from 
attackers. He claims that if the memory has been accessed by a CPU, then the data 




instructions disclose data on the address bus. The author offers a practical 
implementation of his claim through an encrypted on-Chip Mask ROM in a secure 
microcontroller. He claims that the CPU instructions, in addition to its leaking 
information during the program execution, may pass decrypted data in the address 
bus or disclose information through conditional instructions. He advises the 
designers of semiconductor devices, particularly those which are used in sensitive 
applications like banking, not only to use a powerful encryption scheme, but also 
to check the integrity of the codes to be used in these devices. 
3.5 Implications for Attacks Proposed in the Thesis 
There are important concepts that can be extracted from this chapter and related to 
the thesis work. The first one is: a specific portion of EEPROM memory devices 
can be reprogramed without any need to remove the EEPROM from its original 
position; and also we do not need to erase all memory cells to do that. This concept 
supports the application of the proposed attacks in the thesis which target 
algorithms stored in EEPROM since they will change algorithms content in a way 
that helps to retrieve secret information.  
The second concept is: the previous attempts to attack EEPROM by targeting the 
software system used to program EEPROM were limited to specific types of 
hardware devices such as Java smart cards and Z-wave. Under specific conditions, 
this concept supports the ability of attacking the software system used to program 
EEPROM for purpose of retrieving the data stored in it. 
The proposed attacks in the thesis target cryptography algorithms stored in 
EEPROM by inserting fault value and generating a fault result in the computations 
of algorithm, and consequently deducing the secret key according to this error. 
These attacks are  universal as they can be implemented on any hardware device 
which contains EEPROM memory regardless of device type or EEPROM. These 
attacks differ from those found in the literature, which can only be applied in 
specific conditions. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I presented an overview of EEPROM memory devices. I gave a 
short description of EEPROM general architecture and cell configuration. Then I 




digitally. Furthermore, I presented some attacks on EEPROM memory. One of 
them was a software attack against Java Smart Card by [HM 2009]. In the next 
























Chapter Four Proposed Fault Attacks against RSA 
The proposed fault factoring attack and retrieve secret key attack against RSA 
cryptosystems show security issues that threaten these cryptosystems. These attacks 
inject a programming fault in algorithms stored in EEPROM. This fault will be used 
to factorize RSA modulus or recover the secret key of RSA cryptosystem. The 
importance of this chapter is to make developers of RSA cryptography systems 
aware of the security risks which threaten the software used to program hardware 
devices when they choose RSA cryptosystems to secure these devices. This chapter 
is related to the thesis goals as it suggests new fault attacks on RSA, which is 
considered one of the widely used public-key cryptosystems. 
4.1 Introduction 
I assume a scenario that Alice has an RSA system and she chooses parameters p, q 
as two prime numbers. She also chooses a small integer e and computes 𝑛 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞, 
d as 𝑒 ∗ 𝑑 ≡ 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑛)). The public key part of her RSA system will be (e, n) 
and her private key part will be (p, q and d). She wants to use her RSA system to 
encrypt and sign messages implemented on hardware. In order to carry out the two 
operations mentioned above, Alice has to choose appropriate algorithms from the 
algorithms which are currently used for this purpose. She chooses two RSA-CRT 
signature Garner’s algorithms. The first one is protected by modified Shamir’s 
countermeasure and the second one is protected by simplified Vigilant’s 
countermeasure. She chooses these algorithms because they have higher speed of 
process than other algorithms, and they are more resistant to multi fault attacks [RG 
2014] and [BD 2017]. She will use these algorithms alternatively in her work 
concerning sign messages. On the other hand, she chooses two Montgomery Ladder 
RSA Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left algorithms to encrypt her messages. She 
chooses these algorithms in the encryption process as they are regular algorithms 
(they do not use dummy operations) and they are resistant to fault attacks [BD 
2017]. She will use these algorithms alternatively in her work concerning 
encrypting messages. More details about the importance of RSA can be found in 
section 2.3.1 of chapter 2. 
Depending on the mathematical background of RSA which is outlined in section 




of attack are proposed in this chapter. The aim of the fault factoring attack (FF) is 
to factorize the RSA modulus by applying a fault attack on the RSA-CRT signature 
cryptosystem. In this attack, I chose according to Alice chose in above scenario, 
two RSA-CRT Signature Garner’s algorithms. The first one is protected by 
modified Shamir’s countermeasure and the second one is protected by simplified 
Vigilant’s countermeasure, taking into consideration that these algorithms are 
already resistant to fault attacks [RG 2014]. The mathematical background of the 
FF attack is outlined in section 4.2.8. The details of this attack, which include 
algorithms to be attacked, proposed attacks algorithms and a practical example, are 
shown in section 4.3. The aim of the retrieve secret key (RSK) attack is to retrieve 
the secret key d by applying a fault attack on both protected Montgomery Ladder 
RSA versions “Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left” algorithms according to above 
scenario. The details of the RSK attack which include algorithms to be attacked, 
proposed attacks algorithms and a practical example, are shown in section 4.4.  
In all proposed attack algorithms, I assume that the algorithm to be attacked is 
stored in EEPROM inside the victim device to which the attacker has access, and 
therefore, he can induce faults during the computation process of the algorithm. 
EEPROM sits on a victim hardware device and can be erased, read and written to 
[Lan 2015, chap. 6], [YouTube 2014] and [YouTube 2015]. The FF and RSK 
attacks try to deal with a fault in software used to program EEPROM instead of a 
fault in register level. The proposed fault attacks will enter a fault value, by 
changing the algorithm written in the EEPROM and using this value in the 
computation instead of correct values, and consequently deduce the secret key 
according to the fault in the computation. Finally, the attacker will eliminate the 
error result in the computation. Therefore, any checking procedure will confirm that 
all the elements used in the computations are a free of error. The retrieve of secret 
exponent d or factorize modulus n of RSA cryptosystem will have the same effect 
as any of success of implementation of either of two operations will break RSA 
cryptosystem. 
All examples showing the implementation of the FF and RSK attacks in software 
are done by using Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-4500 CPU 2.4 GHZ with 8 GB RAM as 




2017] was chosen as the software platform as it contains a cryptography package 
designed for elliptic curve arithmetic operations. 
4.2 Background of RSA Cryptosystem 
4.2.1 Classical RSA 
The standard RSA cryptosystem [BNP 2007, p. 230] is constructed by choosing 
two prime numbers p and q, computing a modulus n = p*q and selecting a public 
exponent e which is relatively prime to 𝜑(𝑛). The private exponent d can be 
calculated as 
𝑒 ∗ 𝑑 ≡ 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑛)).                                                                                             (1) 
4.2.2 RSA Encryption  
The equation used to encrypt a plain text M with e and n components of classical 
RSA described above is shown below [BNP 2007, p. 230] 
𝑐 ≡ 𝑀𝑒  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛).                                                                                                        (2) 
4.2.3 RSA Decryption  
The equation used to decrypt a cipher c with d and n components of classical RSA 
described above is shown below [BNP 2007, p. 230] 
𝑀 ≡ 𝑐𝑑 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛).                                                                                                        (3) 
4.2.4 RSA Signature  
The equation used to sign a message M with d and n components of classical RSA 
described above is shown below [BNP 2007, p. 230] 
𝑆 ≡ 𝑀𝑑  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛).                                                                                                         (4) 
4.2.5 RSA-CRT Signature 
In general, because very large values for n are used to ensure security from a brute-
force attack, this exponentiation computation is inefficient. However, the system 
owner who knows p and q can speed up the calculation of S by using the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem (CRT) [YKM 2006, p. 55].  
The values p and q are required to do this along with the solution to the equations 
shown below: 




𝑑𝑝 ≡ 𝑑(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 − 1).                                                                                                   (5) 
𝑑𝑞 ≡ 𝑑(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 − 1).                                                                                                   (6) 
Then Sp and Sq is computed by using (7) and (8) 
𝑆𝑝 ≡ 𝑚
𝑑𝑝(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).                                                                                                       (7) 
𝑆𝑞 ≡ 𝑚
𝑑𝑞(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞).                                                                                                       (8) 
Either Gauss’s algorithm or Garner’s algorithm can be used to find CRT signature 
Scrt which is shown in 4.2.6 and 4.2.7. 
4.2.6 RSA-CRT Signature Gauss’s Algorithm 
The equation used to find the RSA-CRT signature Scrt by implementing Gauss’s 
equation and using (7) and (8) [MVV 1996, pp. 612–613] is     
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≡ [(𝑆𝑝 ∗ 𝑞 ∗ (𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)) + (𝑆𝑞 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ (𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞))](𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)           (9) 
4.2.7 RSA-CRT Signature Garner’s Algorithm 
Another equation which is used to find the RSA-CRT signature Scrt by 
implementing Garner’s equation and using (7) and (8) [MVV 1996, p. 68] is       
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≡ 𝑆𝑞 + 𝑞 ∗ [((𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆𝑞) ∗ (𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝))) ∗ (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)].                             (10) 
Example 1. 
James wants to sign a message M =24 and send it to Alice by using RSA-CRT 
scheme. He chooses two prime numbers p=13 and q=23. He computes 
n=p*q=13*23=299 then finds 𝜑(𝑛) where 𝜑(𝑛)= (p-1)*(q-1) =12*22=264. 
After that James chooses e=7 where gcd (e,𝜑(𝑛)) =1.  
James needs to compute secret key d, which is used in the signature of the message 
where  
𝑑 ≡ 𝑒−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑛) ≡ 7−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 264 ≡ 151.   
Then he tries two methods to sign his message M. Firstly, he uses the direct equation 
(4)  
 𝑆 ≡ 𝑀𝑑  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 ≡   24151 𝑚𝑜𝑑 299 ≡ 93. 
Secondly, James tries another method to speed up the computation. He uses an 




 𝑑𝑝 ≡ 𝑑(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 − 1)  ≡ 151 𝑚𝑜𝑑 12 ≡ 7.                                         
 𝑑𝑞 ≡ 𝑑(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 − 1) ≡ 151 𝑚𝑜𝑑 22 ≡ 19.                   
Next, he computes Sp and Sq by using (7) and (8) 
𝑆𝑝 ≡ 𝑀
𝑑𝑝(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ≡ 247(𝑚𝑜𝑑 13) ≡ 2. 
𝑆𝑞 ≡ 𝑀
𝑑𝑝(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ≡ 2419(𝑚𝑜𝑑 23) ≡ 1. 
Now James can use either (9) or (10) to find the final result of signature message 
M. He chooses to use (9) where 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≡ [(𝑆𝑝 ∗ 𝑞 ∗ (𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)) + (𝑆𝑞 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ (𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞))](𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) 
        ≡ [2 ∗ 23 ∗ (23−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 13)) + 1 ∗ 13 ∗ (13−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 23))](𝑚𝑜𝑑 299) 
        ≡ 93.  
4.2.8 RSA-CRT Signature Cryptanalysis 
In an RSA cryptosystem, with two prime numbers p and q and secret key d, a 
message can be signed by using (4). This process can be sped up by using a CRT 
approach. Instead of computing signature S, a two-value Sp, and Sq are calculated 
by using (7) and (8). After that, Sp and Sq are combined to find Scrt by using either 
(9) or (10). 
Now if a fault occurs in the Sp computation process, then Spe is calculated instead 
of Sp while Sq is still error-free. Then a fault signature Scrte is computed by 
combining Spe and Sq. According to [BDL 1997], [Len 1996] and [JLQ 1999], a 
cryptanalysis can find the factor q by implementing one of two following equations:  
𝑞 ≡ 𝑔𝑐𝑑((𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 − 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡), 𝑛).                                                                                     (11)                                                            
 Or 
𝑞 ≡ 𝑔𝑐𝑑((𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒
𝑒 −𝑀), 𝑛).                                                                                       (12)                                                             
Example 2. 
By using information from numeric example 1, Bob wants to factorize n used by 
James and find factors p and q by injecting a fault in the computation                                                                                    




Firstly Bob will use the same result that James gets in example 1. He will use (9) to 
compute a fault result of the CRT signature by using fault Spe=17 instead of the 
correct one Sp=2 where 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≡ [(𝑆𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝑞 ∗ (𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)) + (𝑆𝑞 ∗ 𝑝 ∗ (𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞))](𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) 
        ≡ [(17 ∗ 23 ∗ (23−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 13)) + (1 ∗ 13 ∗ (13−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 23))](𝑚𝑜𝑑 299) 
         ≡ 277. 
    Now, after Bob gets faulted signature Scrte, he can use either (11) or (12) to find 
factor q, since e, M, and Scrt are already known from example 1. Bob chooses (11) 
to find factor q where 
𝑞 = 𝑔𝑐𝑑((𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 − 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡), 𝑛) = 𝑔𝑐𝑑((277 − 93), 299) = 23. 
4.2.9 RSA-CRT Garner’s Signature Algorithm Protected by Modified 
Shamir’s Countermeasure 
Rauzy and Guilley [RG 2014] modify Shamir’s countermeasure [Sha 1997] which 
is applied for a patent in [Sha 1999] to protect RSA-CRT signature by verifying the 
integrity of the partial components and final result of computing the final signature 
by using RSA-CRT. They take new verifications from Aumüller et al.’s 
countermeasure [ABFHS 2002]. The modified Shamir’s countermeasure can be 
summarised as follows: 
Rauzy and Guilley assume that Garner’s algorithm is used in the computations of 
the  RSA-CRT signature, and I assume that the firmware in victim device stores the 
four values, prime numbers p and q, secret key d and the parameter 𝑖𝑞 ≡
𝑞−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 which are  to be used in the the computations of the RSA-CRT 
signature [BFM 2017].           
    The next step is to choose a random small integer r, which the algorithm will use 
in computations as follows: 
𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑟.                                                                                                                     (13)                                                                 
𝑞𝑟 = 𝑞 ∗ 𝑟.                                                                                                                     (14) 
Now the algorithm will return the error value to the user instead of the final result 
if one of two conditions is verified; otherwise the computation process will continue 
until the final result is obtained and returned to the user 




Next step algorithm will compute 
𝑆𝑝𝑟 ≡ 𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟).                                                                                  (16)      
𝑆𝑞𝑟 ≡ 𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑟).                                                                                  (17)    
Now the algorithm will verify the components   
𝑆𝑝𝑟  ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟).                                                                                                      (18) 
If the result is true then the algorithm will return error; otherwise the algorithm will 
continue. 
In the next step, a partial signature will be calculated 
𝑆𝑝 ≡ 𝑆𝑝𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).                                                                                                        (19) 
𝑆𝑞 ≡ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞).                                                                                                        (20) 
In case of using Garner’s equation, the algorithm computes proper signature Scrt by 
using  
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≡ 𝑆𝑞 + 𝑞 ∗ [(i𝑞 ∗  (𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆𝑞) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝))].                                                        (21)  
Finally, the algorithm will return the error if one of the two conditions is verified; 
otherwise it will return  𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡  ≢ 𝑆𝑝𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 ).                                                        (22)                                                     
Example 3   
Tony wants to implement modified Shamir’s countermeasure, which is suggested 
by Rauzy and Guilley, to protect a message signed by using RSA-CRT scheme. 
Therefore, he chooses two random prime numbers p=17, q=37, and small integer r 
=7. Next, he chooses message M=36 Then he computes n=p*q=629. After that, he 
chooses e=5 where gcd (e, 𝜑(𝑛))=1.  
Tony needs to compute secret key d where d≡e-1 mod 𝜑(𝑛)≡ 5-1 mod 576≡461. 
He also needs to compute 𝑖𝑞 ≡ 𝑞
−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 ≡ 37−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 17 ≡ 6. 
After that, he needs to compute pr by using (13) and qr, by using (14) where 
𝑝𝑟 = p ∗ 𝑟 = 17 ∗ 7 = 119. 




Then Tony will check  
𝑝𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 ≡ 119 𝑚𝑜𝑑 17 ≡ 0.  
𝑞𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 ≡ 259 𝑚𝑜𝑑 37 ≡ 0. 
As the two conditions have a 0 result, then Tony will proceed with computing 𝑆𝑝𝑟 
and 𝑆𝑞𝑟 by using (16) and (17) 
𝑆𝑝𝑟 ≡ 𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑟)( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟) ≡ 36
461 𝑚𝑜𝑑 ((17−1)∗(7−1)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 119 ≡ 15. 
𝑆𝑞𝑟 ≡ 𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟) ≡ 36
461 𝑚𝑜𝑑 ((37−1)∗(7−1)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 259 ≡ 36. 
Tony now checks the condition below  
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟 ≡ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟 ≡ 15 mod 7 ≡ 36 mod 7≡1.  
When the condition is verified, then Tony proceeds with computing 𝑆𝑝,  𝑆𝑞 and 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 
by using (19), (20) and (21) as shown below 
𝑆𝑝 ≡ 𝑆𝑝𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)  ≡ 15 𝑚𝑜𝑑 17 ≡15. 
𝑆𝑞 ≡ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞)   ≡ 36 𝑚𝑜𝑑 37 ≡ 36. 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 ≡ 𝑆𝑞 + 𝑞 ∗ [(i𝑞 ∗  (𝑠𝑝 − 𝑠𝑞) )(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)] ≡ 36 + 37 ∗ [(6*(15-36)) mod 17]  
        ≡ 406. 
Finally, Tony will verify 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 by verifying the conditions 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 ≡ 𝑆𝑝𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ≡ 15. 
𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 ≡ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞) ≡ 37. 
The conditions are verified, then Tony will be able to use the final signature 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡 .  
4.2.10 RSA-CRT Garner’s Signature Algorithm Protected by 
Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure 
Rauzy and Guilley [RG 2014] simplify Vigilant’s countermeasure [Vig 2008] to 
protect RSA-CRT signature by reducing the number of verifications from 9 to 3 
and enhancing the countermeasure in speed and decreasing its need for randomness. 




Rauzy and Guilley assume that Garner’s algorithm is used in the computations of 
the RSA-CRT signature, and I assume that the firmware of the victim device stores 
the five values: prime numbers p and q, secret key dp, secret key dq and the 
parameter 𝑖𝑞 ≡ 𝑞
−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,which are  to be used in the computations of the RSA-
CRT signature [BFM 2017]. 
In the beginning, the algorithm chooses a small random integer r and compute n = 
p * q. In the next step, the algorithm will compute verification 𝑐𝑝 for the partial 
prime p by applying the equations below: 
𝑝′ = 𝑝 ∙  𝑟2.                                                                                                                    (23) 
𝑖𝑝𝑟 ≡ 𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2).                                                                                                     (24) 
𝑀𝑝 ≡ 𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′).                                                                                                       (25) 
𝐵𝑝 = 𝑝 ∙  𝑖𝑝𝑟 .                                                                                                                  (26) 
𝐴𝑝 ≡ 1 − 𝐵𝑝 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′).                                                                                               (27) 
𝑀𝑝
′ ≡  𝐴𝑝  ∙   𝑀𝑝 + 𝐵𝑝  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′).                                                            (28) 
𝑆𝑝
′ ≡  𝑀𝑝
′ 𝑑𝑝 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝
′)
 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝′).                                                                                (29) 
𝑆𝑝𝑟 = 1 + 𝑑𝑝  ∙ 𝑟.                                                                                                          (30) 
𝑐𝑝 ≡  𝑀𝑝
′ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).                                                                             (31) 
After that, the algorithm will calculate verification term 𝑐𝑞for the partial prime q by 
applying the equations below: 
𝑞′ = 𝑞 ∙  𝑟2.                                                                                                                     (32) 
𝑖𝑞𝑟 ≡ 𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2).                                                                                                      (33) 
𝑀𝑞 ≡ 𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞
′).                                                                                                        (34) 
𝐵𝑞 = 𝑞 ∙  𝑖𝑞𝑟.                                                                                                                   (35)  
𝐴𝑞 ≡ 1 − 𝐵𝑞 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞
′).                                                                                               (36) 
𝑀𝑞
′ ≡  𝐴𝑞  ∙   𝑀𝑞 + 𝐵𝑞  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞
′).                                                             (37) 
𝑆𝑞
′ ≡  𝑀𝑞
′ 𝑑𝑞 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞
′)




𝑆𝑞𝑟 = 1 + 𝑑𝑞  ∙ 𝑟.                                                                                                           (39) 
𝑐𝑞 ≡  𝑀𝑞
′ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞).                                                                              (40) 
The next step will be the algorithm computing the final signature as follows: 
𝑆′ ≡  𝑆𝑞
′ + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝
′ − 𝑆𝑞
′ )(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝′)).                                                            (41) 
𝑆𝑟 ≡  𝑆𝑞𝑟 + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑞𝑟)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′)).                                                       (42) 
Then them algorithm calculates verification term 𝑐𝑠 for final signature 
𝑐𝑠 ≡  𝑆
′ − 𝑆𝑟 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟
2).                                                                                      (43) 
Finally, the algorithm will return signature S if the equation below is verified 
 𝑆 ≡   𝑆′𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑞𝑐𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛).                                                                                                (44)                                                    
Example 4 
Jim wants to apply simplified Vigilant’s countermeasure to protect a signature for 
a message by using RSA-CRT which is suggested by Rauzy and Guilley. Therefore, 
he chooses two random prime numbers p=59, q=53, and small integer r=4. Next, 
Jim chooses message M=56. Then he computes n=p*q=3127. After that, he chooses 
e=5 where gcd (e, 𝜑(𝑛)) =1 and calculates d=e-1 mod 𝜑(𝑛) ≡ 5-1 mod 𝜑(3127) ≡  
5-1 mod 3016 ≡2413. 
He also needs to compute secret keys dp and dq and the parameter 𝑖𝑞 by using the 
following equations: 
𝑑𝑝 ≡ 𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 (𝑝 − 1) ≡ 2413 𝑚𝑜𝑑 58 ≡ 35.                               
𝑑𝑞 ≡ 𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 (𝑞 − 1) ≡ 2413 𝑚𝑜𝑑 52 ≡ 21.                            
 𝑖𝑞 ≡ 𝑞
−1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ≡  53−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 59 ≡ 49.  
After that, Jim chooses a small random integer r = 4. In the next step, Jim will 
compute verification 𝑐𝑝 for the partial prime p by applying the equations below: 
𝑝′ = 𝑝 ∙  𝑟2  =    59 ∙ 42 = 944.                                                                                    
𝑖𝑝𝑟 ≡ 𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2) ≡   59−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 42 ≡ 3.                                                                       
𝑀𝑝 ≡ 𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′) ≡  56 𝑚𝑜𝑑 944 ≡ 56.                                                                         




𝐴𝑝 ≡ 1 − 𝐵𝑝 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′) ≡    1 −  177 𝑚𝑜𝑑 944 ≡  768.                                             
𝑀𝑝
′ ≡ 𝐴𝑝 ∙  𝑀𝑝 + 𝐵𝑝 ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′) ≡ 768 ∙  56 + 177 ∙ (1 + 4) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 944. 
         ≡ 469. 
𝑆𝑝
′ ≡  𝑀𝑝
′ 𝑑𝑝 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝
′)
 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝′) ≡    46935 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(944) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 944 
                                                            ≡ 46935 𝑚𝑜𝑑 464 𝑚𝑜𝑑 944 ≡ 333.            
𝑆𝑝𝑟 = 1 + 𝑑𝑝  ∙ 𝑟 =   1 +  35 ∙ 4 = 141.                                                                    
𝑐𝑝 ≡  𝑀𝑝
′ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝) ≡ 469 + 3127 − 56 + 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 59 ≡ 1.            
Then Jim will calculate verification term 𝑐𝑞for the partial prime q by applying the 
equations below: 
 𝑞′ = 𝑞 ∙  𝑟2 = 53 ∙  42 = 848.                                                                                      
𝑖𝑞𝑟 ≡ 𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2) ≡ 53−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 42 ≡ 13.                                                               
𝑀𝑞 ≡ 𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞
′) ≡ 56 𝑚𝑜𝑑 848 ≡ 56.                                                                  
  𝐵𝑞 = 𝑞 ∙  𝑖𝑞𝑟 =  53 ∙  13 =  689.                                                                                 
𝐴𝑞 ≡ 1 − 𝐵𝑞 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞
′) ≡ 1 −  689 𝑚𝑜𝑑 848 ≡ 160.                                              
𝑀𝑞
′ ≡  𝐴𝑞 ∙  𝑀𝑞 + 𝐵𝑞 ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞
′) ≡  160 ∙ 56 + 689 ∙ (1 + 4) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 848. 
       ≡ 533. 
𝑆𝑞
′ ≡  𝑀𝑞
′ 𝑑𝑞 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞
′)
 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞′) ≡ 53321 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(848) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 848 
                                                            ≡ 53321 𝑚𝑜𝑑 416 𝑚𝑜𝑑 848 ≡ 677.                     
𝑆𝑞𝑟 = 1 + 𝑑𝑞  ∙ 𝑟 =  1 +  21 ∙ 4 = 85.                                                                        
𝑐𝑞 ≡  𝑀𝑞
′ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞) ≡  533 + 3127 − 56 + 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 53 ≡ 1.            
The next step Jim takes will be computing the final signature as follows: 
 𝑆′ ≡  𝑆𝑞
′ + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝
′ − 𝑆𝑞
′ )(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝′) ) 
      ≡ 677 + 53 ∙ (49 ∙  (333 − 677)𝑚𝑜𝑑 944 ) ≡ 7885. 
 𝑆𝑟 ≡ 𝑆𝑞𝑟 + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞 ∙ (𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑞𝑟)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝
′) ) 




Then Jim calculates verification term 𝑐𝑠 for final signature 
𝑐𝑠 ≡  𝑆
′ − 𝑆𝑟 + 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟
2  ≡  7885 −  45453 + 1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 16 ≡ 1.                        
Finally, the algorithm will return signature S if the equation below is verified 
 𝑆 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 ≡   𝑆′𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑞𝑐𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)        
562413 𝑚𝑜𝑑 3127 ≡   78851∙1∙1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 3127       
1631 ≡ 1631. 
4.3 Fault Factoring Attack   
In the related literature, there are some attacks against RSA-CRT cryptosystems.  
Kong et al. in [KZJSY 2017] proposed an attack against Lee’s improved RSA-CRT 
algorithm [LCC 2014]. Lee et al. in [LCC 2014] used modulus chaining method to 
protect RSA-CRT algorithm by ensuring that the three primes p, q and r are not 
changed during computations. Kong and his team proposed two attacks against 
Lee’s improved RSA-CRT algorithm. The first one injects a permanent fault in Spr, 
and as a result of this fault, they can factorize modulus n of RSA-CRT algorithm. 
The second attack injects a transient error in prime p, and by using the fault result 
generated by this error they can get the same result as in the first attack. However, 
the modulus chaining method used by Lee cannot prevent the two attacks 
mentioned above. 
Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhyay [BM 2017] improve the official differential fault 
analysis on the 2-bit branch predictor performance under the influence of faults. 
Their fault model is based on the ability of the attacker to introduce a bit-flip error 
into the private keystream. The result of their analysis demonstrates that differences 
of branch misses under the impact of fault can leak information about private key 
bits. The authors claim that this kind of attack can threaten RSA modular 
exponentiation and RSA-CRT algorithms. It can also threaten algorithms protected 
by a countermeasure which halts or randomizes the final result if a fault has been 
detected. This attack can be adjusted to attack processers with embedded soft-core 
by introducing practical errors through a skip instruction technique.  
In this section, I show how the fault factoring (FF) attacks are used to factorize the 
RSA modulus n=p*q. The FF attacks try to deal with a fault in the programming 




a fault value by changing the algorithm written in the EEPROM [Lan 2015, chap. 
6], [YouTube 2014] and [YouTube 2015], and then use this value in the 
computation instead of the correct values, and thus deduce the secret key according 
to the fault in the computation. Moreover, the attacker will eliminate the fault result 
in the computation. Therefore, any checking procedure will confirm that all 
elements used in the computations are free of error. This section will also include 
algorithms that I choose to attack and the proposed attack algorithms to be used 
against them, as well as practical examples that will show the implementation of 
these attacks. 
In this section, the FF attack will be implemented on a signature system using RSA-
CRT and protected by countermeasures. Section 4.3.2 will show the 
implementation of an FF attack against the signature system using RSA-CRT 
cryptosystem and protected by modified Shamir’s countermeasure [RG 2014, Alg. 
10]. Section 4.3.4 will show the implementation of an FF attack against a signature 
system also using RSA-CRT cryptosystem but protected by simplified Vigilant’s 
countermeasure [RG 2014, alg. 11]. 
4.3.1 RSA-CRT Signature Using Garner’s Algorithm Protected by 
Modified Shamir’s Countermeasure 
Algorithm 2.1 in section 2.5.1.1 of chapter 2 represents the RSA-CRT signature 
using Garner’s algorithm protected by modified Shamir’s countermeasure of which 
the outline is shown in section 4.2.9. This algorithm is used to speed up the 
computation time of the message signature by using RSA-CRT scheme. Shamir 
modified this algorithm to be resistant to a fault attack by increasing the randomness 
of this algorithm through adding more items to the computation process to make it 
more difficult for an attacker to guess the secret key when using a fault attack. 
Shamir achieved that by inserting a small integer r in the computation; however, he 
did not specify how to choose random prime numbers. In the related literature, 
several methods are proposed by researchers for generating random numbers such 
as the software method presented by [AA 2016] which is based on the use of 
congruence equations, and the hardware method, suggested by [KCLP 2016] which 
generates a prime number by merging Fermat test and trial division in parallel. In 
my implementation of these algorithms, I use the direct command from Maple to 




Random_prime_number ≡ nextprime (rand (21 .. 2n)). 
where n is the number of bits.  
Also, Rauzy and Guilley suggest a modification to Shamir’s countermeasure which 
protects the signature system using RSA-CRT by fixing the checksum operations. 
4.3.2 FF Attack against RSA-CRT with Garner’s Algorithm and 
Protected by Modified Shamir’s Countermeasure 
Algorithm 4.1 is the proposed attack against algorithm 2.1. The aim of algorithm 
4.1 is to factorize RSA-CRT modulus n. In algorithm 4.1, a fault value X is injected 
to be used instead of the stored value 𝑖𝑞 ≡q
-1 mod p to compute a CRT-RSA 
signature S, so that a fault signature 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 will be computed instead of the correct 
one. This fault CRT-RSA signature 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 can be used to factorize RSA-CRT 
modulus n=p*q by computing the factor q= gcd ((𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒-𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡), n) [BDL 1997], [Len 
1996] and [JLQ 1999]. Algorithm 4.1 is shown below.  
Algorithm 4.1 FF Attack against Algorithm 2.1 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  p, q, d, 𝑖𝑞 ≡q
-1 mod p. 
INPUT by user:  message M, fault value X.  
OUTPUT: The factor q. 
1. Choose a small random integer r. 
2. pr            p*r. 
3. qr            q*r. 
4. If pr ≢ 0 (mod p) or qr ≢ 0 (mod q ) then return error. 
5. 𝑆𝑝𝑟             𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟). 
6. 𝑆𝑞𝑟            𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑟). 
7. if  𝑆𝑝𝑟 ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟 then return error. 
8. 𝑆𝑝              𝑆𝑝𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).         
9. 𝑆𝑞              𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞). 
10. 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡             𝑆𝑞 + 𝑞 ∗ [(𝑖𝑞 ∗  (𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆𝑞) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝))]. 
11. Comment: use X instead of 𝑖𝑞 in the computation of Scrt so we get Scrte. 
12. 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒            𝑆𝑞 + 𝑞 ∗ [(𝑋 ∗ (𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆𝑞) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝))]. 
13. n            p*q 




15. Eliminate 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒.  
16. if 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡  ≢  𝑆𝑝𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡  ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞) then return error. 
17. return q≡ 𝑞𝑡. 
Example 5  
See appendix A.1  
4.3.3 RSA-CRT Signature with Garner’s Algorithm Protected by 
Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure 
Algorithm 2.2 in section 2.5.1.1 of chapter 2 represents the RSA-CRT signature 
with Garner’s algorithm protected by simplified Vigilant’s countermeasure the 
outline of which is shown in section 4.2.10. This algorithm which is proposed by 
Rauzy and Guilley [RG 2014] represents a modification of the countermeasure 
suggested by Vigilant [Vig 2008]. 
4.3.4 FF Attack against RSA-CRT Signature with Garner’s Algorithm 
Protected by Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure 
Algorithm 4.2 is the proposed attack against algorithm 2.2. The aim of algorithm 
4.2 is to factorize RSA modulus n. In algorithm 4.2, a fault value X is injected to 
be used instead of stored value 𝑖𝑞 ≡ 𝑞
−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 to compute a CRT-RSA signature 
S, so that a fault signature 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 is computed instead of the correct one. This fault 
CRT-RSA signature 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 can be used to factorize RSA modulus n=p*q by 
computing the factor 𝑞 = 𝑔𝑐𝑑((𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒
𝑒 −𝑀), 𝑛) [BDL 1997], [Len 1996] and [JLQ 
1999]. Algorithm 4.2 shows that even if a more complicated check sum is used, the 
FF attack can factorize RSA-CRT modulus n. In addition, it does not need to 
compute a correct CRT signature as attackers do not need it in computing factor q. 
The only two items attackers need to find are factor q are a fault CRT signature Scrte 
and message M. Algorithm 4.2 is shown below.  
Algorithm 4.2 FF Attack against Algorithm 2.2 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  p, q, dp, dq, 𝑖𝑞 ≡q
-1 mod p. 
INPUT by user:  message M, fault value X. 
OUTPUT: The factor q. 
1. Choose a small random integer r. 




3. 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ              𝑝 ∙  𝑟
2.   
4. 𝑖𝑝𝑟                      𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2). 
5. 𝑀𝑝                 𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
6. 𝐵𝑝                   𝑝 ∙  𝑖𝑝𝑟. 
7. 𝐴𝑝                  1 − 𝐵𝑝( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
8. 𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ           𝐴𝑝  ∙   𝑀𝑝 + 𝐵𝑝  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
9. 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ             𝑞 ∙  𝑟
2.   
10. 𝑖𝑞𝑟               𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2). 
11. 𝑀𝑞              𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
12. 𝐵𝑞                 𝑞 ∙  𝑖𝑞𝑟. 
13. 𝐴𝑞                  1 − 𝐵𝑞 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
14. 𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ           𝐴𝑞  ∙   𝑀𝑞 + 𝐵𝑞  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
15. 𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ              𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
 𝑑𝑝 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ).     
16. 𝑆𝑝𝑟                  1 + 𝑑𝑝  ∙ 𝑟. 
17. 𝑐𝑝                   𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
18. 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ              𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
 𝑑𝑝( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ).     
19. 𝑆𝑞𝑟                   1 + 𝑑𝑞  ∙ 𝑟. 
20. 𝑐𝑞                     𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞). 
21. 𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ               𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)). 
22. Comment: use X instead of 𝑖𝑞 in the computation of Sdash so we get Sdashe.. 
23. 𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒             𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑋 ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ) ). 
24. To get q, we compute 𝑞𝑡           gcd((𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒
𝑒 −𝑀),n). 
25.   Eliminate 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 . 
26. 𝑆𝑟                     𝑆𝑞𝑟 + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑞𝑟)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)). 
27. 𝑐𝑠                     𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑟 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟
2). 
28. 𝑆 ≡   𝑀𝑑  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛).   
29. 𝑆 ≢   𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑞𝑐𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) then return error. 
30 return q=𝑞𝑡. 
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4.4 Retrieve Secret Key Attack   
In this section, I present the retrieve secret key (RSK) attack, which uses a fault 
attack to retrieve RSA secret key d, which may be a key utilised in the signature or 
decryption process. This section will include algorithms I choose to attack (which 
are known as Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA algorithms Left-to-Right [JY 
2002, Fig. 9] and Right-to-Left which I constructed by myself), the proposed 
attacks of algorithms against them as well as practical examples to show the 
implementation of these attacks. 
The retrieved secret key attack is based on ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ 
on RSA cryptosystems described in [YJ 2000], in which the attacker injects a fault 
into the intermediate calculation values of the multiplication process, and from this, 
deduces a bit value of d. As mentioned previously, we assume that the attacker can 
access the chip on which the algorithm was run. The simple and differential power 
attacks as well as the computational and memory safe-error fault attacks are not 
applicable on protected Montgomery Ladder RSA.  In the same time, the new RSK 
attack I proposed is applicable on protected Montgomery Ladder RSA. My new 
RSK attack can be classified as computational safe-error fault attack.  
4.4.1 Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA Left-to-Right Algorithm  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.3 in section 2.5.1.2 
of chapter 2 are the secret key d = (dt, dt-1, …,d1)2 in binary form and size of secret 
key t. The inputs by the user to algorithm 2.3 are the message g and modulus n. 
The output is gd (mod n). Algorithm 2.3 uses R(0) and R(1) to compute gd, 
initialising R(0) to 1 and R(1) to g. Then the algorithm enters a loop running from 
t to 1. In each iteration, a reverse binary value of di is stored in b, R(b) multiplied 
by R(di), the result is stored in R(b) and the value of R(di) is doubled. When the 
loop ends, the value in R(0) will be the desired result gd.  
4.4.2 RSK Attack against the Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA Left-
to-Right Algorithm 
Algorithm 4.3 is a modification of algorithm 2.3. Therefore, algorithm 4.3 has the 
same internal inputs loaded from the firmware of the victim device (the secret key 
d = (dt, dt-1, …,d1)2 in binary form and the size of secret key t).  The inputs by the 
attacker are the message g, fault value X and modulus n. I assume that the attacker 




in binary form and was used in processing the output gd. Algorithm 4.3 access the 
bits of d in order, from most to least. In algorithm 4.3, the variable k is used to store 
the captured binary values of d.  
Algorithm 4.3 is initialised by setting R(0) to 1 and R(1) to message g and key size 
counter z to 1. The idea behind the attack is based on the introduction of the error 
using X at some points in the multiplication process. In each iteration of for loop of 
algorithm 4.3, the reversed binary value of di is stored in b. The result of multiplied 
R(b) by the introduced fault point X is stored in H, and the value of R(b) is stored 
in T.  In the next step, the value of di is checked: if it is 1 then R(b) is multiplied by 
fault point X and stored in the R(b). At this point, the algorithm compares R(b) with 
H and if they are equal, algorithm 4.3 will deduce that the value of the secret key 
bit in this iteration is 1. In this case, the error in R(b) is eliminated by replacing its 
value with T. However, if R(b) is not equal to G, then the algorithm deduces that 
the value of the secret key bit is 0 in this iteration.  
In the subsequent step, R(b) is multiplied by R(di) and stored in R(b), while R(di) 
is doubled and stored in R(di). Then, the counter z is incremented by one. The 
iterations are continued until the for-loop is ended. Then, k contains the estimated 
bits of d, and v is the size of the final value of z-1 which represents the bit-size t of 
d.  
Algorithm 4.3 RSK Attack against Algorithm 2.3 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  d = (dt, dt-1,… , d1)2, size of secret key 
t. 
INPUT by attacker:  message g, fault value X, modulus n. 
OUTPUT: d in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)          1, R(1)         g.  
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label z           1.  
2. z          1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of R(di) in multiplication operations. 
3. For i= t to 1 do  
     3.1 b          ¬ dz. 
     3.2 H            R(b) *X (mod n).   




     3.4  If di = 1 then 
         R(b)            R(b) * X (mod n). 
          End IF. 
COMMENT: The loops store the bits of d in order in the (t)-tuple d. 
      3.5 If R(b) = H then 
           {ki          1. 
 COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(b) by replacing the fault value by a value 
stored in T 
             R(b)           T. 
             Else 
             ki                   0. 
             End If.  
      3.6 R(b)          R(b)*R(di) (mod n). 
      3.7 R(di)          R(di)
2(mod n). 
      3.8 z           z+1. 
 End For loop. 
4. Set v         z-1. 
5. d= (kv, kv-1,  . . . , k2, k1). 
Example 7 
See appendix A.3 
4.4.3 Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA Right-to-Left Algorithm 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.4 in section 2.5.1.2 
of chapter 2 are the secret key d = (dt, dt-1, …, d1)2 in binary form and size of secret 
key t. The inputs by the user to algorithm 2.4 are the message g and modulus n. The 
output is gd. Algorithm 2.4 uses R(0) and R(1) to compute gd, initialising R(0) to 1 
and R(1) to g . Then the algorithm enters a loop running from 1 to t. In each iteration, 
a reverse binary value of di is stored in b, R(b) is doubled, R(di) is multiplied by 
R(b) and the result is stored in R(b). When the loop ends, the value in R(0) will be 





4.4.4 RSK Attack against the Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA 
Right-to-Left Algorithm  
Algorithm 4.4 is a modification of algorithm 2.4. Therefore, algorithm 4.4 has the 
same internal inputs loaded from the firmware of the victim device (the secret key 
d = (dt, dt-1, …, d1)2 in binary form and size of the secret key t).  The inputs by the 
attacker are the message g and fault value X and modulus n. I assume that the 
attacker does not know d but does know that it is stored in the firmware of the victim 
device in binary form and was used in processing the output gd. Algorithm 4.4 
access the bits of d in order, from least to most. In algorithm 4.4, the variable k is 
used to store the captured binary values of d.  
Algorithm 4.4 is initialised by setting R(0) to 1, R(1) to message g and the key size 
counter z to 1. The idea behind the attack is based on the introduction of the error 
using X at some points in the multiplication process. In each iteration of algorithm 
4.4, a reversed value of di is stored in b. The result of multiplying R(b) by the 
introduced fault point X is stored in H and the value of R(b) is stored in T. In the 
next step, the value of di is checked: if it is 1 then the result of R(b) multiplied by 
the introduced fault point X is stored in the R(b). At this point, the algorithm 
compares R(b) with H, and if they are equal, deduces that the value of the secret 
key bit in this iteration is 1. In this case, the error in R(b) is eliminated by replacing 
it with T. However, if R(b) is not equal to H, then the algorithm deduces that the 
value of the secret key bit is 0 in this iteration.  
In the subsequent step, R(b) is doubled and stored in R(b) and then the new value 
of R(b) is multiplied by R(di) and the result is stored in R(b). Then the counter z is 
incremented by one.  The iterations are continued until the for-loop is ended. Then, 
k contains the estimated bits of d, and v is the size of the final value of z-1 which 
represents the bit-size t of d.  
Algorithm 4.4 RSK Attack against Algorithm 2.4 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  d = (dt, dt-1,… , d1)2, size of secret key 
t. 
INPUT by attacker:  message g, fault value X, modulus n. 
OUTPUT: d in binary form and v size of secret key. 




COMMENT: assign key size counter label z           1.  
2. z          1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of R(di) in multiplication operations. 
3. For i= 1 to t do      
     3.1 b           ¬ di. 
     3.2 H          R(b) *X(mod n).   
     3.3 T           R(b) (mod n).          
     3.4  If di = 1 then 
         R(b)         R(b) * X (mod n). 
          End IF. 
COMMENT: The loops store the bits of d in order in the (t)-tuple d. 
      3.5 If R(b) = H then. 
           {ki            1. 
 COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(b) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in T. 
             R(b)           T. 
             Else 
             ki            0. 
             End If.  
      3.6 R(b)          R(b)2 (mod n).    
      3.7 R(b)          R(b)*R(di) (mod n). 
      3.8 z           z+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. Set v          z-1. 
5. d= (kv, kv-1, k3, . . . , k2, k1). 
Example 8 
See appendix A.4 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, two fault attacks were proposed to recover RSA cryptosystem secret 
information. The FF attack was applied to RSA-CRT signature algorithms, and it 
aimed to factorize RSA-CRT modulus n. The RSK attack was implemented on the 
protected Montgomery Ladder RSA “Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left” algorithms, 




or a signature key. The two attacks depended on the concept of safe error attack. 
All the attacks proposed in this chapter posed challenges to the designer of RSA 


























Chapter Five Proposed Fault Attack against Elliptic 
Curve Cryptosystem  
ECC is used to secure data in devices with restricted resources like smart card. The 
fault attack technique proposed here inject a programming fault in algorithms stored 
in EEPROM. This fault will be used to retrieve the secret key of ECC.  This chapter 
is closely related to the thesis goals as it suggests fault attack on ECC.  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we focus on six algorithms for scalar multiplication suggested by 
Montgomery ([JY 2002] and [FV 2012]), Coron [DHB 2016] and Joye ([JY 2002] 
and [Joy 2007]).  All six algorithms are regular and thus resistant to power, timing, 
and safe error attacks (e.g., [FRV 2014], [Che 2017] & [Lal 2017]). 
ECC is one of the most widespread cryptography systems currently used to deal 
with devices with low or constrained resources like IoT devices. The main 
advantage of this kind of cryptography systems is that they provide high level 
security with smaller key size. ECC needs only a key size of 384 bits long digits to 
give the same level of security of RSA with key size of 3072 bits long digits for the 
year 2018 according to BlueKrypt website for both. Bluekrypt website [Gir 2017] 
is a site which gives recommendations for key size according to the requirements 
of different security institutes over the world such as Commercial National Security 
Algorithm (CNSA) Suite, French Network and Information Security Agency 
(ANSSI) and non-regulatory federal agency within the U.S. Commerce 
Department's Technology Administration (NIST), etc. More details about important 
ECC systems can be found in section 2.3.2 of chapter 2. 
In this chapter, I propose a fault point attack against six algorithms to recover the 
secret key used to secure data in ECC. Such attacks on ECC can help designers to 
enhance the security level of ECC implemented on hardware devices by taking into 
consideration the security issues involved in these attacks. The mathematical 
background of the proposed attacks is outlined in section 5.2.  
Any algorithm for point scalar multiplication enters a secret multiplier in bit format; 
the algorithm may then begin with either the most significant bit or the least 
significant one. Left-to-Right versions have some advantages; one being that the 




Typically, in Right-to-Left algorithms, only one variable needs storage while in 
Left-to-Right algorithms, storage is needed for two variables. This fact may have 
some impact on the available resources but appears to have been mainly ignored in 
real-world implementations for other factors such as security.   
While the curve, field, and points P and Q are public knowledge and available on 
the chip, I do not know k nor its number of bits t, but I do know that the bits of k 
are stored inside the firmware of the victim device and were used in processing the 
output Q. The aim of this chapter is to attack elliptic curve cryptosystem and try 
solve the ECDLP which can be defined: for any positive integer k and point P on 
the elliptic curve E, by kP we mean, P added to itself k times. The underlying 
security of the use of elliptic curves in cryptography is based on the difficulty, 
believed to be mathematically NP-hard [GG 2015], of finding the scalar multiple k 
when P and Q = kP are known. The elliptic curve E modulo large prime number p 
and a base point P on elliptic curve E represent the public key part of ECC. While, 
the secret part of ECC is represent by a k in a range [2, p-2] and calculates Q=k*P 
mod p. However, the public key in RSA is (e, N). While, the secret part in RSA is 
d. Therefore, to decrypt a message c in RSA we use M =cd mod n. 
The approach used to attack six algorithms is based on ideas concerning the ‘safe 
error attack’ on elliptic curve cryptosystems described in [YJ 2000], in which the 
attacker injects a fault into the intermediate calculation values of multiples of a 
point, and from this, deduces a bit value of secret key. As mentioned previously, 
the attack scenario assumed that the attacker could access the chip on which the 
algorithm was run.  
I assume that each algorithm is stored in EEPROM on a victim device to which I 
have access and on which I can induce faults during the processing of the algorithm. 
EEPROM sits on a hardware device and can be erased, read or written to [YouTube 
2014], [Lan 2015, chap. 6], [YouTube 2015], and [Ard 2018]. All proposed attacks 
in this chapter try to deal with a fault in the programming level of EEPROM instead 
of a fault in the register level. The proposed fault attack will inject a fault value by 
changing the algorithm written in the EEPROM after it is loaded into the RAM and 
then this value is used in the computation instead of the correct values. This will 




computation. In addition, the attacker will eliminate the fault result in the 
computation, therefore, any checking procedure will confirm that all elements used 
in the computations are free of error.   
All examples showing the implementation of the fault point attack in software are 
done by using Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-4500 CPU 2.4 GHZ with 8 GB RAM as a 
hardware platform and Windows 7 as the operating system. Maple 2017b [Maple 
2017] was chosen as the software platform as it contains a cryptography package 
designed for elliptic curve arithmetic operations.    
In section 5.3 the Montgomery ladder algorithms are presented together with the 
proposed fault point attack against them. Section 5.4 deals with the Coron 
algorithms and the proposed fault point attack against them. Then in section 5.5 the 
Joye algorithms are presented and also the proposed fault point attack against them. 
Finally, section 5.6 will be the summary of this chapter. 
5.2 Mathematical Background  
Elliptic curves form the basis of an efficient cryptosystem which is often chosen for 
implementation on small devices, such as those which would be used to authenticate 
messages in an IoT scenario. Some mathematical models represent elliptic curve 
according to the types of curve used and mathematical equations used to add and 
double points. In this section, I will show how the elliptic curve can be used in 
cryptography and signatures systems by offering a detailed  presention of the 
processes of key generation, encryption, decryption and signing a message by using 
ECC.   
 I also focus on general Weierstrass and Montgomery elliptic curves because the 
proposed fault attack against elliptic curve cryptosystem use general Weierstrass 
and Montgomery elliptic curves in their operations.   
5.2.1 ECC Key Generation 
I assume that two users, Sam and Lauren, want to set up an ECC to sign messages 
and to secure the interchange of messages between them.  
The First step, for a setup of ECC, is the key generation. Each one of them must 
choose an elliptic curve E modulo prime p, and a base point P on the same curve E. 
Each one of them must also choose a private random a in [2, 𝑝 − 2] and 




private key is a. The message chosen by Sam or Lauren must be a point on the 
elliptic curve of the two parties. [Bat 2013].                      
5.2.2 ECC Encryption   
I assume that Sam wants to send a message to Lauren and he uses the keys 
generated in 5.2.1 to encrypt it. 
Sam creates a message as a point K on Lauren’s elliptic curve E.  
He gets Lauren’s public key (p, P, Q) where 𝑄 ≡ 𝑐𝑃 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝), c is Lauren’s 
secret. 
He chooses 𝑑 ∈ [2, 𝑝 − 2] arbitrarily. 
He calculates dP and K + dQ (mod p).  
He sends the cipher ≡ (dP, K + dQ) (mod p). [Bat 2013] 
5.2.3 ECC Decryption  
Lauren receives the cipher message (dP, K + dQ) (mod p) from Sam. She retrieves 
K by calculating (K+dQ)-cdP≡K+dcP-cdP≡K(mod p), where c is her arbitrary 
secret [Bat 2013].  
5.2.4 ECC Signature 
Lauren wants to sign a message G and send it to Sam. She chooses a private key h. 
She calculates N which represents number of points on her curve E and V=hP=(x, 
y). Her public key will be (p, E, N, P, V). She signs the message G by taking the 
following steps: 
1. She arbitrarily chooses an integer t with 1 ≤ t < N and gcd (t, N)=1, and calculates 
F=tP=(x, y). 
2. She calculates u ≡ t -1 (G−hx) (mod N). 
3. She sends the signed message (G, F, u) to Sam. 
Sam verifies the signature of Lauren by taking the following steps: 
1. Sam obtains Lauren’s public key p, E, N, P and V. 
2. He calculates Z1=xV + uF and Z2=GP. 




5.2.5 General Weierstrass Elliptic Curves Background 
The general affine version of the elliptic curve equation, as taken from the 
monograph [BSS 1999, p. 30] by Blake, Seroussi and Smart, is known as the 
Weierstrass elliptic curve equation and is given by: 
 
𝑦2 + 𝑎1𝑥𝑦 + 𝑎2𝑦 =  𝑥
3 + 𝑎3𝑥
2 + 𝑎4𝑥 + 𝑎5.                                                   (1)      
  
Where the constants ai are from a fixed finite field GF(q) of any characteristic ≥ 2, 
and q is a prime power (I have taken the liberty of labelling the coefficients in a 
slightly different way than that of equation (3) in [BSS 1999, Chap. III]. Using E to 
refer to such a curve, I then use the notation E(Fq) to indicate that the coefficients 
are from GF(q).  
The points of such a curve, along with an additional ‘point at infinity’, which acts 
as the identity and for which I use the symbol O, form an abelian group under an 
operation ‘+’ on the points defined algebraically by the equations (3) and (4) given 
below [BSS 1999, Chap. III]. This ‘+’ operation can be defined regardless of the 
characteristic of the field. Points on the curve are represented as affine pairs (x, y) 
where each of x and y come from GF(q) and satisfy the equation (1).  
 
For any point P = (x, y) on E, the negative of P is defined to be the point  
 
−𝑃 = (𝑥, −𝑦 − 𝑎1𝑥 − 𝑎2).                                                                        (2) 
                                                           
As mentioned on [BSS 1999, p. 33], this definition applies to all finite field 
characteristics. I define P + (– P) to be O. 
To define the addition of two points (other than the pair P and –P) on E, I introduce 
some further notation to simplify the formulas. Let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) 
be distinct points on E.  
In case x1 ≠ x2, let 𝛼 = (𝑦2 − 𝑦1)/(𝑥2 − 𝑥1) and 𝛽 = (𝑦1𝑥2 − 𝑦2𝑥1)/(𝑥2 − 𝑥1). 
In case x1 = x2 but P2 ≠ –P1 (the case P1 = P2),  
let 𝛼 = (3(𝑥1)
2 + 2𝑎3𝑥1 + 𝑎4 − 𝑎1𝑦1)/(2𝑦1 + 𝑎1𝑥1 + 𝑎2)  and 𝛽 = (−(𝑥1)
3 +




Letting P1 + P2 = (x3, y3), then the coordinates of this sum in both cases above are 
given by:  
  𝑥3 = 𝛼
2 + 𝑎1𝛼 − 𝑎3 − 𝑥1 − 𝑥2,                                                                               (3)     
And 
𝑦3 = −(𝛼 + 𝑎1)𝑥3 − 𝛽 − 𝑎2.                                                                                      (4)                                                                                                                                                  
5.2.6 Montgomery Elliptic Curves Background 
In the late 1980s, Montgomery developed a revised form of (1) to speed up elliptic 
curve factorisation methods [Mont 1987], [CS 2017] and [OLR 2017]. The generic 
version of these Montgomery curves for prime order fields of characteristic >3 in 
affine form is given by: 
𝐵𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝐴𝑥2 + 𝑥.                                                                                                    (5)                                                                                                                                                
where A and B are elements of the underlying field. 
As pointed out by Hamburg in [Ham 2015], over fields of prime characteristic 
congruent to 3 modulo 4, the curve in (5) is equivalent to one with B = 1, whereas 
this is not the case for fields of prime characteristic congruent to 1 modulo 4. 
Hamburg also points out that where the order of the Montgomery curve is h*q for 
a large prime q, the factor h is always divisible by 4, which leads to some possible 
attacks. His paper describes how to eliminate factors by using ‘point compression’. 
The Montgomery curve equation (5) over a field of prime order congruent to 3 
modulo 4, can be transformed into a Montgomery curve with B = 1, in which case, 
the curve is referred to as ‘untwisted’.  
Computations on an elliptic curve can be performed in affine or projective 
coordinates. Using projective coordinates has the advantage that field inversions in 
point operations are simplified by the introduction of the additional coordinate. 
However, the authors of [KFSV 2011] claim that points should be converted from 
projective back to affine before outputting the result as this saves the cost of 
transferring a coordinate. Not transferring back to affine coordinates before output 
also provides an adversary with the opportunity of capturing some side-channel 
information from the projection as has been shown in [NSS 2004]. In this section, 
I will keep using affine point representation. 






For 2(x, y): 𝑥2𝑝 = [(𝑥
2 − 𝑎)2 − 8𝑏𝑥]/[4(𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏)] .                                   (6) 
 
for P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) with x1 ≠  x2, letting xR be the x-coordinate of 
the sum and 𝑥𝑅
′  be the x-coordinate of the difference P1 – P2: 
 
  𝑥𝑅 = [2(𝑥1 + 𝑥2)(𝑥1𝑥2 + 𝑎) + 4𝑏]/(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)
2 − 𝑥𝑅
′ .                                        (7)    
 
Although Montgomery curves have proved to be efficient for use in elliptic curve 
factorisation methods, especially in conjunction with the Montgomery ladders 
[Ham 2015], the curves have been found to be too specialised for general use in 
most international standards used today, including ANSI, IEEE and SEC (e.g.,. [IT 
2002]). The efficiency benefit of equations (6) and (7) is that only the x-coordinate 
of points is used at each stage; however, the major drawback to using (7) for the 
addition of two general points on a Montgomery curve, is that it requires that I 
should be able to produce a difference of two points. Izu, Möller and Takagi 
comment on this issue in [IMT 2002] and in [IT 2002], where the doubling and 
addition operations are separated. Their aim is to gain as much efficiency as 
possible, and this is achieved by writing the multiplier k as a sum of powers of 2 
and producing repeated doublings of the point using (6) until the required sufficient 
amount has been obtained. At this stage, however, to generate the value for Q = kP, 
point additions of random points must be made, rather than point doublings, and 
thus the need for point differences becomes problematic.  The authors of [IMT 
2002] deal with this situation by the use of a ‘YRecovering’ algorithm given in 
Appendix A.5 of their paper. A simpler method usable in case the underlying field 
has characteristically a prime congruent to 3 modulo 4, is a basic result found in 
many elementary number theory and cryptography texts (for example [BJ 2002, p. 
86]) which states: ‘If p ≡ 3 (mod 4) is prime and x ≡ y(p+1)/4 (mod p), then either y 
or –y has square roots x and –x.’ Alternatively, equations (3) and (4) can be used 
throughout instead of (6) and (7). 
Nonetheless, the ‘Right-to-Left’ and ‘Left-to-Right’ algorithms produced by 
Montgomery for point additions (first proposed in the context of RSA), and made 
explicit on [JY 2002, p. 7], are still much in demand for point doubling which is the 




particular, their use in computing scalar multiples over curves with form (5) is 
particularly efficient. 
In our case, I focus on an attack in which many additions, which are not doublings 
are required. In this case, the assumption that I have the x-coordinate x(P1 – P2) of 
P1 – P2 is unreasonable; in fact to find this using (7) requires x(P1 – (–P2)) = x(P1 + 
P2) leading us into an infinite loop computationally. In the proposed attack against 
the Montgomery power ladder algorithm, I, therefore, use the addition formulas of 
(3) and (4); an additional benefit for me is that these provide both coordinates of 
the sum which I can then compare with my target point.   
5.3 Montgomery Ladder Algorithms 
The Montgomery powering ladder was introduced in [Mont 1987], [CS 2017] and 
[OLR 2017] to assist in speeding up elliptic curve factorisation methods; it has been 
analysed in many papers in the last twenty years, and is still used as one of the 
benchmarks of elliptic curve computations of point multiples (e.g., [FV 2012]). 
While it was initially introduced for use with the Montgomery curve equations, the 
authors of [Cor 1999] and [JY 2002] explain how it can be adapted to work with 
any abelian group, and also to any elliptic curve group represented by the form (1) 
in section 5.2.5.  
The aim of this section is to attack the ECDLP on both Right-to-Left and Left-to-
Right versions of the Montgomery powering ladder. I deal with the Left-to-Right 
version in sections (5.3.1 and 5.3.2) and the Right-to-Left version in sections (5.3.3 
and 5.3.4). When using bits of k from Left-to-Right (most to least significant), I can 
always assume that the first bit is 1. In this case, there are two ways to establish the 
algorithm computing multiples of P: either begin from the left-most bit or begin 
from the second bit from the left. For small values of k, the latter method saves one 
round in the loop and so is more efficient than the former method; however, for 
very large values of k, there is little saving in efficiency between the two methods.  
5.3.1 Left-to-Right Montgomery Ladder Algorithms 
Algorithm 2.5 in section 2.7.1.1 of chapter 2 (taken from [FV 2012, alg. 1] where 
it is presented in additive form) represent the Montgomery powering ladder with 
Left-to-Right scalar multiplication beginning the point additions from the second 




The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.5 are the secret key 
k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2 in binary form and size of the secret key t. The input by the user 
to algorithm 2.5 is the known base point P, which belongs to the known curve E(Fq) 
over the field GF(q). The output is the known point Q = k*P. Algorithm 5.1 assumes 
that kt = 1 and does not use this bit. Algorithm 2.5 initiates R(0) which is an 
intermediate variable used to store the scalar additions of P with P value, and 
initiates R(1) with 2P value. Then, algorithm 2.5 enters in loop starting from t-1 
down to 1. In each iteration, R(0) is added to R(1) and the result is stored in R(¬ ki) 
and R(ki) is doubled. When the loop ends, the value in R(0) is the final result of kP. 
 
The addition operation used here is that of scalar addition and with equations (3) 
and (4) since we do not require the efficiency provided by (6) and (7).   
5.3.2 The Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Montgomery 
Ladder Algorithm 
On accessing the RAM of the victim device where algorithm 2.5 is loaded from the 
EEPROM of the same device, I assume that the bits of k (kt-1,…, k1)  are accessible 
in order, from Left-to-Right (most to least). The proposed attack makes changes to 
produce algorithms that capture the binary values of k and the attack approach is 
based on ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ on elliptic curve cryptosystems 
described above. 
Algorithm 5.1 is a modification of algorithm 2.5. Therefore, I assume that the bits 
(kt-1, … k2, k1) of the secret key k are stored in the firmware of the victim device 
and loaded into the RAM of the victim device by algorithm 5.1 while it is being 
executed in the RAM of the same device. The attacker has no direct access to the 
secret key, nor to its size. Only algorithm 5.1 can access it and deal with it as an 
internal input. Along the way, the captured bits of k are stored in values check (dt, 
dt-1, …, d2, d1). The attack is based on the introduction of a significant error, using 
any fault point X chosen by the attacker instead of P at some points in the point 
addition process. To avoid legal discovery of this error, I correct it at line 3.4. 
Algorithm 5.1 is initialised by setting R(0) to the point P, R(1) to the point 2P and 
the key size counter e to 2. In each iteration of algorithm 5.1, R(0) is stored in Z 
and the result of adding R(0) to the introduced fault point X is stored in N. In the 




introduced fault point X is stored in R(¬ki).  At this stage, algorithm 5.1 compares 
R(¬ ki) with N, and if they are equal, it deduces that the value of the secret key bit 
in this iteration is 1; in which case, the error in R(¬ki) is eliminated by replacing it 
with Z. However, if R(¬ki) is not equal to N, then the algorithm deduces that the 
value of the secret key bit is 0 in this iteration.  
In the next step, R(0) is added to R(1) and stored in R(¬ki) while R(ki) is doubled. 
The key size counter e is incremented by one. The iterations are continued until the 
loop ends. As a result of this process, the estimated bits of k are stored in  d, and 
the final value of e-1 represents the bit-size v of k. 
Algorithm 5.1 Fault Point Attack against Algorithm 2.5 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size, where 
kt = 1. 
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)            P, R(1)            2P, e           2. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e           2 and through the loop 
store the bits of k in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 
2. Use X as a fault point.  
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
3. For i from t-1 down to 1 do 
3.1 Z           R(0). 
3.2 N           R(0) + X. 
3.3 If ki=1 then 
R(¬ki)          R(0) +X. 
End if. 
3.4 If R(¬ ki) = N then 
di                1. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(¬ ki) by replacing fault value by a 
correct value stored in Z. 





di           0. 
End If. 
3.5 R(¬ki)           R(0) + R(1). 
3.6 R(ki)            2R(ki). 
3.7 e               e+1. 
End While loop. 
4. set v         e–1. 
5. k= (1, dt-1, dt-2 … d2, d1). 
Example 1 
See appendix B.1 
5.3.3 The Right-to-Left Montgomery Ladder Algorithm 
Algorithm 2.6 in section 2.7.1.1 of chapter 2 represent the Right-to-Left 
Montgomery Ladder algorithm. Because the algorithm begins from the right, it 
must start with the least significant bit. 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.6 are the secret key 
k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2 in binary form and size of the secret key t. The input by the user 
to algorithm 2.6 is the known base point P, which belongs to the known curve E(Fq) 
over the field GF(q). The output is the known point Q = k*P. Algorithm 2.6 initiates 
R(0) which is an intermediate variable used to store the scalar additions of P with 
identity value O and, initiates R(1) with P value. Then, algorithm 2.6 enter in loop 
starting from 1 up to t. In each iteration, R(1) is stored  in G, the result of (1 - ¬ ki) 
is stored in b, R(0) is added to R(1) and the result is stored in R(b), G is stored in 
R(1) and R(1) is doubles. When the loop ends, the value in R(0) is the final result 
of kP. As in the previous section, addition is based on equations (3) and (4). 
5.3.4 Fault Point Attack against Right-to-Left Montgomery Ladder 
Algorithm  
On accessing the RAM of the victim device where the algorithm 2.6 is loaded from 
the EEPROM of the same device, I assume that the bits of k (kt, kt-1,…, k1) are 
accessible in order from Right-to-Left (least to most). The proposed attack makes 
changes to produce algorithms that capture the binary values of k and the attack 
approach is based on ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ on elliptic curve 




Algorithm 5.2 is a modification of algorithm 2.6. Therefore, I assume that the bits 
(kt, kt-1, … k2, k1) of the secret key k are stored in the firmware of the victim device 
and loaded into the RAM of the victim device by algorithm 5.2 while it is being 
executed in the RAM of the same device. The attacker has no direct access to the 
secret key nor to its size. Only algorithm 5.2 can access it and deal with it as an 
internal input. Along the way, the captured bits of k are stored in values (dt, dt-1 … 
d2, d1). The attack is based on the introduction of a significant error, using any fault 
point X chosen by the attacker instead of P at some points in the point addition 
process. To avoid legal discovery of this error, I correct it at line 3.6. 
Algorithm 5.2 is initialised by setting R(0) to the point O, R(1) to the point P and 
the key size counter e to 1. In each iteration of algorithm 5.2, R(0) is stored in E, 
R(1) is stored in G, the result of (1 - ¬ ki) is stored in b, and the result of adding 
R(0) to the introduced fault point X is stored in N. In the next step, the value of b is 
checked: if it is 0 then the result of adding R(0) to the introduced fault point X is 
stored in R(b).  At this stage, the algorithm compares R(b) with N, and if they are 
equal, it deduces that the value of the secret key bit in this iteration is 1; in which 
case, the error in R(b) is eliminated by replacing it with E. However, if R(b) is not 
equal to N, then the algorithm deduces that the value of the secret key bit is 0 in this 
iteration.  
In the next step, R(0) is added to R(1) and stored in R(b), G is stored in R(1), R(1) 
is doubled. The key size counter e is incremented by one. The iterations are 
continued until the loop ends. As a result of this process the estimated bits of k are 
stored in d, and the final value of e-1 represents the bit-size v of k. 
Algorithm 5.2 Fault Point Attack against Algorithm 2.6 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)            O, R(1)           P, e           1. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e          1 and through the loop store 
the bits of k in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 




COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
3. For i from 1 up to t do 
3.1 E          R(0). 
3.2 G          R(1). 
3.3 b          1– ki. 
3.4 N           R(0) + X. 
3.5 If b=0 then 
      R(b)           R(0) + X. 
      End If. 
3.6 If R(b) = N then 
         {di                 1. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(¬ ke) by replacing the fault value by a 
correct value stored in E. 
           R(b)         E}.    
       Else 
            di           0. 
       End If  
3.7 R(b)           R(0) +R(1). 
3.8 R(1)           G. 
3.9 R(1)           2R(1). 
3.10  e            e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. set v            e-1. 
5. k= (dt, dt-1, . . . , d2, d1). 
 
Example 2 
See appendix B.2 
5.4 Coron’s Algorithms 
The Coron Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left algorithms are resistant to simple power 
and timing attacks and do not require a large amount of storage and computing 
power. Algorithm 2.7 in section 2.7.1.1 of chapter 2 represents Coron Left-to-Right 




corresponding Right-to-Left version, which I personally developed and introduced 
in this research.   
5.4.1 Left-to-Right Coron Algorithm 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.7 are the secret key 
k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2 in binary form and size of the secret key t. The input by the user 
to algorithm 2.7 is the known base point P, which belongs to the known curve E(Fq) 
over the field GF(q). The output is kP. This algorithm initiates the place-holder 
W(0) to P and updates it with new multiples of P as the algorithm progresses 
through the loop from t-1 down to 1. In each iteration, W(0) is doubled and added 
to P, and the result is stored in the place-holder W(1), and W(ki) is stored in W(0). 
The final result of kP is stored in W(0) after the loop is complete.  
The addition operation used her is that of scalar addition and with equations (3) and 
(4) since we do not require the efficiency provided by (6) and (7).   
5.4.2 Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Coron Algorithm 
On accessing the RAM of the victim device where algorithm 2.7 is loaded from the 
EEPROM of the same device, I assume that the bits of k (kt-1,… k2, k1) are 
accessible in order, from Left-to-Right (most to least). The proposed attack makes 
changes to produce algorithms that capture the binary values of k and the attack 
approach is based on ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ on elliptic curve 
cryptosystems described above.  
Algorithm 5.3 is a modification of algorithm 2.7. Therefore, I assume that the bits 
(kt-1, … k2, k1 ) of the secret key k are stored in the firmware of the victim device 
and then loaded into the RAM of the victim device by algorithm 5.3 while it is being 
executed in the RAM of the same device. The attacker has no direct access to the 
secret key nor to its size. Only algorithm 5.3 can access it and deal with it as an 
internal input. Along the way, the captured bits of k are stored in values (dt, dt-1 … 
d2, d1). The attack is based on the introduction of a significant error, using any fault 
point X chosen by the attacker instead of P at some points in the point addition 
process. To avoid legal discovery of this error, I correct it at line 3.5. 
In algorithm 5.3, I use P and the fact that kt = 1. Then I use new variables to store 




to store accumulated multiples of P and the variable d to store the captured binary 
values of k.  
Algorithm 5.3 Fault Point Attack against Algorithm 2.7      
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. W(0)            P. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e           2 the loop store the bits of k 
in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 
2. Use X as a fault point, e           2. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations 
3. For i from t-1 down to 1 do 
     3.1 W(0)          2W(0). 
     3.2 R         W(0) + X. 
     3.3 W(1)           W(0)+X. 
COMMENT: The loop stores the bits of k in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 
     3.4 If W(ki) = R then 
           di            1.  
            Else 
            di         0. 
           End If. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in W(1) by replacing fault value by a result of 
addition W(0)+P. 
     3.5 W(1)           W(0)+P. 
     3.6 W(0)           W(ki). 
     3.7 e          e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. Set v          e-1. 
5. k= (1, dt-1, dt-2, . . . , d2, d1.).  
 
Algorithm 5.3 is initialised by setting W(0) to the point P and the counter key size  




of adding W(0) to the introduced fault point X is stored in R. In the next step, the 
result of adding W(0) to the introduced fault point X is stored in W(1).  At this 
point, algorithm 5.3 compares W(ki) with R; if they are equal, it deduces that the 
value of the secret key bit in this iteration is 1; otherwise, the algorithm deduces 
that the value of the secret key bit is 0. In the next step, the result of adding P to 
W(0) is stored in W(1). This operation eliminates the fault value in W(1). Then 
W(ki) is stored in W(0). Next, the counter size e is incremented by one. The 
iterations are continued until the loop ends. As a result of this process the estimated 
bits of  k are stored in d, and the final value of e-1 represents the bit-size v of k.  
Example 3 
See appendix B.3 
5.4.3 Right-to-Left Coron Algorithm  
I rebuild the Right-to-Left Coron algorithm 2.8 in section 2.7.1.1 of chapter 2 which 
is the reverse way of dealing with bits of the secret key in Left-to-Right Coron. I 
use the same equation used by Coron Left-to-Right (W(0)= W(ki)) and build the 
rest of the algorithm depending on this equation. I use a new variable R so that I 
can get the final output kP. I refer to this algorithm as Right-to-Left Coron because 
I need a Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left algorithm for Montgomery, Coron and 
Joye as my attack is applied on two versions: Left-to Right and Right-to-Left 
algorithms. Coron Right-to-Left algorithm is similar to the Right-to-Left Joye in 
that it begins by setting O to W(0) and P to R. I could not find the Right-to-Left 
version of Coron algorithm in any of the references I have searched, so I rebuild the 
Right-to-Left Coron algorithm by myself. 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.8 are the secret key 
k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2 in binary form and size of the secret key t. The input by the user 
to algorithm 2.8 is the known base point P, which belongs to the known curve E(Fq) 
over the field GF(q). The output is kP. Algorithm 2.8 initiates the place-holder W(0) 
to O and a second place-holder R to P. Then the algorithm enters a loop running 
from 1 up to t. In each iteration, it stores R in W(1), adds W(0) to W(1) and stores 
the result in W(1); it also stores W(ki) in W(0), and stores 2R in R. When the loop 





5.4.4 Fault Point Attack against Right-to-Left Coron Algorithm 
On accessing the RAM of the victim device where algorithm 2.8 is loaded from the 
EEPROM of the same device, I assume that the bits of k (kt, kt-1,…, k1) are 
accessible in order, from Right-to-Left ( least to most). The proposed attack makes 
changes to produce algorithms that capture the binary values of k, and the attack 
approach is based on ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ on elliptic curve 
cryptosystems described above. 
Algorithm 5.4 is a modification of algorithm 2.8. Therefore, I assume that the bits 
(kt, kt-1, … k2, k1 ) of the secret key k are stored in the firmware of the victim device 
and loaded into the RAM of the victim device by algorithm 5.4 while it is being 
executed in the RAM of the same device. The attacker has no direct access to the 
secret key nor to its size. Only algorithm 5.4 can access it and deal with it as an 
internal input. Along the way, the captured bits of k are stored in values (dt, dt-1, … 
, d2, d1). The attack is based on the introduction of a significant error, using any 
fault point X chosen by the attacker instead of P at some points in the point addition 
process. To avoid legal discovery of this error, I correct it at line 3.4.  
 
Algorithm 5.4 Fault Point Attack against Algorithm 2.8 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. W(0)            O, R           P.  
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e          1. 
2. Use X as a fault point, e           1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of W(1) in addition operations. 
3. For i from 1 up to t do       
 3.1 G          W(0) +X. 
      3.2  If ki = 1 then 
         W(1)         W(0) + X. 
          End If. 




      3.3 If W(1) = G then 
            di                 1. 
            Else 
            di                 0. 
           End If.  
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in W(1) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in R 
      3.4 W(1)          R. 
      3.5 W(1)         W(0) + W(1). 
      3.6 W(0)          W(ki). 
      3.7   R          2R. 
      3.8 e           e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. set v          e-1. 
5. k= (dt, dt-1, . . . , d2, d1). 
 
Algorithm 5.4 is initialised by setting W(0) to the identity point O, R to the point P 
and the key size counter e to 1. As in the previous attack, the idea is based on the 
introduction of a significant error, using fault point X instead of P at some stages in 
the point addition process. In each iteration of algorithm 5.4, the result of adding 
W(0) to the introduced fault point X is stored in G. In the next step, the value of ki 
is checked: if it is 1 then the result of adding W(0) to the introduced fault point X 
is stored in W(1).  At this stage, algorithm 5.4 compares W(1) with G; and if they 
are equal, it deduces that the value of the secret key bit in this iteration is 1; 
otherwise, it deduces that the value of the secret key bit is 0. In the next step, R is 
stored in W(1). This operation erases the fault in W(1). After that, W(0) is added to 
W(1) and stored in W(1) while W(ki) is stored in W(0). The value of R is now 
doubled, and the counter size e is incremented by one. The iterations are continued 
until the loop ends. As a result of this process, the estimated bits of k are stored in  
d, and the final value of e-1 represents the bit-size v of k. 
The attacks proposed in algorithms 5.3 and 5.4 can retrieve secret key information 
even though the original algorithms 2.7 and 2.8 incorporate a countermeasure 
against simple power and timing attacks [Cor 1999]. They can also retrieve the 




is implemented; this is because I eliminate the errors as I run the algorithm (Step 
3.5 in algorithm 5.3 and Step 3.4 in algorithm 5.4). 
Example 4 
See appendix B.4 
5.5 Joye’s Algorithms 
I now show how to attack Joye’s Add-always algorithm in both directions: Left-to-
Right and Right-to-Left.  
Algorithm 2.9 in section 2.7.1.1 of chapter 2 shows the Joye-Yen ‘Left-to-Right’ 
version [JY 2002, Fig. 7], working from the most to least significant bits( I modify 
this algorithm to provide the output Q=kP instead of gk ); while algorithm 2.10 in 
section 2.7.1.1 of chapter 2 shows the ‘Right-to-Left’ version [Joy 2007, Alg. 3] 
working in the opposite direction. 
5.5.1 The Left-to-Right Joye-Yen Algorithm 
The fault point attack against algorithm 2.9 involves a modification to the same 
algorithm by adding some steps to change the internal operation and the output of 
the algorithm. My objective in so doing is to recover each of the bits of secret key 
k.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.9 are the secret key 
k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2 in binary form and size of the secret key t. The input by the user 
to algorithm 2.9 is the known base point P, which belongs to the known curve E(Fq) 
over the field GF(q). The output is the known point Q = k*P. Algorithm 2.9 uses 
R(0) and R(1) to accumulate multiples of P, initialising R(0) to O and R(1) to P. 
Then the algorithm enters a loop running from t to 1. In each iteration, R(0) is added 
to R(1) and the result stored in R(¬ ki) while 2R(ki) is stored in R(ki). When the 
loop ends the value in R(0) will be the desired result kP.   
5.5.2 Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Joye-Yen Algorithm 
On accessing the RAM of the victim device where algorithm 2.9 is loaded from the 
EEPROM of the same device, I assume that the bits of k (kt-1,…, k1) are accessible 
in order, from Left-to-Right. The proposed attack makes changes to produce 




ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ on elliptic curve cryptosystems described 
above. 
Algorithm 5.5 is a modification of algorithm 2.9. Therefore, I assume that the bits 
(kt, kt-1, … k2, k1 ) of the secret key k are stored in the firmware of the victim device  
and loaded into the RAM of the victim device by algorithm 5.5 while it is being 
executed in the RAM of the same device. The attacker has no direct access to the 
secret key nor to its size. Only algorithm 5.5 can access it and deal with it as an 
internal input. Along the way, the captured bits of k are stored in values (dt, dt-1, …, 
d2, d1). The attack is based on the introduction of a significant error, using any fault 
point X chosen by the attacker instead of P at some points in the point addition 
process. To avoid legal discovery of this error, I correct it at line 3.4. 
Algorithm 5.5 is initialised by setting R(0) to the identity point O, R(1) to the point 
P and the key size counter e to 1. In each iteration of algorithm 5.5, the result of 
adding R(0) to the introduced fault point X is stored in G. In the next step, the value 
of R(¬ ki) is stored in T.  At this point, algorithm 5.5 compares R(¬ ki) with G; if 
they are equal, it deduces that the value of the secret key bit in this iteration is 1, in 
which case, the error in R(¬ki) is eliminated by replacing it with T. However, if 
R(¬ki) is not equal to G, then the algorithm deduces that the value of the secret key 
bit is 0 in this iteration. 
In the subsequent step, R(0) is added to R(1) and stored in R(¬ ki), while R(ki) is 
doubled. The key size counter e is incremented by one. The iterations are continued 
until the loop ends. As a result of this process, the estimated bits of k are stored in 
d, and the final value of e-1 represents the bit-size v of k. 
Algorithm 5.5 Fault Point Attack against Algorithm 2.9 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)            O, R(1)           P. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e           1. 
2. Use X as a fault point. e           1. 




3. For i from t down to 1 do 
     3.1  G          R(0) +X. 
     3.2  T           R(¬ ke).          
     3.3  If ki = 1 then 
         R(¬ ki)         R(0) + X. 
          End If. 
COMMENT: The loop stores the bits of k in order in the (t)-tuple d. 
      3.4 If R(¬ ki) = G then 
           {di                  1. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(¬ ke) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in T. 
             R(¬ ki)           T. 
             Else 
             di           0. 
             End If.  
      3.5 R(¬ ki)          R(0) + R(1).    
      3.6  R(ki)          2 R(ki). 
      3.7  e           e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. Set v          e-1. 
5. k= (dt, dt-1,  . . . , d2, d1). 
Example 5 
See appendix B.5 
5.5.3 The Right-to-Left Joye Algorithm 
The fault point attack against the Right-to-Left Joye algorithm 2.10 for scalar 
multiplication involves a modification to same algorithm by adding some steps to 
change the internal operation and the output of the algorithm. My objective, as 
always, is to recover each of the bits of the secret key k.   
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 2.10 are the secret key 
k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2 in binary form and size of the secret key t. The input by the user 
to algorithm 2.10 is the known base point P, which belongs to the known curve 




accumulate multiples of P, initialising R(0) to O and R(1) to P. Then the algorithm 
enters a loop running from 1 to t. Joye uses a dummy variable b to store ¬ ke. In 
each iteration, R(b) is doubled and stored in R(b), and this is then added to R(kj) 
with the result again stored in R(b). When the loop ends, the value in R(0) is kP. 
5.5.4 Fault Point Attack against the Right-to-Left Joye Algorithm 
On accessing the RAM of the victim device where algorithm 2.10 is loaded from 
the EEPROM of the same device, I assume that the bits of k (kt, kt-1,…, k1) are 
accessible in order, from Right-to-Left (least to most). The proposed attack makes 
changes to produce algorithms that capture the binary values of k and the attack 
approach is based on ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ on elliptic curve 
cryptosystems described above. 
Algorithm 5.6 is a modification of algorithm 2.10. Therefore, I assume that the bits 
(kt, kt-1, … k2, k1 ) of the secret key k are stored in the firmware of the victim device 
and loaded into the RAM of the victim device by algorithm 5.6 while it is being 
been executed in the RAM of the same device. The attacker has no direct access to 
the secret key nor to its size. Only algorithm 5.6 can access it and deal with it as an 
internal input. Along the way, the captured bits of k are stored in values (dt, dt-1, … 
d3, d2, d1). The attack is based on the introduction of a significant error, using any 
fault point X chosen by the attacker instead of P at some points in the point addition 
process. To avoid legal discovery of this error, I correct it at line 3.7 
Algorithm 5.6 is initialised by setting R(0) to the identity point O, R(1) to the point 
P and the key size counter e to 1. In each iteration of algorithm 5.6, the variable b 
is set to 1- ki, the value of R(b) is doubled, the result of adding R(0) to the introduced 
fault point X is stored in G, and the value of R(b) is stored in T.     
In Step 3.5, the result of adding R(b) to the fault point X is stored in R(b).  At this 
point, algorithm 5.6 compares R(b) with G. If they are equal, it deduces that the 
value of the secret key bit in this iteration is 1; otherwise algorithm 5.6 deduces that 
the value of the secret key bit is 0. Step 3.7 eliminates the error in R(b) by replacing 
it with T. Step 3.8 again replaces the value of R(b) with R(b) + R(ki). The key size 
counter e is incremented by one. The iterations are continued until the loops ends. 
As a result of this process, the estimated bits of k are stored in  d, and the final value 




Algorithm 5.6 Fault Point Attack against Algorithm 2.10 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)           O, R(1)           P. 
COMMENT: Assign pointer label e          1. 
2. Use X as a fault point, e            1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
3. For i from 1 up to t do 
     3.1 b           1- ki. 
     3.2 R(b)         2 R(b). 
     3.3 G           R(0) + X.                      
     3.4 T             R(b). 
     3.5 R(b)               R(b)+ X . 
COMMENT: The loop stores the bits of k in order in the de. 
      3.6 If R(b) = G then 
            di            1. 
            Else 
            di            0. 
        End If. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(b) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in T. 
     3.7 R(b)          T. 
     3.8 R(b)            R(b) + R(ke).  
     3.9 e           e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. set v          e-1. 
5. k= (dt, dt-1, . . . , d2, d1). 
Example 6 





This chapter showed a new fault point attack implemented on six different scalar 
multiplications algorithms. The aim of this attack was to retrieve the secret key k 
bits used in these algorithms to find the result of Q=kP. Fault point attack was based 
on ideas concerning the ‘safe error attack’ on elliptic curve cryptosystems described 
in [YJ 2000], in which the attacker injected a fault into the intermediate calculation 
values of multiples of P, and from this, deduced a bit value of k. The attack was 
simulated successfully by Maple 2017b on all six algorithms with low numbers and 




















Chapter Six Implementation of Proposed Attacks on RSA 
and ECC by Arduino Mega2560 Hardware 
Arduino Mega2560 hardware is an open hardware and software product used as an 
experimental tool to support developers in different applications like IoT devices. 
The Arduino Mega2560 acts as a mini laptop computer with restricted resources. 
The implementation of attacks proposed in this thesis against RSA and ECC by 
using Arduino Mega2560 demonstrates the possibility of applying my attacks to 
recover secret keys from hardware devices with restricted resources. This chapter 
is related to the thesis goals as it focuses on the implementation of attacks proposed 
against RSA and ECC.  
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I implement ten attack algorithms proposed in chapters four and five 
against RSA and ECC cryptosystems by using Arduino Mega2560 hardware. I 
present in section 6.2 a full description of the implementation process of RSK attack 
against protected Montgomery Ladder RSA Left-to-Right algorithm [Chap. 4, 
section 4.4.1] which is one of the fault attacks proposed against RSA algorithms in 
this thesis. Section 6.2 offers a detailed description of implementation procedures 
which represent a model that is applied in all the other implementation examples of 
fault attacks proposed in this thesis against RSA and ECC cryptography algorithms. 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the possibility of implementation of 
attacks proposed in this thesis against RSA and ECC in devices with low and 
restricted hardware resources. This chapter also includes a short comparison 
between Maple and MATLAB concerning the implementation of attack algorithms 
and the difficulty I face when implementing high numbers (3072 bits long digits) 
for RSA and high numbers (384 bits long digits) for ECC with MATLAB software.  
The rest of chapter six is organized as follows: Section 6.2 deals with hardware 
implementation procedures of proposed RSK attack on RSA algorithm by using 
Arduino Mega2560. Section 6.3 presents a comparison between Maple and 




6.2 Hardware Implementation of proposed RSK attack on RSA 
Algorithm by using Arduino Mega2560 
Implementation of my proposed RSK attack on RSA algorithm can be summarised 
as follows: 
6.2.1 Description of a general IoT device 
An average device component of the IoT has an internal EEPROM and RAM and 
uses a suitable cipher suite to authenticate data being exchanged with other devices 
in the same information network through a handshake protocol.   
6.2.2 Preparing the victim device  
I assume that the victim device is an average device component of the IoT with 
internal (readable and writable) EEPROM and RAM memories. In particular, it 
should be equivalent to the Arduino Mega2560 model of the Arduino series devices, 
which has an internal EEPROM of size 4 KB, making it suitable for implementing 
my proposed attacks. 
In preparing the victim device for the attack, I chose an Arduino Mega2560 and 
provided its EEPROM with three algorithms: a handshake program, and RSA and 
ECC algorithms as follows: handshake [CT 2014], Protected Montgomery Ladder 
RSA Left-to-Right algorithm [Chap. 4, section 4.4.1] and The Right-to-Left Coron 
ECC algorithm [chap. 5, section 5.4.3]. 
The handshake program is used to establish connection with other devices. It also 
checks for cipher suite used for authenticating data and the compatibility of 
cryptography algorithm used to secure data exchange between the two devices. The 
RSA and ECC algorithms are used to secure data being exchanged. The handshake 
program and the MATLAB script of the two algorithms of RSA and ECC inside 
the internal EEPROM are shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. 
Program 1 Handshake Program 
The device sends a TCP Synchronize packet to Destination, 
The device sends the cryptography suite used  
The device receives Destination's SYN-ACK, cryptography suite ACK 
The device sends Acknowledge, 
TCP socket connection is ESTABLISHED. 




MATLAB Script of Protected Montgomery Ladder RSA Left-to-Right 
Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): Secret key d, Secret key size t. 
INPUT by user: Modulus n, Message g. 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 
r=[1 g]; 
for i=1:t  
    if d(i)==1 
     b=1; 
    else 
    b=2; 
    end 
    if d(i)==1 
     u=2; 
    else 
     u=1; 






clearvars  a; 
Figure 6.2 RSA MATLAB Script. 
MATLAB Script of Right-to- Left-to- Coron ECC Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from Firmware): Secret key d, Secret key d size 
t. 
INPUT by user: Coefficients of ECC equation a4 and a5, prime p, Base 
point P1. 
a = arduino(‘COM5’,’Mega2560’) 







   if d(i)==1 
       u=2; 
   else 
       u=1; 
   end 
   W(2,:)=R 
   W(2,:)=addell([W(1,1),W(1,2)],[W(2,1),W(2,2)],a4,a5,p); 
   W(1, :)=W(u,:) 
   R=multell([R(1),R(2)],2,a4,a5,p) 
end 
 W(1, :) 
clear arduino 
clearvars  a; 
Figure 6.3 ECC MATLAB Script. 
6.2.3 Generic plan to attack an IoT device  
The generic plan to attack an IoT device is based on establishing a wired connection 
between the computer of the attacker and the IoT device in the absence of the owner 
of the device for a period of time. The attacker must have full access to the IoT 
device, reads the internal EEPROM of the device and finds the cryptographic 
algorithm he wants to target and loads it into the RAM of the same device. Finally, 
the attacker modifies the target cryptographic algorithm according to his attack, 
executes the modified algorithm inside the RAM of the same device and retrieves 
the secret key. 
I assume that I am an attacker. I enter a room in which an information network is 
operating through various IoT devices. I also assume that the administrator of the 
information network is out of room for a period of time.  I choose one of the IoT 
devices in the network, which is Arduino Mega2560 model of the Arduino series 
devices, to be a victim device because it has an internal EEPROM of the size of 4 
KB which is suitable for implementing my proposed attacks in the thesis. The 
Manufacturing Company of Arduino provides an Arduino Desktop IDE which can 
be used to program this hardware device. The Arduino Desktop IDE software is 




supported by MATLAB 2017b which offers a particular software package dealing 
with this device. The MATLAB 2017b also provides built-in functions that 
facilitate executing cryptography algorithms. The Arduino Mega2560 is 
characterized by the following specifications: Microcontroller ATmega2560, 
Flash Memory 256 KB of which 8 KB are used by the bootloader 
(firmware), SRAM 8KB and EEPROM 4KB. Figure 6.4 shows the main 
components of Arduino Mega2560 [Chu 2018]. 
 
Figure 6.4 the Main Components of Arduino Mega2560 
 I assume that the EEPROM in the victim device is both readable and writable such 
as the EEPROM 24LC256 chip, and that a suite of cryptographic algorithms as well 
as a hand-shake protocol are stored there. For example, as described in [Neto2018], 
a suite of protocols such as those recommended by NIST [PMC 2014, Section 3.3] 
could be loaded during its manufacturing process. 
I assume that when a key is needed, it is generated on some secondary computing 
device of the victim owner and securely (via hardware) stored in firmware on the 
Arduino device to be called when the associated algorithm is run. 
When running one of the cryptographic algorithms, it loads into RAM along with 




algorithm is used but used for a time period covering several deployments of the 
authentication.   
Figure 6.5 shows the diagram of hardware implementation of a fault attack 
proposed in this thesis against RSA cryptography algorithm stored in the internal 















Figure 6.5 Block Diagram of the Plan of Attack. 
The implementation procedures of proposed fault attacks can be summarized in the 
following steps:   
1. I establish a connection between my computer laptop with the victim device 
through a USB wire. I use the standard EEPROM library included in the Arduino 
Desktop IDE software to deal with internal EEPROM of the victim device. I use 
the command EEPROM.read (address) to read a byte from EEPROM. I read 4096 
bytes since the size of internal EEPROM inside the victim device is 4 kB. The 






















Input key d and its 








2. Checking contents of EEPROM to 




of characters. Figure 6.6 shows the screen shot of the first 26 locations of EEPROM 
content. I use the sketch below to get all values stored in the internal EEPROM. 
#include <EEPROM.h> 
int addr = 0; 
byte value; 
void setup() { 
  // put your setup code here, to run once: 
Serial.begin(9600); 
  // initialise serial and wait for the port to open: 
  while (!Serial) { 
    ; // wait for serial port to connect. Needed for native USB port only 
  } 
} 
void loop() { 
  // put your main code here, to run repeatedly: 
 value = EEPROM.read(addr); 
 Serial.print(addr); 
  Serial.print("\t"); 
  Serial.write(value); 
  Serial.println(); 
 addr = addr + 1; 
 if (addr == EEPROM.length()) { 
   for(;;){} 
 } 






Figure 6.6 Screen Shot of the First 26 Locations of EEPROM Content. 
The result of the above operation is presented as symbols from the characters set of 
ASCII codes instead of hexadecimal values because I used the command 
Serial.write (value) to show the output in serial output console of the victim device. 
The command Serial.write (value) prints the character equivalent to the 
hexadecimal code of ASCII codes. Figure 6.6 shows only the first 26 locations of 




2.  I copy the results I get from step one and paste them it on a word document. I 
read the stream of characters inside the word document and search for the keyword 
powermod which indicates the location of RSA program.  
3. Depending on my knowledge and experience I rebuild the MATLAB script of 
RSA algorithm from the equivalent characters I get from step two for the whole 
RSA algorithm and load it into the RAM of the victim device. The MATLAB script 
will be as follows: 
Internal INPUT: Secret key d, Secret key size t. 
INPUT by user: Modulus n, Message g. 
OUTPUT: y=gd mod n 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 
r=[1 g]; 
for i=1:t  
    if d(i)==1 
     b=1; 
    else 
    b=2; 
    end 
    if d(i)==1 
     u=2; 
    else 
     u=1; 









clearvars  a; 
The first step of the MATLAB script is internal input which loads the values of the 
secret key d and its size t from firmware inside the flash memory of the victim 
device into the RAM of the same device. This operation is executed by RSA 
algorithm and I have no control over it. I can only input the modulus n and message 
g inside the algorithm.  
The MATLAB script considers the first value from left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the MATLAB script defines Left-to-Right in the For-Loop as “For 
i=1:t  ” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-Loop in 
RSA algorithm from Left-to-Right is defined as “For i from t to 1 do”.  
4. I modify the original MATLAB script I got from step three according to Figure 
6.7 which represents the RSK attack algorithm against RSA algorithm. 
RSK Attack Algorithm against RSA Algorithm  
Internal INPUT: Secret key d, Secret key size t. 
INPUT by attacker: Fault value X, Modulus n, Message g. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form. 
1. R(0)          1, R(1)         g.  
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of R(di) in multiplication 
operations. 
2. For i from t to 1 do 
     2.1 b          ¬ di. 
     2.2 H            R(b) *X (mod n).   
     2.3 S           R(b) (mod n).          
     2.4  If di = 1 then 
         R(b)           R(b) * X (mod n). 
          End IF. 
COMMENT: The loops store the bits of d in order in the (t)-tuple d. 
      2.5 If R(b) = H then 




 COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(b) by replacing the fault value by a 
value stored in T 
             R(b)           S. 
             Else 
             ki                   0. 
             End If.  
      2.6 R(b)          R(b)*R(di) (mod n). 
      2.7 R(di)          R(di)
2(mod n). 
 End for 
3. d= (kt, kt-1, . . . , k3 , k2, k1). 
Figure 6.7 RSK Attack Algorithm against RSA Algorithm 
5. The final result of modifying the original RSA MATLAB script carried out in 
step 4 will be: 
Internal INPUT: Secret key d, Secret key size t. 
INPUT by attacker: fault value X, modulus n, message g. 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 
r=[1 g]; 
Comment: The function sym() used to deal with high integers more than 64 bit. 
k =sym ('k', [1 t]) 
for i=1:t 
    if d(i)==1 
     b=1; 
    else 
    b=2; 
    end 
    if d(i)==1 
     u=2; 
    else 
     u=1; 
    end 





 if d(i)== 1 
     r(b)=mod(r(b)*X,n) 
 end 
 if r(b)==h 
  k(i)=1 
  r(b)=s 
 else 






clearvars  a; 
I execute the modified algorithm in the RAM of the victim device, and the result I 
get is the secret key value which is shown below. 
The retrieved value of the secret key k will be [kt, kt-1 , . .  , k2, k1] 
6.2.4 Implementation Time of RSK Attack against RSA Program  
The time required for the attack to be completed is 20.08 minutes. This time is 
calculated for implementing the following steps: 
1. Getting control of the victim device by connecting it to my computer and 
preparing Arduino Desktop IDE software to be operated. 
2. Reading all the contents of EEPROM of the victim device. 
3. Checking the output of step 2 and specifying the location of RSA original 
algorithm to be attacked. The time needed to carry out this step depends on the 
experience of the attacker. 
4. Running MATLAB 2017b and rebuilding the RSA original MATLAB script. 
5. Modifying the result of step 4 according to the attack algorithm. 





More experienced attackers usually spend less implementation time.   
The implementation is done with  
Message g=124. 
Modulus n=143. 
Secret key d = 1     0     0     0     1     1     1     1     1     0     0     0     0     1     1     1 
  Columns 17 through 32 
     1     0     0     0     1     0     1     1     1     0     0     0     0     0     1     1 
  Columns 33 through 35 
     1     1     1. 
Size of key t=35. 
Fault value X=66.   
Appendix C provides ten implementation examples which demonstrate how the 
attacks proposed by this thesis can be implemented on RSA and ECC cryptography 
algorithms by using Arduino Mega2560. 
6.3 Maple and MATLAB: A Comparison 
In chapters four and five, I have used Maple 2017 as a software platform in 
implementation of attack algorithms which I proposed against RSA and ECC 
cryptosystems. In this chapter, I have chosen MATLAB 2017b [MATLAB 2017] 
as a software platform to implement all attacks proposed against RSA and ECC by 
using Arduino mega2560. Now, I want to point out some significant similarities 
and differences, which I have noticed, between Maple and MATLAB in the 
implementation of cryptography algorithms.  
Firstly, Maple is similar to MATLAB as each of the two software platforms has a 
special cryptography package containing built-in functions to simplify applying 
cryptography algorithms.  
Secondly, Maple can deal with high numbers like (3072 bits long digits) in RSA 
and (384 bits long digits) in case of ECC directly. However, MATLAB converts 
the same high numbers mentioned above in floating point’s representation which is 




function which converts high numbers from floating point’s representation into 
special high numbers. The sym function represents one of the functions define in 
the symbolic toolbar of MATLAB. 
Finally, Maple uses fast modular exponentiation to deal with high numbers 
mentioned above for RSA and ECC when dealing with modular inverse functions. 
However, MATLAB lacks fast modular exponentiation to deal with high numbers. 
Therefore, MATLAB gives an error when using high numbers with modular 
inverse.  
In spite of all the restriction of MATLAB, I have succeeded to factorize RSA 
modulus and retrieve the secret key in RSA with high numbers (3072 bits long 
digits).  I have also succeeded to retrieve the secret keys d in all six attack 
algorithms proposed against ECC with high numbers (384 bits long digits).      
Example 
In this example I demonstrate how MATLAB and MAPLE deal with high numbers. 
I will use the result of x=2100 as an example to show the difference between 
MATLAB and Maple when dealing with result x. 
In Maple 
x := 2100; 




By using sym() function 
>> x=sym(x) 
x =  
1267650600228229401496703205376 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I described the implementation of all the attacks proposed in this 
thesis against RSA and ECC by using Arduino Mega2560 as a hardware platform 




implementation process was to prove the possibility of applying my proposed 
attacks on a restricted hardware device like Arduino Mega2560 which represents 
an example of IoT devices. The implementation is conducted successfully with 
small numbers (two to three digits), high numbers (3072 bits long digits) in RSA 
and (384 bits long digits) in case of ECC. Furthermore, I made a short comparison 
between MAPLE and MATLAB software concerning implementing cryptography 
algorithms. I also explained the difficulty I had faced when using MATLAB in my 
implementation and then I offered some solutions to the problems I had faced in 




















Chapter Seven Summary, Conclusion & Future work  
In this chapter, I present an overall summary of my research work. The chapter also 
includes the main findings and conclusions that may be derived from this research 
work. Finally, I offer my suggestions for future work. 
7.1 Summary  
This research work may be summarized as follows: 
1. I built a programming platform to implement two public key systems (RSA and 
Elliptic Curve) by using Maple 2017. I used this software platform to analyse the 
procedures of these cryptographic systems. 
2. I have studied and analysed attacks against RSA and Elliptic Curve by reviewing 
previous related work. I have developed different scenarios of attacks for different 
protocols i.e. ECDH, encryption or signature. The attacks proposed in this thesis 
only target the modular exponential and scalar multiplication. 
3. I reviewed existing literature on EEPROM hardware devices. However, my 
proposed attacks are based on idea of attacking software used to program EEPROM 
and trying to change EEPROM content in a way that simplifies the detection of the 
secret key value. My review of EEPROM devices supported the idea of my 
proposed attacks and helped me to achieve my goal. Therefore, I included a whole 
chapter to my thesis under the name of ‘EEPROM Environment’. 
4. I proposed two new fault attacks on RSA cryptosystems. The first one was the 
fault factorizing attack (FF) which factorized the RSA modulus by applying a fault 
attack on the two RSA-CRT Signature Garner’s algorithms. The first algorithm was 
protected by modified Shamir’s countermeasure and the second one was protected 
by simplified Vigilant’s countermeasure. It can be clearly noted that the proposed 
FF attacks induce a fault into the computation of i_q. I also proposed a retrieve 
secret key (RSK) attack which was able to retrieve the secret key d by applying a 
fault attack on both protected Montgomery Ladder RSA versions: “Left-to-Right 
and Right-to-Left” algorithms. I implemented the two attacks FF and RSK by using 
Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-4500 CPU 2.4 GHZ with 8 GB RAM as a hardware platform 
and Windows 7 as the operating system. Maple 2017 was chosen as the software 
platform as it contains a cryptography package designed for cryptographic 





5. I proposed a fault point attack on six scalar multiplications algorithms of ECC 
which are both versions “Left-to-Right and Right-to-Left” of Montgomery, Coron 
and Joye algorithms. I also made a comparison between General Weierstrass and 
Montgomery Elliptic Curves equations. I used the General Weierstrass Elliptic 
Curves equations because they compute the two coordinates x and y of the point in 
the same step. I implemented the fault point attack on six ECC algorithms by using 
Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-4500 CPU 2.4 GHZ with 8 GB RAM as a hardware platform 
and Windows 7 as the operating system. I selected Maple 2017 as a software 
platform because it contains a cryptography package designed for cryptographic 
computation operations. 
6. I complemented the implementation of all attack algorithms against RSA and 
ECC by using Arduino Mega2560 hardware. The number of attack algorithms 
which had been implemented were ten: four against RSA algorithms and six against 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) algorithms.  
The Arduino Mega2560 is characterized by the following specifications: 
Microcontroller ATmega2560, Flash Memory 256 KB of which 8 KB are 
used by the bootloader (firmware), SRAM 8KB and EEPROM 4KB. The 
software platform used in the implementation was MATLAB 2017b. I faced some 
problems in programming these attack algorithms by using MATLAB 2017b, 
especially when I used high numbers: (3072 bits long digits) for RSA and (384 bits 
long digits) for ECC. However, I was able to solve these problems and I managed 
to complete implementation of attack algorithms with high numbers for all ten 
attack algorithms. 
7.2 Conclusion 
My research work has revealed certain facts and conclusions that can be specified 
as follows: 
1. A fault attack can be implemented on hardware devices not only by targeting 
their hardware components but, also by attacking the software used to program and 




2. Use of devices with readable/writable/ EEPROM should be avoided in the IoT 
in order to circumvent attacks such as mine.  
3. The PUF security techniques which are used to generate secret key in real time 
cannot prevent the proposed attacks in this thesis. The proposed attacks in this thesis 
change algorithms stored in EEPROM and retrieve secret keys during algorithms 
operations in real time instead of retrieving keys generated previously and stored in 
EEPROM memory. 
4. The attacks proposed in this research work can be implemented on a device with 
limited resources such as a Arduino Mega2560 hardware device. These attacks can 
retrieve the secret key for ECC with key size 384 bits long digits and factorize 
modulus n and also retrieve the secret key for RSA with key size 3072 bits long 
digits. The key sizes recommended for the year 2018 are 384 bits long digits for 
ECC and 3072 bits long digits for RSA according to BlueKrypt web site.  Bluekrypt 
website [Gir 2017] is a site which gives recommendations for key size according to 
the requirements of different security institutes all over the world. 
5. Maple software provides more powerful functions to deal with high numbers like 
3072 bits long digits than MATLAB. Therefore, it is more suitable to use Maple 
instead of MATLAB when implementing cryptography algorithms.  
7.3 Future work 
In this section I will offer few suggestions for future work which can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Extending the Implementation of the attacks proposed in this research work to 
other cryptosystems which are used to secure IoT devices including lightweight 
cryptography algorithms. 
2. This thesis deals with hardware implementation of proposed FF, RSK and fault 
point attacks against RSA and ECC cryptography algorithms in case of direct access 
(wired connection between attacker computer and victim device)  and leaves 
indirect access (wireless connection) as future work.  The attacker can target a 
victim device even if he has no direct access to it. He can establish a connection 




the attacker with the opportunity to get control over a hardware device without 
being observed by the device owner. 
3. The attacks proposed in this thesis target (modular exponentiation in the case for 
RSA) or (scalar multiplication in the case of ECC). An approach which combines 
the two techniques in dealing with both algorithms, i.e. RSA and ECC, can be 
considered for a future work. The two algorithms typically perform both kinds of 
computations, i.e. modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication.  
4. This thesis offers some ideas for empowering and upgrading the countermeasures 
resistance to fault attacks proposed in this thesis. These ideas deal with two aspects 
of protection. The first one concerns the physical access of an attacker to the victim 
hardware device which can be prevented by protecting these hardware devices from 
unauthorized, direct access (wired connection). Furthermore, owners of hardware 
device are advised to disable any facility of remote connection via Bluetooth or near 
field communication (NFC) technology and enable these facilities only when they 
need them for an authorized information transfer (wireless connection). The second 
aspect is related to the software used to program and update hardware devices. This 
software must be obtained from a known source and which has the authority to 
perform program or update processes. This may prevent any malware software or 
unknown source software to make any modifications on the hardware content.          
5. Modifying the attack algorithms proposed in this thesis to overcome any 
countermeasures proposed against them in future. 
6. I plan to include the implementation of fault point attack against Edwards’s 
curves in a future work. 
7. In the near future, I plan to submit a selection of results of this thesis to a 
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A.1 Example 5 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 4.2 are p=31, q=29 
d=593 and  𝑖𝑞 ≡ q
-1 mod p=15. The input enter by user to algorithm 4.2 are the 
message M=23 and the random fault value X=66. I assume that p, q, d and 𝑖𝑞 are 
stored in firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any access 
to them. The goal of this example is to compute q which has a partial factor of 
n=p*q. 
Algorithm 4.2 was implemented in Maple code and the steps are shown below.  
1. r := (rand(2 .. 2^4))(); r := 11. 
2. pr := p*r; pr := 341. 
3. qr := q*r;  qr := 319. 
4. er := "error"; er := "error". 
    if `mod`(pr, p) <> 0 or `mod`(qr, q) <> 0 then er end if. 
5. v := (p-1)*(r-1); v := 300. 
    Spr: = `mod`(M^(`mod`(d, v)), pr); Spr := 232. 
6. u := (q-1)*(r-1); u := 280. 
Sqr := `mod`(M^(`mod`(d, u)), qr); Sqr := 199. 
7. if `mod`(Spr, r) <> `mod`(Sqr, r) then er end if. 
8. Sp := `mod`(Spr, p); Sp := 15. 
9. Sq := `mod`(Sqr, q); Sq := 25. 
10. Scrt := Sq+q*(`mod`(iq*(Sp-Sq), p)); Scrt := 170. 
11 and 12. Scrte := Sq+q*(`mod`(X*(Sp-Sq), p)); Scrte := 663. 
13. n=p*q=899. 




15. unassign ('Scrte'). 
16. if `mod`(Scrt, p) <> `mod`(Spr, p) or `mod`(Scrt, q) <> `mod`(Sqr, q) then er 
end if. 
17. q = qt; q = 29. 
A.2 Example 6 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 4.4 are p=47, q=37, 
dp≡ d mod (p-1) ≡21,dq≡d mod(q-1) ≡23 and 𝑖𝑞 ≡ q
-1 mod p=14. The inputs by 
the user to algorithm 4.4 are the message M=56 and the random fault value X=34. 
I assume that p, q, dp, dq and  𝑖𝑞 are stored in the firmware of the victim device, and 
the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this example is to 
compute q which has a partial factor of n=p*q. 
Algorithm 4.4 was implemented in Maple code and the steps are shown below.  
1.r := (rand(2 .. 2^4))(); r := 3. 
2. n:= p*q; n := 1739. 
3. pdash := p*r^2; pdash := 423. 
4. ipr := `mod`(1/p, r^2); ipr := 5. 
5. Mp := `mod`(M, pdash); Mp := 56. 
6. Bp := p*ipr; Bp := 235. 
7. Ap := `mod`(1-Bp, pdash); Ap := 189. 
8. Mpdash := `mod`(Ap*Mp+Bp*(1+r), pdash); Mpdash := 103. 
9. qdash := q*r^2; qdash := 333. 
10. iqr := `mod`(1/q, r^2); iqr := 1. 
11. Mq := `mod`(M, qdash); Mq := 56. 
12. Bq := q*iqr; Bq := 37. 
13. Aq := `mod`(1-Bq, qdash); Aq := 297. 




15. eupdash := (p-1)*(r^2-1); eupdash := 368. 
     Spdash := `mod`(Mpdash^(`mod`(dp, eupdash)), pdash);Spdash := 253. 
16. Spr := dp*r+1; Spr := 64. 
17. cp := `mod`(Mpdash+n-M+1, p); cp := 1. 
18. euqdash := (q-1)*(r^2-1); euqdash := 288. 
      Sqdash := `mod`(Mqdash^(`mod`(dq, euqdash)), qdash); Sqdash := 52. 
19. Sqr := dq*r+1; Sqr := 70. 
20. cq := `mod`(Mqdash+n-M+1, q); cq := 1. 
21. Sdash := Sqdash+q*(`mod`(iq*(Spdash-Sqdash), pdash)); Sdash := 10264. 
22. Comment: use X instead of 𝑖𝑞 in the computation of Sdash so we get Sdashe.. 
23. Sdashe := Sqdash+q*(`mod`(X*(Spdash-Sqdash), pdash)); Sdashe := 2494. 
24. qt := gcd(Sdashe^e-M, n); qt := 37. 
25. unassign('Sdashe'). 
26. Sr := Sqr+q*(`mod`(iq*(Spr-Sqr), pdash)); Sr := 12613. 
27. cs := `mod`(Sdash-Sr+1, r^2); cs := 1. 
28. Sf := `mod`(M^d, n); Sf := 1569. 
29. Sfchk := `mod`(Sdash^(cp*cq*cs), n); Sfchk := 1569 As Sf=Sfchk no error. 
30. q = qt; q = 37. 
A.3 Example 7 
I choose three random prime numbers p=3967, q=1327 and e=37 and compute 
n=p*q=5264209, and d=e-1 mod (p-1)*(q-1)= 2131993 in decimal form or 
"1000001000100000011001" in binary form. The internal inputs (loaded from the 
firmware) to algorithm 4.6 are d= "1000001000100000011001" in binary form and 
the size of the secret key t= 22. The inputs by the attacker to algorithm 4.6 are the 
message g=12, the random fault value X=8 and modulus n= 5264209. I assume that 




device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this example 
is to retrieve d which is the secret key of RSA. 
Since Maple does not accept indices beginning with 0, as in the binary left to right 
attack, we use 1, 2 instead of 0, 1 in the Maple code. 
The Maple program considers the first value from left when dealing with For-Loop. 
Therefore, the Maple program defines Left-to-Right in the For-Loop as “for i from 
1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-Loop in 
RSA algorithm from Left-to-Right is defined as “For i from t to 1 do”.  
The attack algorithm 4.6 was implemented in Maple code, and the steps are shown 
below.  
Step1.    
> R[1] := 1; R[1] := 1 
> R[2] := g; R[2] := 12                          
Step2. 
> z=1; z=1 
Step3 
for i from 1 to t do 
     Step 3.1 
      if d[i] = "1" then b := 1 else b := 2 end if 
     Step 3.2 
      H: = R[b]*X mod n 
     Step 3.3 
     T := R[b] 
     Step 3.4 
     if d[i] = "1" then  R[b] := R[b]*X mod n  end if 
      Step 3.5 
     if R[b] = H then  k[i] := 1; R[b] := T else k[i] := 0 end if 
    Step 3.6 
    if d[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1end if 




    Step 3.7 
    R[u] := R[u]^2 mod n   
   Step 3.8 
    z := z+1 
End While loop 
Step 4 
 Set v          z-1 
Step 5 
 d= [k1, k2, k3, . . . , kv-1, kv]= "1000001000100000011001" 
A.4 Example 8 
I choose three random prime numbers p=9769, q=10453 and e=29 and compute 
n=p*q=102115357, and d=e-1 mod (p-1)*(q-1)= 52807829 in decimal form or 
"11001001011100100010010101" in binary form. The internal inputs (loaded from 
the firmware) to algorithm 4.8 are d= "11001001011100100010010101" in binary 
form and size of the secret key t= 26. The inputs by the attacker to algorithm 4.8 
are the message g=16, the random fault value X=12 and modulus n= 5264209. I 
assume that the secret key d and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware 
of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of 
this example is to retrieve d which is the secret key of RSA. 
Since Maple does not accept indices beginning from 0, as in the binary left to right 
attack, we use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 1 in the Maple code.  
The Maple program considers the first value from left when dealing with For-Loop. 
Therefore, the Maple program defines Right-to-Left in the For-Loop as “for i from 
t to 1 do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-Loop in 
RSA algorithm from Right-to-Left is defined as “For i from 1 to t do”.  
The attack algorithm 4.8 was implemented in Maple code, and the steps are shown 
below.  
Step1    
> R[1] := 1; R[1] := 1 





> z=1; z=1 
Step3 
for i from t by -1 to 1 do 
     Step 3.1 
      if d[i] = "1" then b := 1 else b := 2 end if 
     Step 3.2 
      H: = R[b]*X mod n 
     Step 3.3 
     T := R[b] 
     Step 3.4 
     if d[i] = "1" then  R[b] := R[b]*X mod n  end if 
      Step 3.5 
     if R[b] = H then  k[i] := 1; R[b] := T else k[i] := 0 end if 
    Step 3.6 
    if d[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1end if 
     R[b]:= R[b]^2 mod n 
    Step 3.7 
    R[b] := R[b]*R[u] mod n   
   Step 3.8 
    z := z+1 
End While loop 
Step 4 
 Set v          z-1 
Step 5 









B.1 example 1 
Here, I demonstrate the attack on a Weierstrass curve, using point addition formulas 
(3) and (4) in the computations, so that both coordinates are evaluated in each step.  
I use the curve y2=x3+x+ (3w+3) over GF(52) where w is a solution of the 
irreducible polynomial x2+4x+2 over GF(5), and so w2=w+3. Based on points in 
affine form, I choose the point P = (0, 2w+1), value k = 6. Based on the general 
Weierstrass equation (1), the coefficients are: a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, a4=1, a5=3w+3. I 
also need a fault value X which I have chosen arbitrarily with value (0, 3w + 4) 
modulo 5. 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 5.2 are k="110" in 
binary form and the size of the secret key t= 3. The inputs by the attacker to 
algorithm 5.2 are the P = (0, 2w+1), the random fault value X=(0, 3w + 4) and the 
curve GF(p) values where p=5, a4=1 and a5=3w+3. I assume that the secret key k 
and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the victim device, and the 
attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k 
which is the secret key of ECC. 
Maple will not directly compute elliptic curve points using the inbuilt commands. 
My options were therefore either to write subroutines in Maple enabling 
computation of values such as (w+4)-1 or (w+4)2 in the extension field, or to use as 
much of Maple as we could and do the remaining work by hand. I opted for the 
latter solution. The four Maple commands ‘solve’, ‘expand’, ‘addell’ and ‘multell’ 
were used extensively, along with manual manipulation. 
Because k is 110 in binary form, algorithm 5.2 will run through two complete 












Iteration 1  
i=2 
Z= R(0)=[0, 2w+1]; 
N=R(0)+X=P+(-P)= O; 
Since k2=1 then R(¬k2)=R(0) +X= P+(-P)= O; 




Set e=e+1=3 updating the key size counter;  
Iteration 2  
i=1 
Z= R(0)= 3P=[4w+3,4w+3]; 
N=R(0)+X=3P+(-P)=2P=[3w+4,3w+2]; 
Since k3=0 then no value added to X and stored in R(¬k3); 
Since R(¬k1)=R(1)≠ N we set d1 =0 and no error occurs in R(¬k3);  
R(¬k1)=R(1)=R(0)+R(1)=3P+4P=7P=[2w,4w+2]; 
R(k1)=R(0)=2R(k1)=2R(0)=6P=[2w+2,3]; 
Set e=e+1=4 updating the key size counter; 
End of loop 
Set v = e – 1 = 3. 
I obtain the final value of k as the components of the triple (1, d2, d1) which is 110.  
B.2 Example 2 
I use the same experimental environment and addition operations which I have used 
for the attack in the previous section.  
The chosen curve is of Montgomery type:  
y2 = x3 + 356055934632865372341974084664 x2 + x with P = (737747, 724721), 
where k = 8957 in base 10 and is “10001011111101” in base 2, and the field is 
GF(p) where p = 1083948976932424618521046268491.  
 I also need a fault value X which I have chosen arbitrarily with value (737747, 
1083948976932424618521045543770). 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 5.4 are 




by the attacker to algorithm 5.4 are the P = (737747, 724721), the random fault 
value X=(737747, 1083948976932424618521045543770) and the curve GF(p) 
values where p=1083948976932424618521046268491, a4=1 and a5=0. I assume 
that the secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the 
victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this 
example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
I use point addition formulas (3) and (4) in the computations so that both 
coordinates are evaluated in each step. 
In the Maple code below, I use R(1) instead of R(0) and R(2) instead of R(1) as 
Maple does not use the index 0. Note also that O in Maple is represented as 
[“infinity”,”infinity”]. 
The Maple program considers the first value from left when dealing with For-Loop. 
Therefore, the Maple program defines Right-to-Left in the For-Loop as “for i from 
t by -1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-
Loop in ECC algorithm from Right-to-Left is defined as “For i from 1 to t do”. 
 
Step 1  
> R [1]:= [“infinity”, “infinity”]; R [1]:= [“infinity”, “infinity”]; 
> R [2]:= [737747, 724721]; R [2]:= [737747, 724721]; 
> e:=1; e:=1 
Step 2 
>X:= (737747, 1083948976932424618521045543770); X:= (737747, 
1083948976932424618521045543770). 
Step 3 
for i from t  by -1 to 1 do  : 
  Step 3.1 
 E := R[1] 
  Step 3.2 
 G := R[2] 
COMMENT: Since b is an index in the next steps, we use b = 1, 2 instead of b = 
0, 1 
  Step 3.3 
  if k[i] = "1" then b := 1 else b := 2 end if 




    N := addell([R[1][1], R[1][2]], [X[1], X[2]], a4, a5, p) 
  Step 3.5 
    if b = 1 then R[b] := addell([R[1][1], R[1][2]], [X[1], X[2]], a4, a5, p) end if      
  Step 3.6 
    c := R[b];  
    if c = N then d[i] := "1"; R[b] := E else d[i] := "0" end if  
  Step 3.7 
    R[b] := addell([R[1][1], R[1][2]], [R[2][1], R[2][2]], a4, a5, p) 
  Step 3.8 
    R[2] := G 
  Step 3.9 
    R[2] := multell([R[2][1], R[2][2]], 2, a4, a5, p) 
    Step 3.10 
    e := e+1 
End of Step 3 
Step 4 
v=e-1; v=14 
 Step 5 (the bits of k are output) 
[d14=1, d13=0, d12=0, d11=0, d10=1, d9=0, d8=1, d7=1, d6=1, d5=1, d4=1, d3=1, d2=0, d1=1] 
Concerning the point X on the curve, the Maple notation for the x- (respectively y-
) coordinate of X is given by X[1] (respectively X[2]). So in Step 3 above, where 
R[i] is itself a point, the notation R[i][1] refers to its x-coordinate.  
B.3 Example 3 
I choose the field GF(16708911996216745859) for the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 
9763215x + 16479282469090387564 with point P = (612359, 1000013) given in 
affine form. My target is to find k, which I know in advance is 933 in base 10 and 
is “1110100101” in base 2. I set p = 16708911996216745859. I also choose 
arbitrarily a fault point X:= ( 612359, 16708911996215745846). 
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
are: a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, a4=9763215, a5=16479282469090387564.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 5.6 are 




the attacker to algorithm 5.6 are the P = (612359, 1000013), the random fault value 
X:= (612359, 16708911996215745846)and the curve GF(p) values where 
p=16708911996216745859, a4=9763215 and a5=16479282469090387564. I 
assume that the secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware 
of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of 
this example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
Implementation of algorithm 5.6 in Maple code access register bits from Left-to-
Right and the steps for this example are shown below. I begin with counter key size 
e=2 as I begin to count from second bit as the first bit is always 1. The notations 
P[1] and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa and ordinate values of the point P. 
Since Maple does not accept indices beginning from 0, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 
and 1. 
The Maple program considers the first value from left when dealing with For-Loop. 
Therefore, the Maple program defines Left-to-Right in the For-Loop as “for i from 
1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-Loop in 
ECC algorithm from Left-to-Right is defined as “For i from t to 1 do”.  
Step 1 
> W[1]:= P; W[1]:=[ 612359, 1000013] 
> e:=2; e:=2 
Step 2 
> X:= [ 612359, 16708911996215745846] 
COMMENT: Inject error into Step 3 by using X instead of P in addition operations: 
Step 3 
for i from 1  to t -1 do      
  Step 3.1 
  W[1] := multell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], 2, a4, a5, p) 
  Step 3.2    
  R := addell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], [X[1], X[2]], a4, a5, p) 




  W[2]:= addell([W[1][1],W[1][2]],[X[1],X[2]].a4,a5,p);  
  Step 3.4  
  if k[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1 end if;  
  n := W[u]; 
  if n = R then d[i] := "1" else d[i] := "0" end if 
 Step 3.5   
 W[2] := addell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], [P[1], P[2]], a4, a5, p) 
Step 3.6 
 W[1] := W[u] 
Step 3.7 
 e := e+1 
End of Step 3 
Step 4 
> v := e-1; v := 10 
Step 5 (the bits of k are output) 
[d10=1, d9=1, d8=1, d7=0, d6=1, d5=0, d4=0, d3=1, d2=0, d1=1] 
B.4 Example 4 
I choose the curve y2=x3+x+(3w+3) over GF(52) where w is a solution of the 
irreducible polynomial x2+4x+2 over GF(5), and so w2=w+3.  Based on points in 
affine form, I choose P = (0, 2w+1), the value k = 6.  
Based on the general Weierstrass equation (1), the coefficients are: a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, 
a4=1, a5=3w+3. I also choose arbitrarily a fault point X= (0, 3w + 4) modulo 5.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 5.8 are k="110" in 
binary form and the size of the secret key t= 3. The inputs by the attacker to 
algorithm 5.8 are the P = (0, 2w+1), the random fault value X= (0, 3w + 4) and the 
curve GF(p) values where p=5, a4=1 and a5=3w+3. I assume that the secret key k 




attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k 
which is the secret key of ECC.     
Maple will not directly compute elliptic curve points for an extension field using 
the commands of the previous example. My options were therefore either to write 
subroutines for Maple enabling computation of values such as (w+4)-1or (w+4)2 in 
the extension field or to use as much of Maple as I could and do the remaining work 
by hand. I opted for the latter solution. The four Maple commands ‘solve’, ‘expand’, 
‘addell’ and ‘multell’ were used extensively, while their outputs often needed 
manual manipulation; in particular, I used equations (3) and (4) from section 5.2.5. 
Because k is 110 in binary form, algorithm 5.8 will run through three complete 
iterations, in each of which it will produce a bit of k. The description of execution 
of algorithm 5.8 is presented below.  






Choose X=  [0, 3w+4]; 
Step 3 
Iteration 1  
i=1; 
V = W(0) + X = O +(-P) = [0, 3w+4]; 
Since k=0 then W(1) is not changed; 
Since W(1) ≠ V I set d[i] =0; 
W(1)=R= P=[0, 2w+1]; 
W(1)=W(0)+W(1)= O+P = P=[0, 2w+1]; 






Iteration 2  
i=2; 
V = W(0) + X = O +(– P) = [0, 3w+4] ; 
Since k=1 then W(1) = W(0) + X = O +(-P) = [0, 3w+4]; 
Since W(1) = V I set d[i] =1;  
W(1)=R= 2P=[3w+4, 3w+2]; 






V = W(0) + X = 2P +(-P) = P=[0, 2w+1]; 
Since k=1 then W(1) = W(0) + X = 2P +(-P) = P=[0, 2w+1]; 
Since W(1) = V, I set d[i] =1;  
W(1)=R= 4P=[3w+4, 3w+2]; 




The iterations end. 
The final output value of k is equal to (kt, kt-1, …, k1)2 which is represented by the 
components of the triple (d[3], d[2], d[1]) which is 110. 
B.5 Example 5 
I choose the field GF(36028797018963971) for the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 




(36028797018963969, 18083753824772429)  given in affine form. My target is to 
find k, which I know in advance is 1435 in base 10 and is “10110011011” in binary 
base. I set p = 36028797018963971. I also choose arbitrarily a fault point X:= 
(36028797018963969, 17945043194191542). 
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
are: a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, a4=23049492390237540, a5=26353962252453337.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 5.10 are 
k="10110011011" in binary form and the size of the secret key t= 11. The inputs 
by the attacker to algorithm 5.10 are the P = (36028797018963969, 
18083753824772429), the random fault value X:= ([36028797018963969, 
17945043194191542) and the curve GF(p) values where p=36028797018963971, 
a4=23049492390237540 and a5=26353962252453337. I assume that the secret key 
k and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the victim device, and the 
attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k 
which is the secret key of ECC. 
 
The attack algorithm 5.10 is implemented in Maple code, and the steps are shown 
below. The notations P[1] and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa and ordinate 
values of the point P. Since Maple does not accept indices beginning from 0, as in 
the Coron attack, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 1 in the Maple code.  
The Maple program considers the first value from the left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the Maple program defines Left-to-Right in the For-Loop as “for 
i from 1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-
Loop in ECC algorithm from Left-to-Right is defined as “For i from t to 1 do”.  
Step1  
> R[1] := ["infinity", "infinity"];  R[1] := ["infinity", "infinity"] 
> R[2] := P ; R[2] := [36028797018963969, 18083753824772429] 
> e := 1; e := 1 




> X := [36028797018963969, 17945043194191542]; X := [36028797018963969, 
17945043194191542] 
Step 3 
for i from 1  to t  do    
Step 3.1 
G := addell([R[1][1], R[1][2]],[X[1],X[2]],a4,a5,p); 
Step 3.2 
    if k[i] = "1" then z := 1 else z := 2 end if 
    T := R[z]  
Step 3.3  
    if k[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1 end if 
if u=2 then R[z] := addell([R[1][1], R[1][2]],[X[1],X[2]],a4,a5,p); end if; 
Step 3.4     
   n := R[z];  
   if n = G then d[i] := "1"; R[z] := T else d[i] := "0" end if 
Step 3.5     
R[z] := addell([R[1][1], R[1][2]], [R[2][1], R[2][2]], a4, a5, p) 
  Step 3.6 
   R[u] := multell([R[u][1], R[u][2]], 2, a4, a5, p)  
  Step 3.7 
   e := e+1 
  End For Loop 
Step 4 
v:=e-1; v:=11 
Step 5 (the bits of k are output) 




B.6 Example 6 
In this example, I choose an elliptic curve over the extension field GF(28) of GF(2) 
using a solution w of the irreducible polynomial x8+ x4 + x3 +x+1 over GF(2). I use 
the elliptic curve y2+xy=x3 + (w4+w+1) where the coefficients are polynomials in 
GF(28).  Based on points in affine form, I choose the point P = (w, w2 +1), value k 
= 6. Based on the general Weierstrass equation (1), the coefficients are: a1=1, a2=0, 
a3=0, a4=0, and a5= w
4+w+1. I also choose arbitrarily a fault point X = (w, w2 +w+1) 
modulo 2. 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm 5.12 are k="110" in 
binary form and the size of the secret key t= 3. The inputs by the attacker to 
algorithm 5.12 are the P = (w, w2 +1), the random fault value X = (w, w2 +w+1)  
and the curve GF(p) values where p=2, a4=0 and a5= w4+w+1. I assume that the 
secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the victim 
device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this example 
is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
I face here the same Maple problem as in the previous field extension example: 
Maple will not directly compute elliptic curve points using the commands. So I use 
as many Maple commands as possible in combination with manual manipulation; 
in particular, I use equations (3) and (4) from Section 5.2.5.  
Because k is 110 in binary form, the attack algorithm will run through three 
complete iterations, in each of which it will produce a bit of k.  
Step 1 
>R(0)= O; 
>R(1)=P=[ w, w2 +1]; 
> e=1; 
Step 2 
X= - P = [w, w2 +w+1]; 
Step 3 





Since k =0 then b=1-0=1; 
R(b)=R(1)=2R(1)=2P=[w6+w2+w, w6+w5+1]; 
G = R(0) + X = O +(-P) = -P= [w, w2 +w+1]; 
T= R(b)= 2P=[w6+w2+w, w6+w5+1]; 
R(b)= R(b) + X = R(1)+X=2P+(-P) =P= [w, w2+1];  
Since R(b)= R(1)≠G I set d[i] =0;  
R(b)=T=2P=[w6+w2+w, w6+w5+1] which eliminates the error in R(b)=R(1); 






G = R(0) + X = O + (-P) = [w, w2 +w+1]; 
T= R(b)= O; 
R(b)= R(b) + X = R(0)=R(0)+X= O +(-P) = [w, w2 +w+1]; 
Since R(b) = R(0) = G I set d[i] =1;  
R(b)=T= O which eliminates the error in R(b)=R(0); 
R(b)=R(b)+R(ki)=R(0)=R(0)+R(1)= O + 2P = 2P = [w
6+w2+w, w6+w5+1]; 
Set e=e+1=3; 
Iteration 3  
i=3 
Since k =1 then b=1-1=0; 
R(b)=R(0)=2R(0)=4P=[w6+1, w7+w5+w4+w3+1]; 
G = R(0) + X = 4P+(-P) = 3P=[w7+w5+w3+w2, w5+w2+w]; 
T= R(b)=4P=[w6+1, w7+w5+w4+w3+1]; 
R(b)= R(b) + X = R(0)=R(0)+X4P+(-P) = 3P=[w7+w5+w3+w2, w5+w2+w]; 








Ends of iterations 
Iteration 4 
v=e-1=3  
The final output value of k is equal to (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2 as the components of the 





















C.1 Implementation Examples of Fault Factoring (FF) Attack 
Algorithms against RSA-CRT by Using Arduino Hardware 
In this appendix I present the implementation examples of FF attack against RSA-
CRT algorithms by using Arduino Mega2560 hardware. This appendix is arranged 
as follows: appendix C.1.1 focuses on the implementation example of FF attack 
against RSA-CRT signature protected by modified Shamir’s countermeasure. 
Appendix C.1.2 presents the implementation example of FF attack against RSA-
CRT signature protected by Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure.  
C.1.1 Implementation of FF Attack against RSA-CRT Signature 
Algorithm Protected by Modified Shamir’s Countermeasure 
FF Attack Algorithm against RSA-CRT Signature Algorithm Protected by 
Modified Shamir’s Countermeasure 
The details of the FF attack algorithm against RSA-CRT signature algorithm 
protected by modified Shamir’s countermeasure can be found in section 4.3.2. 
Algorithm C.1.1 shows the FF attack algorithm against RSA-CRT Signature 
algorithm protected by modified Shamir’s countermeasure. 
Algorithm C.1.1 The FF Attack Algorithm against RSA-CRT Signature 
Algorithm Protected by Modified Shamir’s Countermeasure 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  p, q, d, 𝑖𝑞 ≡q
-1 mod p. 
INPUT by user:  message M, fault value X.  
OUTPUT: The factor q. 
1. Choose a small random integer r. 
2. pr            p*r. 
3. qr            q*r. 
4. If pr ≢ 0 (mod p) or qr ≢ 0 (mod q ) then return error. 
5. 𝑆𝑝𝑟             𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑟). 
6. 𝑆𝑞𝑟            𝑀
𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑞𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑟). 
7. if  𝑆𝑝𝑟 ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟 then return error. 
8. 𝑆𝑝              𝑆𝑝𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝).         
9. 𝑆𝑞              𝑆𝑞𝑟  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞). 




11. Comment: use X instead of 𝑖𝑞 in the computation of Scrt so we get Scrte. 
12. 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒            𝑆𝑞 + 𝑞 ∗ [(𝑋 ∗ (𝑆𝑝 − 𝑆𝑞) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝))]. 
13. n            p*q 
14. To get q, we compute 𝑞𝑡           gcd((𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒-𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡) ,n).  
15. Eliminate 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒.  
16. if 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡  ≢  𝑆𝑝𝑟  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡  ≢ 𝑆𝑞𝑟( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞) then return error. 
17. return q= 𝑞𝑡. 
 
Example of the Implementation Process  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.1.1 are p=67, q=71 
d=1777 and  𝑖𝑞 ≡ q
-1 mod p=17. The inputs by the attacker to algorithm C.1.1 are 
the message M=23 and the random fault value X=66. I assume that p, q, d and 𝑖𝑞 
are stored in the firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any 
access to them. The goal of this example is to compute q which has a factor of 
n=p*q. The attacker also chooses a small integer r=5. 
The implementation program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 
pr=p*r; 
qr=q*r; 

















if mod(scrt,p)~= mod(spr,p) || mod(scrt,q)~= mod(sqr,q) disp('error'); end 
q=qt 
clear arduino 
clearvars  a; 
The results of the implementation program are: 
RSAshmair_Arduino 
a =  
 arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 
               Libraries: {'I2C', 'Servo', 'SPI'} 
pr = 335 
qr = 355 
spr = 39 
sqr = 34 
sp = 39 
sq = 34 
n =  4757 
scrt = 1312 
qt = 71 




C.1.2 Implementation of the FF Attack against RSA-CRT Signature 
Algorithm Protected by Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure 
FF Attack Algorithm against RSA-CRT Signature Algorithm Protected by 
Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure 
The details of the FF attack algorithm against RSA-CRT signature algorithm 
protected by Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure can be found in section 4.3.4 
Algorithm C.1.2 shows the FF attack algorithm against RSA-CRT Signature 
algorithm protected by Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure. 
Algorithm C.1.2 FF Attack Algorithm against RSA-CRT Signature 
Algorithm Protected by Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  p, q, dp, dq, 𝑖𝑞 ≡q
-1 mod p. 
INPUT by user:  message M, fault value X. 
OUTPUT: The factor q. 
1. Choose a small random integer r. 
2.   n                 p*q. 
3. 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ              𝑝 ∙  𝑟
2.   
4. 𝑖𝑝𝑟                      𝑝
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2). 
5. 𝑀𝑝                 𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
6. 𝐵𝑝                   𝑝 ∙  𝑖𝑝𝑟. 
7. 𝐴𝑝                  1 − 𝐵𝑝( 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
8. 𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ           𝐴𝑝  ∙   𝑀𝑝 + 𝐵𝑝  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
9. 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ             𝑞 ∙  𝑟
2.   
10. 𝑖𝑞𝑟               𝑞
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟2). 
11. 𝑀𝑞              𝑀 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
12. 𝐵𝑞                 𝑞 ∙  𝑖𝑞𝑟. 
13. 𝐴𝑞                  1 − 𝐵𝑞 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
14. 𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ           𝐴𝑞  ∙   𝑀𝑞 + 𝐵𝑞  ∙ (1 + 𝑟) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ). 
15. 𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ              𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
 𝑑𝑝 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝜑(𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ).     
16. 𝑆𝑝𝑟                  1 + 𝑑𝑝  ∙ 𝑟. 
17. 𝑐𝑝                   𝑀𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝). 
18. 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ              𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ




19. 𝑆𝑞𝑟                   1 + 𝑑𝑞  ∙ 𝑟. 
20. 𝑐𝑞                     𝑀𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑛 −𝑀 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞). 
21. 𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ               𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)). 
22. Comment: use X instead of 𝑖𝑞 in the computation of Sdash so we get Sdashe.. 
23. 𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒             𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑋 ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑞𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ) ). 
24. To get q, we compute 𝑞𝑡           gcd((𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒
𝑒 −𝑀),n). 
25.   Eliminate 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑒 . 
26. 𝑆𝑟                     𝑆𝑞𝑟 + 𝑞 ∙ (𝑖𝑞  ∙  (𝑆𝑝𝑟 − 𝑆𝑞𝑟)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ)). 
27. 𝑐𝑠                     𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑆𝑟 + 1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑟
2). 
28. 𝑆 ≡   𝑀𝑑  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛).   
29. 𝑆 ≢   𝑆𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑐𝑝𝑐𝑞𝑐𝑠  (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛) then return error. 
30 return q=𝑞𝑡. 
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.1.2 are p=131, 
q=137, dp≡ d mod (p-1) ≡87, dq≡d mod(q-1) ≡91 and 𝑖𝑞 ≡ q
-1 mod p=22. The 
inputs by the attacker to algorithm C.1.2 are the message M=31 and the random 
fault value X=77. I assume that p, q, dp, dq and  𝑖𝑞 are stored in the firmware in 
victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this 
example is to compute q which has a factor of n=p*q. The attacker also chooses a 
small integer r=6. 
The implementation in program MATLAB 2017b is: 
































if mod(sfinal, n)~= powermod(Sdash,(cp*cq*cs),n) disp('error'); end 
q=qt 
clear arduino 
clearvars  a; 
 
The results of the implementation program are: 
RSAvirlag_Arduino 
a =  
arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 




               Libraries: {'I2C', 'Servo', 'SPI'} 
n = 17947 
pdash = 3275 
ipr =  21 
Mp = 31 
Bp = 2751 
Ap = -2750 
Mpdash = -85119 
qdash = 3425 
iqr = 23 
Mq = 31 
Bq = 3151 
Aq = -3150 
Mqdash = -95869 
eupdash = 3120 
Spdash = 2736 
Spr = 436 
cp = 1 
euqdash = 3264 
Sqdash = 3231 
Sqr = 456 
cq = 1 
Sdash = 306001 




Sdashe = 165576 
qt = 137 
cs = 1 
q = 137 
C.2 Implementation Examples of RSK Attack against Protected 
RSA Montgomery Ladder Algorithms by using Arduino 
Hardware 
In this appendix I present the implementation of the RSK attack against RSA 
algorithms by using Arduino Mega2560. This appendix is arranged as follows: 
appendix C.2.1 deals with the implementation example of retrieve secret key attack 
against protected RSA Montgomery ladder Left-to-Right algorithm. Appendix 
C.2.2 presents the implementation example of retrieve secret key attack against 
protected RSA Montgomery ladder Right –to-Left algorithm. 
C.2.1 Implementation of RSK Attack Algorithm against Protected RSA 
Montgomery Ladder Left-to-Right Algorithm 
RSK Attack Algorithm against Protected RSA Montgomery Ladder Left-to-
Right Algorithm 
The details of RSK attack algorithm against protected RSA Montgomery ladder 
Left-to-Right algorithm can be found in section 4.4.2. Algorithm C.2.1 presents the 
retrieve secret attack algorithm against protected RSA Montgomery ladder Left-to-
Right algorithm.   
 Algorithm C.2.1 RSK Attack against Protected RSA Montgomery ladder 
Left-to-Right Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  d = (dt, dt-1,… , d1)2, size of secret key 
t. 
INPUT by attacker:  message g, fault value X, modulus n. 
OUTPUT: d in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)          1, R(1)         g.  
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label z           1.  
2. z          1. 




3. For i= t to 1 do  
     3.1 b          ¬ dz. 
     3.2 H            R(b) *X (mod n).   
     3.3 T           R(b) (mod n).          
     3.4  If di = 1 then 
         R(b)            R(b) * X (mod n). 
          End IF. 
COMMENT: The loops store the bits of d in order in the (t)-tuple d. 
      3.5 If R(b) = H then 
           {ki          1. 
 COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(b) by replacing the fault value by a value 
stored in T 
             R(b)           T. 
             Else 
             ki                   0. 
             End If.  
      3.6 R(b)          R(b)*R(di) (mod n). 
      3.7 R(di)          R(di)
2(mod n). 
      3.8 z           z+1. 
 End For loop. 
4. Set v         z-1. 
5. d= (kv, kv-1,  . . . , k2, k1). 
 
Example of the Implementation Process  
I choose three random prime numbers p=257, q=263 and e=17 and compute 
n=p*q=67591, and d=e-1 mod (p-1)*(q-1)= 47345 in decimal form or 
"1011100011110001" in binary form. The internal inputs (loaded from the 
firmware) to algorithm C.2.1 are d= "1011100011110001" in binary form and the 
size of the secret key t= 16. The inputs by the attacker to algorithm C.2.1 are the 
message g=124, the random fault value X=66 and modulus n= 67591. I assume that 
the secret key d and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the victim 
device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this example 




The implementation program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 
r=[1 g]; 
z=1; 
k= [1 t] 
for i=1:t 
    if d(i)==1 
     b=1; 
    else 
        b=2; 
    end 
    if d(i)==1 
     u=2; 
    else 
      u=1; 
    end 
 h=mod(r(b)*X,n); 
 T=mod(r(b),n); 
 if d(i)==1 
     r(b)=mod(r(b)*X,n) 
 end 
 if r(b)==h 
  k(i)=1 
  r(b)=T 
 else 













The results of the implementation program are: 
RSAmontLR 
a =  
  arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 
               Libraries: {'I2C', 'Servo', 'SPI'}p =257 
r(1) = 1 % initial value for r(1) and r(2)     
r(2)=124  
r =  20578       50805 % Final value of r(1) and r(2)     
d =[ k16, k15, …., k3, k2, k1] 
   =[ 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1] % retrieve secret key 
C.2.2 Implementation of RSK Attack against Protected RSA 
Montgomery Ladder Right-to-Left Algorithm 
RSK Attack Algorithm against Protected RSA Montgomery Ladder Right-
to-Left Algorithm 
The details of RSK attack algorithm against protected RSA Montgomery ladder 
Right-to-Left algorithm can be found in section 4.4.4. Algorithm C.2.2 shows the 
Retrieve secret attack algorithm against protected RSA Montgomery ladder Right-
to-Left algorithm. 
Algorithm C.2.2 RSK Attack against Protected RSA Montgomery ladder 
Right-to-Left Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware):  d = (dt, dt-1,… , d1)2, size of secret key 
t. 




OUTPUT: d in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)          1, R(1)           g. 
COMMENT: assign key size counter label z           1.  
2. z          1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of R(di) in multiplication operations. 
3. For i= t to 1 do      
     3.1  b           ¬ di. 
     3.2  H          R(b) *X(mod n).    
     3.3  T           R(b) (mod n).          
     3.4  If di = 1 then 
         R(b)         R(b) * X (mod n). 
          End IF. 
COMMENT: The loops store the bits of d in order in the (t)-tuple d. 
      3.5 If R(b) = H then. 
           {ki            1. 
 COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(b) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in T. 
             R(b)           T. 
             Else 
             ki            0. 
             End If.  
      3.6 R(b)          R(b)2 (mod n).    
      3.7 R(b)          R(b)*R(di) (mod n). 
      3.8 z           z+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. Set v          z-1. 
5. d= (kv, kv-1, k3, . . . , k2, k1). 
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
I choose three random prime numbers p=521, q=523 and e=37 and compute 
n=p*q=272483, and d=e-1 mod (p-1)*(q-1)= 168733 in decimal form or 
"101001001100011101" in binary form. The internal inputs (loaded from the 




the size of the secret key t= 18. The inputs by the attacker to algorithm C.2.2 are 
the message g=143, the random fault value X=78 and modulus n= 272483. I assume 
that the secret key d and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the 
victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this 
example is to retrieve d which is the secret key of RSA. 
The implementation program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 
r=[1 g]; 
z=1; 
k = [1 t] 
for i=1:t 
    if d(i)==1 
     b=1; 
    else 
        b=2; 
    end 
    if d(i)==1 
     u=2; 
    else 
      u=1; 
    end 
 h=mod(r(b)*X,n); 
 T=mod(r(b),n); 
 if d(i)==1 
     r(b)=mod(r(b)*X,n) 
 end 
 if r(b)==h 
  k(i)=1 
  r(b)=T 
 else 












The results of the implementation program are  
RSAmontRL 
a =  
  arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 
               Libraries: {'I2C', 'Servo', 'SPI'}p =257 
r(1) = 1 % initial value for r(1) and r(2)     
r(2)=143  
y = 197597   % final value gd 
r = 197597   190622 % Final value of r(1) and r(2)     
d = [k18, k17, …., k3, k2, k1] 
  = [ 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1] % retrieve secret key 
C.3 Implementation Examples of Proposed Attacks against ECC 
by Using Arduino Hardware 
In this appendix I will present the implementation of fault point attacks against ECC 
algorithms by using Arduino Mega2560. This appendix is arranged as follows: 
appendix C.3.1 focuses on the implementation of fault point attack against Left-to-
Right ECC Montgomery ladder algorithm. Appendix C.3.2 presents the 
implementation of fault point attack against Right–to-Left ECC Montgomery 




against Left-to-Right Coron algorithm. Appendix C.3.4 deals with the 
implementation of fault point attack against Right–to-Left Coron algorithm. 
Appendix C.3.5 presents the implementation of fault point attack against Left-to-
Right Joye-Yen algorithm. Appendix C.3.6 focuses on the implementation of fault 
point attack against Right–to-Left Joye algorithm.  
C.3.1 Implementation of Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right ECC 
Montgomery Ladder Algorithm 
Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right ECC Montgomery Ladder 
Algorithm 
The details of the fault point attack against Left-to-Right ECC Montgomery ladder 
algorithm can be found in section 5.3.2. Algorithm C.3.1 shows the fault point 
attack against Left-to-Right ECC Montgomery ladder Left-to-Right algorithm. 
 
Algorithm C.3.1 The Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right ECC 
Montgomery Ladder Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size, where 
kt = 1. 
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)            P, R(1)            2P, e           2. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e           2 and through the loop store 
the bits of k in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 
2. Use X as a fault point.  
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
3. For i from t-1 down to 1 do 
3.1 Z           R(0). 
3.2 N           R(0) + X. 
3.3 If ki=1 then 
R(¬ki)          R(0) +X. 
End if. 




di                1. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(¬ ki) by replacing fault value by a correct 
value stored in Z. 
R(¬ ki)         Z. 
Else 
di           0. 
End If. 
3.5 R(¬ki)           R(0) + R(1). 
3.6 R(ki)            2R(ki). 
3.7 e               e+1. 
End While loop. 
4. set v         e–1. 
5. k= (1, dt-1, dt-2 … d2, d1). 
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
I choose a curve of Montgomery type:  
y2 = x3 + 1024 x2 + x with P = (1029, 208), where k = 522 and the field is 
GF(p) where p = 1031. I arbitrarily choose a fault point X=(1029,823).  
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
are: a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, a4=1, & a5=0.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.3.1 are 
k="1000001010" in binary form and the size of the secret key t= 10. The inputs by 
the attacker to algorithm C.3.1 are the P = (1029, 208), the random fault value 
X=(1029,823)  and the curve GF(p) values where p=1013, a4=1 & a5=0. I assume 
that the secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the 
victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this 
example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
Implementation of algorithm C.3.1 in MATLAB code access register bits from 
Left-to-Right and the steps for this example are shown below. I begin with e=2 as 
the first bit is always 1. The notations P[1] and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa 
and ordinate values of the point P. Since MATLAB does not accept indices 




The MATLAB script considers the first value from the left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the MATLAB script defines Left-to-Right in the For-Loop as “for 
i from 1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-
Loop in ECC algorithm from Left-to-Right is defined as “For i from t to 1 do”. 
The implementation program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 







Z=R(1,:)       
   if k(i)==1 
       u=1; 
   else 
       u=2; 
   end 
   if k(i)==1 
       z=2; 
   else 
       z=1; 
   end 
   N=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p) 
   if u==1 
       r11(u,:)=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p); 
   end 
   if r11(u,:)==N 
       d(i)=1; 
   r11(u,:)=Z; 
   else 




   end 
   R(u,:)=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[R(2,1),R(2,2)],a4,a5,p) 
   r11(z,:)=multell([R(z,1),R(z,2)],2,a4,a5,p) 





The results of the implementation program are: 
ECCMontLRArduino 
a =  
  arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 
               Libraries: {'I2C', 'Servo', 'SPI'}p =257 
R(1 , :) = [1029         208]  % initial value for r(1,1) and r(1, 2) 
 R(2, :)=  [593         450]    % initial value for r(2,1) and r(2, 2) 
R(1 , :)  = [398   641]  % Final value of r(1)  
k = [1, d9, d8, … d2, d1] 
   = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0] % retrieve secret key 
C.3.2 Implementation of Fault Point Attack against Right–to-Left ECC 
Montgomery Ladder Algorithm 
Fault Point Attack against Right–to-Left ECC Montgomery Ladder 
Algorithm 
The details of the fault point attack against Right–to-Left ECC Montgomery ladder 
algorithm can be found in section 5.3.4. Algorithm C.3.2 shows the fault point 




Algorithm C.3.2 Fault Point Attack against Right–to-Left ECC 
Montgomery ladder Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)            O, R(1)           P, e           1. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e          1 and through the loop store 
the bits of k in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 
2. Use X as a fault point. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
3. For i from 1 up to t do 
3.1 E          R(0). 
3.2 G          R(1). 
3.3 b          1– ki. 
3.4 N           R(0) + X. 
3.5 If b=0 then 
      R(b)           R(0) + X. 
      End If. 
3.6 If R(b) = N then 
         {di                 1. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(¬ ke) by replacing the fault value by a 
correct value stored in E. 
           R(b)         E}.    
       Else 
            di           0. 
       End If  
3.7 R(b)           R(0) +R(1). 
3.8 R(1)           G. 
3.9 R(1)           2R(1). 
3.10  e            e+1. 
 End While loop. 




5. k= (dt, dt-1, . . . , d2, d1). 
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
I choose a curve of Montgomery type:  
y2 = x3 + 2048 x2 + x with P = (2061, 972), where k = 1129 and the field is 
GF(p) where p = 2063. I arbitrarily choose a fault point X=(2061,1091).  
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
are: a1=0, a2=0, a3=2048, a4=1, & a5=8192.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.3.2 are 
k="10001101001" in binary form and the size of the secret key t= 11. The inputs 
by the attacker to algorithm C.3.2 are the P = (2061, 972), the random fault value 
X=(2061,1091) and the curve GF(p) values where p=2063, a4=1 & a5=0. I assume 
that the secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the 
victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this 
example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
Implementation of algorithm C.3.2 in MATLAB code access register bits from 
Right-to-Left and the steps for this example are shown below. The notations P[1] 
and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa and ordinate values of the point P. Since 
MATLAB does not accept indices beginning from 0, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 
1. 
The MATLAB script considers the first value from left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the MATLAB script defines Right-to-Left in the For-Loop as “for 
i from t by -1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the 
For-Loop in ECC algorithm from Right-to-Left is defined as “For i from 1 to t do”. 
The Implementation Program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 










   if k(i)==1 
       b=1; 
   else 
       b=2; 
   end 
   if k(i)==1 
       z=2; 
   else 
       z=1; 
   end 
   N=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p) 
   if b==1 
       R(b,:)=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p); 
   end 
   if R(b,:)==N 
       d(i)=1; 
   R(b,:)=E; 
   else 
       d(i)=0; 
   end 
   R(b,:)=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[R(2,1),R(2,2)],a4,a5,p) 
   R(2,:)=G 
   R(2,:)=multell([R(2,1),R(2,2)],2,a4,a5,p) 











R(1 , :) = [Inf   Inf]  % initial value for R(1,1) and R(1, 2) 
 R(2, :)=  [2061         972]    % initial value for R(2,1) and R(2, 2) 
R(1,:) = [799   284]  % Final value of R(1,1) and R(1,2)     
k = [d11, d10, d9, … d2, d1] 
   = [ 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1] % retrieve secret key. 
C.3.3 Implementation of the Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right 
Coron Algorithm 
Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Coron Algorithm 
The details of fault point attack against Coron algorithm can be found in section 
5.4.2. Algorithm C.3.3 shows the fault point attack against Left-to-Right Coron 
algorithm. 
Algorithm C.3.3 Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Coron Algorithm        
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. W(0)            P. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e           2 the loop store the bits of k 
in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 
2. Use X as a fault point, e           2. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations 
3. For i from t-1 down to 1 do 
     3.1 W(0)          2W(0). 
     3.2 R         W(0) + X. 
     3.3 W(1)           W(0)+X. 
COMMENT: The loop stores the bits of k in order in the (t-1)-tuple d. 
     3.4 If W(ki) = R then 
           di            1.  
            Else 
            di         0. 




COMMENT: Eliminate the error in W(1) by replacing fault value by a result of 
addition W(0)+P. 
     3.5 W(1)           W(0)+P. 
     3.6 W(0)           W(ki). 
     3.7 e          e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. Set v          e-1. 
5. k= (1, dt-1, dt-2, . . . , d2, d1.).  
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
I choose a curve: 
y2 = x3 + 4096x + 8192 with P = (8217, 8062), where k=1679 and the field is 
GF(8219) where p=8219. I arbitrarily choose a fault point X=(8217,157). 
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
are: a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, a4=4096, & a5=8192.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.3.3 are 
k="11010001111" in binary form and the size of the secret key t= 11. The inputs 
by the attacker to algorithm C.3.3 are the P = (8217, 8062), the random fault value 
X=(8217,157) and the curve GF(p) values where p=8219, a4=4096 & a5=8192. I 
assume that the secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware 
of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of 
this example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
Implementation of algorithm C.3.3 in MATLAB code access register bits from 
Left-to-Right and the steps for this example are shown below. I begin with e=2 as 
the first bit is always 1. The notations P[1] and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa 
and ordinate values of the point P. Since MATLAB does not accept indices 
beginning from 0, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 1. 
The MATLAB script considers the first value from the left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the MATLAB script defines Left-to-Right in the For-Loop as “for 
i from 1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-
Loop in ECC algorithm from Left-to-Right is defined as “For i from t to 1 do”. 




a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 






    R=addell([W(1,1),W(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p) 
    W(2,:)=addell([W(1,1),W(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p) 
   if k(i)==1 
       u=2; 
   else 
       u=1; 
   end 
   n=W(u,:) 
   if n==R 
       d(i)=1; 
   else 
       d(i)=0; 
   end 
   W(2,:)=addell([W(1,1),W(1,2)],[P(1),P(2)],a4,a5,p) 
   W(1,:)=W(u,:) 





The results of the implementation program are:  
CoronLRArduino 
a =  
  arduino with properties: 




                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 
               Libraries: {'I2C', 'Servo', 'SPI'}p =257 
W(1 , :) = [8217, 8062]  % initial value for W(1,1) and W(1, 2) 
W(1 , :)= [7919        4758]  % Final value of W(1,1) and W(1,2)     
k = [1, d10, d9, … d2, d1] 
   = [ 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1] % retrieve secret key 
C.3.4 Implementation of Fault Point Attack against Right-to-Left 
Coron Algorithm 
Fault Point Attack against Right-to-Left Coron Algorithm 
The details of fault point attack against Right-to-Left Coron algorithm can be found 
in section 5.4.4. Algorithm C.3.4 shows the fault point attack against Right-to-Left 
Coron algorithm. 
Algorithm C.3.4 Fault Point Attack against Right-to-Left Coron Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. W(0)            O, R           P.  
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e          1. 
2. Use X as a fault point, e           1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of W(1) in addition operations. 
3. For i from 1 up to t do       
 3.1 G          W(0) +X. 
      3.2  If ki = 1 then 
         W(1)         W(0) + X. 
          End If. 
COMMENT: The loop stores the bits of k in order in the de. 
      3.3 If W(1) = G then 




            Else 
            di                 0. 
           End If.  
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in W(1) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in R 
      3.4 W(1)          R. 
      3.5 W(1)         W(0) + W(1). 
      3.6 W(0)          W(ki). 
      3.7   R          2R. 
      3.8 e           e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. set v          e-1. 
5. k= (dt, dt-1, . . . , d2, d1). 
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
I choose a curve :  
y2 = x3 + 2048 x2 + x with P = (131109, 34349), where k = 4790 and the field 
is GF(131111) where p = 131111. I arbitrarily choose a fault point 
X=(7919,126353).  
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, a4=13621, & a5=13162.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.3.4 are 
k="1001010110110" in binary form and the size of the secret key t= 13. The inputs 
by the attacker to algorithm C.3.4 are the P = (131109, 34349), the random fault 
value X=(7919,126353) and the curve GF(p) values where p=131111, a4=13621 & 
a5=13621. I assume that the secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored in 
the firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to 
them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
Implementation of algorithm C.3.4 in MATLAB code access register bits from 
Right-to-Left and the steps for this example are shown below. The notations P[1] 




MATLAB does not accept indices beginning from 0, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 
1. 
The MATLAB script considers the first value from left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the MATLAB script defines Right-to-Left in the For-Loop as “for 
i from t by -1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the 
For-Loop in ECC algorithm from Right-to-Left is defined as “For i from 1 to t do”. 
The implementation program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino ('COM5','Mega2560') 





   G=addell([W(1,1),W(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p) 
    if k(i)==1 
       u=2; 
   else 
       u=1; 
    end 
   if u==2 
       W(2,:)=addell([W(1,1),W(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p); 
   end 
    if W(2,:)==G 
       d(i)=1; 
   else 
       d(i)=0; 
    end 
   W(2,:)=R 
   W(2,:)=addell([W(1,1),W(1,2)],[W(2,1),W(2,2)],a4,a5,p); 
   W(1,:)=W(u,:) 
   R=multell([R(1),R(2)],2,a4,a5,p) 








The results of the implantation program are: 
CoronRLsecond_Arduino 
a =  
  arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 
               Libraries: {'I2C', 'Servo', 'SPI'}p =257 
W(1 , :) = [Inf, Inf]  % initial value for W(1,1) and W(1, 2) 
W(1 , :)= [16866, 26161]  % Final value of W(1,1) and W(1,2)     
k =  [d13, d12, d11, … d2, d1] 
   = [ 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0] % retrieve secret key 
C.3.5 Implementation of Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Joye-
Yen Algorithm 
Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Joye-Yen Algorithm 
The details of fault point attack against Left-to-Right Joye-Yen algorithm can be 
found in section 5.5.2. Algorithm C.3.5 shows the fault point attack against Left-
to-Right Joye algorithm. 
Algorithm C.3.5 Fault Point Attack against Left-to-Right Joye-Yen 
Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (1, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 




1. R(0)            O, R(1)           P. 
COMMENT: Assign key size counter label e           1. 
2. Use X as a fault point. e           1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
3. For i from t down to 1 do 
     3.1  G          R(0) +X. 
     3.2  T           R(¬ ke).          
     3.3  If ki = 1 then 
         R(¬ ki)         R(0) + X. 
          End If. 
COMMENT: The loop stores the bits of k in order in the (t)-tuple d. 
      3.4 If R(¬ ki) = G then 
           {di                  1. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(¬ ke) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in T. 
             R(¬ ki)           T. 
             Else 
             di           0. 
             End If.  
      3.5 R(¬ ki)          R(0) + R(1).    
      3.6  R(ki)          2 R(ki). 
      3.7  e           e+1. 
 End While loop. 
4. Set v          e-1. 
5. k= (dt, dt-1,  . . . , d2, d1). 
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
I choose a curve: 
y2 = x3 + 173541x + 109093 with P = (524345, 19732), where k=8892 and the field 
is GF(524347) where p=524347. I arbitrarily choose a fault point 
X=(524345,504615). 
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 




The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.3.5 are 
k="10001010111100" in binary form and the size of the secret key t= 14. The inputs 
by the attacker to algorithm C.3.5 are the P = (524345, 19732), the random fault 
value X=(524345,504615) and the curve GF(p) values where p=524347, a4=173541 
& a5=109093. I assume that the secret key k and size of the secret key t are stored 
in the firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to 
them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of ECC. 
Implementation of algorithm C.3.5 in MATLAB code access register bits from 
Left-to-Right and the steps for this example are shown below. The notations P[1] 
and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa and ordinate values of the point P. Since 
MATLAB does not accept indices beginning from 0, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 
1. 
The MATLAB script considers the first value from the left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the MATLAB script defines Left-to-Right in the For-Loop as “for 
i from 1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the For-
Loop in ECC algorithm from Left-to-Right is defined as “For i from t to 1 do”. 
The implementation program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 





G=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p)       
   if k(i)==1 
       u=2; 
   else 
       u=1; 
   end 
   if k(i)==1 
       z=1; 




       z=2; 
   end 
   T=R(z,:) 
   if u==2 
       R(z,:)=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p); 
   end 
   n=R(z,:) 
   if n==G 
       d(i)=1; 
   R(z,:)=T; 
   else 
       d(i)=0; 
   end 
   R(z,:)=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[R(2,1),R(2,2)],a4,a5,p) 
   R(u,:)=multell([R(u,1),R(u,2)],2,a4,a5,p) 






The results of the implementation program are: 
JoyeLRArduino 
R(1 , :) = [Inf, Inf]  % initial value for R(1,1) and R(1, 2) 
R(2 , :) = [524345, 19732]  % initial value for R(2,1) and R(2, 2) 
R(1 , :)= [383934  479120]  % Final value of R(1,1) and R(1,2)     
k = [d14, d13, d12, … d2, d1] 




C.3.6 Implementation of the Fault Point Attack against Right-to-Left 
Joye Algorithm 
Fault Point Attack against Right-to-Left Joye Algorithm 
The details of the fault point attack against Right-to-Left Joye algorithm can be 
found in section 5.5.4. Algorithm C.3.6 shows the fault point attack against Right-
to-Left Joye algorithm. 
Algorithm C.3.6 Fault Point Attack against the Right-to-Left Joye 
Algorithm 
Internal INPUT (loaded from firmware): k = (kt, kt-1,…, k1)2, t key size,  
INPUT by user: The elliptic curve E, its field Fq, point P on E (Fq) and Fault 
point X. 
OUTPUT: k in binary form and v size of secret key. 
1. R(0)           O, R(1)           P. 
COMMENT: Assign pointer label e          1. 
2. Use X as a fault point, e            1. 
COMMENT: Inject error by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
3. For i from 1 up to t do 
     3.1 b           1- ki. 
     3.2 R(b)         2 R(b). 
     3.3 G           R(0) + X.                      
     3.4 T             R(b). 
     3.5 R(b)               R(b)+ X . 
COMMENT: The loop stores the bits of k in order in the de. 
      3.6 If R(b) = G then 
            di            1. 
            Else 
            di            0. 
        End If. 
COMMENT: Eliminate the error in R(b) by replacing fault value by a value 
stored in T. 
     3.7 R(b)          T. 
     3.8 R(b)            R(b) + R(ke).  




 End While loop. 
4. set v          e-1. 
5. k= (dt, dt-1, . . . , d2, d1). 
 
Example of the Implementation Process 
I choose a curve :  
y2 = x3 + 427149x + 474895 with P = (2097209, 1489440), where k = 11469 
and the field is GF(2097211) where p = 2097211. I arbitrarily choose a fault 
point X =(2097209,607771). 
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
a1=0, a2=0, a3=0, a4=427149, & a5=474895.  
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to algorithm C.3.6 are 
k="10110011001101" in binary form and the size of the secret key t= 14. The inputs 
by the attacker to algorithm C.3.6 are the P = (2097209, 1489440), the random fault 
value X =(2097209,607771) and the curve GF(p) values where p = 2097211, 
a4=427149 & a5=474895. I assume that the secret key k and size of the secret key t 
are stored in the firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any 
access to them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k which is the secret key of 
ECC. 
Implementation of algorithm C.3.6 in MATLAB code access register bits from 
Right-to-Left and the steps for this example are shown below. The notations P[1] 
and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa and ordinate values of the point P. Since 
MATLAB does not accept indices beginning from 0, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 
1. 
The MATLAB script considers the first value from left when dealing with For-
Loop. Therefore, the MATLAB script defines Right-to-Left in the For-Loop as “for 
i from t by -1 to t do” where t represents the size of the secret key d. However, the 
For-Loop in ECC algorithm from Right-to-Left is defined as “For i from 1 to t do”. 
The implementation program in MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 








b=1-k(i)     
   if b==1 
       u=2; 
   else 
       u=1; 
   end 
   if k(i)==1 
       z=2; 
   else 
       z=1; 
   end 
    R(u,:)=multell([R(u,1),R(u,2)],2,a4,a5,p) 
   G=addell([R(1,1),R(1,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p)   
    T=R(u,:) 
    R(u,:)=addell([R(u,1),R(u,2)],[X(1),X(2)],a4,a5,p) 
   n=R(u,:) 
   if n==G 
       d(i)=1; 
   else 
       d(i)=0; 
   end 
   R(u,:)=T; 
   R(u,:)=addell([R(u,1),R(u,2)],[R(z,1),R(z,2)],a4,a5,p) 










R(1 , :) = [Inf, Inf]  % initial value for R(1,1) and R(1, 2) 
R(2 , :) = [2097209, 1489440]  % initial value for R(2,1) and R(2, 2) 
R(1 , :)= [971536       81621]  % Final value of R(1,1) and R(1,2)     
k = [d14, d13, d12, … d2, d1] 






















In this appendix I present screen shots for some operations on data EEPROM 




























I present here two implementation examples which show how I apply RSK 
proposed in chapter four against “Left-to-Right” and “Right-to-Left” RSA 
Montgomery algorithms with a private key size 3072 bits long digits. 
Example 1 
In the implementation of RSK against protected Montgomery Ladder RSA “Left-
















3913 and  


















12574002161, and  















8311 in decimal form. 






















































1111101000100011100010101001010101001000010111" and size of the secret 
key t= 3081. The inputs by the attacker to attack algorithm are the message g=222, 
the random fault value X=352 and modulus n which its value is given above. I 
assume that the secret key d and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware 
of the victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of 
this example is to retrieve d which is the secret key of RSA.. 
Since Maple does not accept indices beginning with 0, as in the binary left to right 
attack, we use 1, 2 instead of 0, 1 in the Maple code.  
The attack algorithm was implemented in Maple code, and the steps are shown 
below.  
Step1.    
> R[1] := 1; R[1] := 1 
> R[2] := g; R[2] := 222                          
Step2. 
> z=1; z=1 
Step3 
for i from 1 to t do 
     Step 3.1 
      if d[i] = "1" then b := 1 else b := 2 end if 
     Step 3.2 
      H: = R[b]*X mod n 
     Step 3.3 
     T := R[b] 




     if d[i] = "1" then  R[b] := R[b]*X mod n  end if 
      Step 3.5 
     if R[b] = H then  k[i] := 1; R[b] := T else k[i] := 0 end if 
    Step 3.6 
    if d[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1end if 
     R[b]:= R[b]*R[u] mod n 
    Step 3.7 
    R[u] := R[u]^2 mod n   
   Step 3.8 
    z := z+1 
End While loop 
Step 4 
 Set v          z-1 
Step 5 



















































Example 2  
In the implementation of RSK against protected Montgomery Ladder RSA “Right-



















6823,   



































27 in decimal form. 






















































10100111000001000010000001001010001100011" and size of the secret key t= 
3076. The inputs by the attacker to attack algorithm are the message g=260, the 
random fault value X=787 and modulus n which its value is given above. I assume 
that the secret key d and size of the secret key t are stored in the firmware of the 
victim device, and the attacker does not have any access to them. The goal of this 
example is to retrieve d which is the secret key of RSA.. 
Since Maple does not accept indices beginning from 0, as in the binary left to right 
attack, we use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 1 in the Maple code.  
The attack algorithm was implemented in Maple code, and the steps are shown 
below.  
Step1    
> R[1] := 1; R[1] := 1 
> R[2] := g; R[2] := 260                        
Step2 
> z=1; z=1 
Step3 
for i from t by -1 to 1 do 
     Step 3.1 
      if d[i] = "1" then b := 1 else b := 2 end if 
     Step 3.2 
      H: = R[b]*X mod n 
     Step 3.3 
     T := R[b] 
     Step 3.4 
     if d[i] = "1" then  R[b] := R[b]*X mod n  end if 
      Step 3.5 
     if R[b] = H then  k[i] := 1; R[b] := T else k[i] := 0 end if 
    Step 3.6 
    if d[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1end if 




    Step 3.7 
    R[b] := R[b]*R[u] mod n   
   
 Step 3.8 
    z := z+1 
End While loop 
Step 4 
 Set v          z-1 
Step 5 































































I present here two implementation examples to show how I apply a fault point attack 
proposed in chapter five against “Left-to- Right” and “Right-to-Left” Coron 
algorithms with a private key size 384 bits long digits. 
Example 1  
In this example I implement fault point attack against “Left-to- Right” Coron 
algorithm. 
I choose the field 
GF(39402006196394479212279040100143613805079739270465446667948293
404245721771497210611414266254884915640806627990307047)  
for the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 
279503974009108680717862289403158754920875853053263116892722308031
51023644068552761279886225476177281403352866529296 x + 
468874730229678858229705420347854345750284847257991630749736540585
7008329225735853833551903436306437780786411000956. 




68485388524198850095479870062155363105961434073471) given in affine 
form. My target is to find k, which I know in advance is 
312145579408803855624250154864117785886180357951470178931020154986
51020161929235784873730223985639746019018329134118 in base 10. I also 











Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
are:  












100011010001011100110110110101110011011011001010000100110" in binary 
form and the size of the secret key t= 384. The inputs by the attacker to attack 
algorithm are the point P, the random fault value X and the curve GF(p) with p, a4 
and a5 values which are given above. I assume that the secret key k and size of the 
secret key t are stored in the firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does 
not have any access to them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k which is the 
secret key of ECC. 
Implementation of attack algorithm in Maple code access register bits from left-to-
right and the steps for this example are shown below. I begin with e≡2 as the first 
bit is always 1. The notations P[1] and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa and 
ordinate values of the point P. Since Maple does not accept indices beginning from 
0, I use 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 1. 
Step 1 
W[1] := P; 
W[1] :=  














Inject error into Step 3 by using X instead of P in addition operations: 
Step 3 
for i from 1  to t -1 do      
  Step 3.1 
  W[1] := multell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], 2, a4, a5, p) 
  Step 3.2    
  R := addell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], [X[1], X[2]], a4, a5, p) 
  Step 3.3   
  W[2]:= addell([W[1][1],W[1][2]],[X[1],X[2]].a4,a5,p);  
  Step 3.4  
  if k[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1 end if;  
  n := W[u]; 
  if n = R then d[i] := "1" else d[i] := "0" end if 
 Step 3.5   
 W[2] := addell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], [P[1], P[2]], a4, a5, p) 
Step 3.6 





 e := e+1 
End of Step 3 
Step 4 









In this example I implement fault point attack against “Right-to-Left” Coron 
algorithm.  
I choose the field 
GF(32084455814733133929866525925776603080359232331786713678343824
090925198070759290328067047552719758075416655999797491) for the 

















04313715422898143252597969407268067751430146943437] given in affine 
form. My target is to find k, which is stored in the firmware of the victim device 
with value 
377142980861484771443397232925800706395029897715451815076746512408
10586220276942828529839697747780788088213766375431 in base 10.  
I set p ≡ 
320844558147331339298665259257766030803592323317867136783438240909
25198070759290328067047552719758075416655999797491.  
Referring to the general Weierstrass equation (1), the corresponding coefficients 
are:  











001101101101001001010111010100011110001111000100000000111" in binary 
form and the size of the secret key t= 384. The inputs by the attacker to attack 
algorithm are the point P, the random fault value X and the curve GF(p) with p, a4 
and a5 values which are given above. I assume that the secret key k and size of the 
secret key t are stored in the firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does 
not have any access to them. The goal of this example is to retrieve k which is the 
secret key of ECC. 
 The notations P[1] and P[2] refer respectively to the abscissa and ordinate values 
of the point P. Since Maple does not accept indices beginning from 0, I use 1 and 





W[1] := ["infinity", "infinity"]; W[1] := ["infinity", "infinity"] 
R := P; 
R :=  
[3208445581473313392986652592577660308035923233178671367834382\  










COMMENT: Inject error into Step 3 by using X instead of P in addition operations. 
e := 1; e := 1 
Step 3 
for i from t  by -1 to 1 do  : 
  Step 3.1 
     G := addell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], [X[1], X[2]], a4, a5, p) 
  Step 3.2    
if k[i] = "1" then u := 2 else u := 1 end if 
  if u = 2 then W[2] := addell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], [X[1], X[2]], a4, a5, p) end if 
  Step 3.3   
if W[2] = G then d[i] := "1" else d[i] := "0" end if 




  W[2] := R       
 Step 3.5   
 W[2] := addell([W[1][1], W[1][2]], [P[1], P[2]], a4, a5, p) 
Step 3.6 
 W[1] := W[u] 
Step 3.7 
   R := multell([R[1], R[2]], 2, a4, a5, p) 
Step 3.8 
 e := e+1 
End of Step 3 
Step 4 


















I demonstrate here two implementation examples which to how I apply FF attack 
proposed in chapter 4 against RSA-CRT signature protected by modified Shamir’s 
countermeasure and Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure algorithms by using 
Arduino Mega2560. This appendix shows how attacks can factorize the modulus n 
with size 3072 bits long digits on Arduino Mega2560 hardware device.  
Example 1 
In this example I implement FF attack against RSA-CRT signature protected by 
modified Shamir’s countermeasure. 


































573 and e=3  
















































































871. I also choose arbitrarily a small integer r=13 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to the attack algorithm are p, q d 
and 𝑖𝑞 values which are given above. The input enter by attacker to the attack 
algorithm 4.2 are the message M=23 and the random fault value X=66. I assume 
that p, q, d and 𝑖𝑞 are stored in firmware of the victim device, and the attacker does 
not have any access to them. The goal of this example is to compute q which has a 
partial factor of n=p*q. 
The implementation in program MATLAB 2017b is: 
a = arduino('COM5','Mega2560') 
pr=p*r; 
qr=q*r; 

















if mod(scrt,p)~= mod(spr,p) || mod(scrt,q)~= mod(sqr,q) disp('error'); end 
q=qt 
clear arduino 
clearvars  a; 
 
The results of the implementation program are: 
a =  
arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 

















































































































































































In this example I implement FF attack against RSA-CRT signature protected by 
Simplified Vigilant’s Countermeasure algorithms. 

























































































































































7. I also choose arbitrarily a small integer r=28 
The internal inputs (loaded from the firmware) to the attack are p, q, dp, dq and 𝑖𝑞 
values which are given above. The inputs by the attacker to the attack algorithm are 




𝑖𝑞 are stored in the firmware in victim device, and attacker does not have any access 
to them. The goal of this example is to compute q which has a factor of n=p*q.  
The implementation in program MATLAB 2017b is: 



































clearvars  a; 
The results of the implementation program are: 
a =  
arduino with properties: 
                    Port: 'COM5' 
                   Board: 'Mega2560' 
           AvailablePins: {'D2-D53', 'A0-A15'} 
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Mq =  
55 
  














































































































   

































































































































   

































   
qt =  
464768479629596645028760202664365949654958014109031618932918892182
976298479768818058986883562649472580106092620398441395519242367563
203769733030853774962592082568931176515239907523988079124130176019
581264563344991578374443201928386238126749550521783388896702323581
591419458060139046158365504904766330040906647459481564302785304510
526412948816019799405475852019401224355966175008330914299086479213
804125914731700466429312473200069571498564257485346603623288632297
826530731087966912535226076778014995773524763264400984816771120940
 
243 
 
059900801367628858738795660593301839588481064689356682396664374210
961534527527082267604902869111861741076583590683731110364344929235
715706415940350587201303364567260094042711052953518983647322522935
896103381414837241395033263265852387570782420808231337442599631686
003351958841104890158184598317525988563496857292009705273761964540
739299121052233576876517472510355433195329148568633157005386375527
53 
  
cs = 
1 
  
q = 
464768479629596645028760202664365949654958014109031618932918892182
976298479768818058986883562649472580106092620398441395519242367563
203769733030853774962592082568931176515239907523988079124130176019
581264563344991578374443201928386238126749550521783388896702323581
591419458060139046158365504904766330040906647459481564302785304510
526412948816019799405475852019401224355966175008330914299086479213
804125914731700466429312473200069571498564257485346603623288632297
826530731087966912535226076778014995773524763264400984816771120940
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